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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When Alan Greenspan stepped down as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Fed) in early 2006, he was widely hailed as the world’s most important and 
successful monetary policymaker.1 He had resided over 19 years of low, stable inflation and 
robust growth, only interrupted by two relatively mild and short-lived recessions. 
Increasingly, market participants and politicians had put their faith in this one man, and his 
small band of monetary brothers at the Federal Open Market Committee—the main decision-
making body of the Fed—to ensure the stability of the economy. Bob Woodward of the 
Washington Post dubbed him the “Maestro” in a best-selling biography.2 
Convening at the annual Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium at Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming in late August 2005, central bankers and economists from around the world 
discussed the legacy of the soon departing chairman. Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reis, two 
prominent American macroeconomists, stated that Greenspan “has a legitimate claim to being 
the greatest central banker who ever lived. His performance as chairman of the Fed has been 
impressive, encompassing, and overwhelmingly beneficial—to the nation, to the institution, 
and to the practice of monetary policy.”3  
Central banking expert John B. Taylor concurred: “No matter what metric you use, the 
Greenspan era gets exceedingly high marks for economic performance.” He pointed to the 
“price stability” and “economic stability” that had characterized the U.S. economy under the 
chairman’s watch. Moreover, he stressed the principled way the Greenspan FOMC had 
conducted policy: 
“[M]onetary policy decisions under Alan Greenspan’s leadership have been guided by a clear 
set of monetary policy principles. Good judgment and leadership have been essential to 
implementing these principles, but the principles are by no means a secret. These principles, 
along with their judicious implementation, are a major reason for the extraordinary economic 
performance during the Greenspan era.”4 (Emphasis added.) 
The principles in question were those in line with his own “Taylor Rule,” a set of guidelines 
for how central banks should make use of their main policy lever—the manipulation of some 
sort of short-term interest rate—in order to influence its main policy goals—the desired 
                                                      
1 Economist, “Danger time for America” and “Monetary Myopia,” January 12, 2006 
2 Bob Woodward, Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed and the American Boom, Simon & Schuster, 2000 
3 Alan S. Blinder and Ricardo Reis, ”Understanding the Greenspan Fed,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 
2005, p. 13 
4 John B. Taylor, ”Commentary: Understanding the Greenspan Fed,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 
2005, p. 107-108 
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growth rate of inflation and output.5 The Taylor framework is based on the observation that 
stable growth in average consumer prices was closely associated with economic stability 
during the Greenspan years. The operating “rule” was in fact an attempt to formalize the track 
record of the chairman, and could thus be seen as both descriptive of actual monetary 
policymaking as well as prescriptive of how policy should be conducted.6 
Thus this “rule” points to major elements of the monetary doctrines that informed Fed 
practices during the Greenspan years. The overall consensus that emerged during this period 
was one of a “Great Moderation”—two decades of almost unprecedented macroeconomic 
stability—in part ascribed to the stabilizing influences of central bankers and their pursuit of 
“price stability.”7 Other core beliefs contributed to the emerging consensus as well, such as 
notions of a “natural” rate of unemployment, the role of expectations among market 
participants, and strong-held views on how central bankers should respond to large-scale 
fluctuations in asset prices. These core beliefs, how they evolved and in what ways they 
contributed to shape the practice of policy is the topic of this study. An investigation into the 
development of monetary policy during this period leads to the following question:  
How did U.S. monetary doctrines and practices evolve during the Great Moderation, and 
which main factors contributed in shaping these developments? 
To shed light on this important question, three central episodes of monetary practice will be 
given ample attention. The first episode culminated with the 1994 FOMC decision to prevent 
an upward tick in inflation, even though no such inflationary pressures were apparent in 
indicators of consumer price growth at the time these actions were taken. The second episode 
was FOMC decisions in the late 1990s on occasion to discontinue the practice of raising rates 
when indicators of strong growth and tight labor markets suggested the need to cool down the 
economy. The third episode was the 2003 FOMC decision to take out an “insurance policy” 
towards a potential, but unlikely, downside risk of deflation. Whereas the first episode 
involved an act of preemptive monetary tightening, the third episode represented the opposite, 
a move towards preemptive monetary easing. The second episode falls somewhere in 
between, and can be seen as a transitional step towards a new policy regime. 
                                                      
5 John B. Taylor, “Discretion versus policy rules in practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy 39, 1993, pp. 195-214 
6 As pointed out by Blinder and Reis: “But, of course, Taylor’s original parameters were not intended 
to set a standard of fine-tuning. In fact, they were intended to capture the behavior of Alan Greenspan.” 
Blinder and Reis, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2005, pp. 33-34 
7 The Economist dubbed central bankers “heroes of the zeroes,” alluding to the attainment of low and 
stable inflation during the Great Moderation. Economist, “Heroes of the Zeroes,” October 18, 2007 
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The working hypothesis of the investigation at hand is that these episodes represent major 
shifts in U.S. monetary doctrines and practices—from a focus on preemptive tightening, in 
order to fully contain inflation, to an approach characterized by a systematic bias towards 
preemptive easing whenever certain “downside risks” appear on the horizon. 
What caused this shift? During the early years of Greenspan’s tenure, the fight against 
inflation was still not seen as perfectly secured. The wish to build reputational capital as 
credible inflation fighters was high on the list of priorities. However, as the Great Moderation 
became entrenched in the minds of policymakers and monetary economists, the gains were 
perceived as more permanently realized. At the same time, new challenges arose both within 
the domestic economy and stemming from abroad. 
It will be argued that perceived threats was a main contributing factor to the development of 
the doctrines informing monetary practices of this period. The stance towards preemptive 
tightening was motivated by the lessons drawn from the Great Inflation of the 1970s and early 
80s. However, during the 1990s and early 2000s, the familiar inflationary foe was gradually 
surpassed by two other major concerns of which the Fed had less experience—a fear of 
financial fallouts and a fear of deflation. Both emanated from observed real time events, 
notably a period of global financial turbulence and certain unsettling economic developments 
taking place in the world’s second largest economy, Japan. 
 
The Role of Ideas 
This study starts off from one basic assumption, namely that ideas matter and that to 
understand the evolution of economic policy, one needs to investigate the core beliefs of the 
historical actors involved. This is not to say that external constraints do not matter—they 
do—but that in the final analysis no policies could ever be formulated if decision-makers do 
not possess some basic model of how the world works and formulate cogent thoughts on how 
policy instruments could be made use of to influence the goals aimed at.8 One major 
argument developed through subsequent analysis and discussion is that U.S. monetary 
doctrines largely evolved in reaction to lessons drawn from historical experiences. The 
analysis emphasizes the intellectual response to these experiences among leading actors who 
                                                      
8 Central banking researcher (and former practitioner) Alan Blinder makes a similar point in stressing 
that “some kind of model—however informal—is necessary to do policy, for otherwise how can you 
even begin to estimate the effects of changes in policy instruments?” Alan S. Blinder, Central Banking 
in Theory and Practice, MIT Press, 1999, p. 7 
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sought to refine and sometimes redefine models of the world they were trying to come to 
grips with. 
Such a view highlights the role of ideas in economic decision-making and how they feed into 
the performance of modern economies. The British economist John Maynard Keynes 
famously wrote that the “ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else.” He added that decision-makers engaged in practical politics are 
“usually the slaves of some defunct economist” and that those in authority are “distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”9 
In an anthology exploring how the ideas of Keynes gained influence in various industrial 
countries, Peter A. Hall outlines three different analytical approaches to investigating the 
development of economic doctrines and policy practices. The first one is “economist-
centered” in that it analyzes this issue mainly as a problem of explaining how new ideas gain 
acceptance among members of the economics profession. In the present study, a chapter 
exploring the evolution of macroeconomic understanding will largely make use of such an 
approach. A second perspective is labeled “state-centered,” and sees evolving doctrines as a 
way to solve the administrative puzzles associated with conducting policy.10 This study can 
be seen as following such a strategy, which seems to correspond well with Greenspan’s 
understanding of the policymaking process. Hall points out that how readily new ideas will be 
accepted in large part depends “on the way those ideas relate to the economic and political 
problems of the day.”11 Prominent Fed officials spent considerable time contemplating 
economic events unfolding around them, trying to make sense of the world. In response, new 
doctrines were formed and new monetary practices followed. 
The third approach, which Hall labels “coalition-centered,” embeds the analysis in a wider 
social context, giving attention to how politicians and voters influence the policy process. 
This context will largely be left aside, though it is important in its own right and should be a 
worthy pursuit for other studies. Monetary doctrines can be seen as strategies of policy 
formulation and communication within a democratic setting, finding ways to shield the 
central bank from external pressure, at the same time gaining recognition for its importance. 
                                                      
9 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Classic Books 
America, 2009 [originally published in 1936], p. 331 
10 Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, Princeton 
University Press, 1989, pp. 8-13 
11 Peter A. Hall, “Conclusion,” in Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power, 1989, p. 369 
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In approximating the second outlined approach, most attention will be given to doctrinal 
developments in light of policymakers’ pursuit of a satisfactory framework for conducting 
policy, informed both by lessons learned from monetary experiences as well as from the 
emerging academic debate. 
In the postwar years, Keynes would himself become one of those academic scribblers 
informing policymakers on how to conduct policy, more specifically policy aimed at 
stabilizing the economy on a macro level through the conduct of deliberate “aggregate 
demand management.” The original policy levers envisioned for this government task was the 
discretionary use of taxing and spending decisions to influence the overall level of investment 
and consumption in the economy, thus ensuring a desired level of output and employment. 
Thus high hopes were placed on the shoulders of fiscal policymakers to smooth out economic 
fluctuations. Several governments in the industrial countries would design policies aimed at 
“governing the economy” based on Keynesian policy-prescriptions.12 In the U.S., such 
policies were forcefully pursued by the Kennedy-Johnson administration (1961-69). Rather 
than delivering the promised stability and improved economic performance, postwar 
aggregate demand management ended up in a highly unstable episode of accelerating 
inflation, weak performance and widespread uncertainty, both to the policy regime as well as 
the general economic outlook. 
The Great Inflation (c.1965-85) led to soul-searching among macroeconomists and profound 
revisions of economic policymaking. In the early 1980s, Fed Chairman Paul Volcker (1979-
1987) sought to rein in monetary excesses. His successor Alan Greenspan (1987-2006) 
seemed determined to finish the job.13 Inflation, depending on how it is measured, was 
somewhere around 4 percent during the first year of Greenspan’s chairmanship, 3 percent a 
decade later, and just above 2 percent at the time of his departure in 2006.14 Having finally 
caged the “inflation dragon,” other issues entered policy discussions at the Fed.15 Greenspan 
would develop a new style of policymaking, which he dubbed the Fed’s “risk management 
paradigm.” Such an approach stressed flexibility and the need to weigh potential threats 
against each other by assessing the potential damage should such developments come to pass.  
                                                      
12 Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, 
Oxford University Press, 1986 
13 Richard Timberlake, Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History, 
University of Chicago Press, 1993, pp. 390-91 
14 Blinder and Reis, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2005, p. 30 
15 “[D]uring the 1980s and 1990s most industrial-country central banks were able to cage, if not 
entirely tame, the inflation dragon. Although a number of factors converged to make this happy 
outcome possible, an essential element was the heightened understanding by central bankers and, 
equally as important, by political leaders and the public at large of the very high costs of allowing the 
economy to stray too far from price stability.” Ben S. Bernanke, “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t 
Happen Here,” remarks before the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2002 
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The Preemption Doctrine 
The picture that emerges from this analysis is that monetary doctrines evolved from a 
predominant concern with inflation and monetary tightening to a concern with a wide range 
of threats, including incipient deflation and financial stress. The understanding of challenges 
emanating from domestic and global economic developments increasingly led the Fed to 
formulate a doctrine of preemptive easing—the idea that the monetary authorities should cut 
interest rates and inject liquidity into the banking system to stave off potential threats to the 
short-term stability of the economy, even before they turned into actual threats. 
In some sense, monetary preemption could be seen as a corollary to the contemporaneous 
“Bush doctrine,” the notion that U.S. authorities should nip potential security threats in the 
bud. Both doctrines would come to define crucial aspects of government interventions, one in 
the foreign political sphere the other in the domestic economic sphere. 
The monetary preemption doctrine and the underlying set of assumptions it rested upon 
evolved in response to experiences with events taking place both domestically and in the 
global economy. Reflecting upon these developments in the late 1990s, Greenspan stated: 
“For monetary policy to foster maximum sustainable economic growth, it is useful to preempt 
forces of imbalance before they threaten economic stability.” (Emphasis added.) Such a 
stance did not involve leaning against asset prices when stock markets were booming, or 
confronting other imbalances as they were building up, but rather to contain the fallout from 
financial distress, even before it materialized. Such a strategy would, it was hoped, minimize 
the costs to the economy: “When we can be preemptive we should be, because modest 
preemptive actions can obviate the need of more drastic actions at a later date that could 
destabilize the economy.”16 
These beliefs drew upon previous historical lessons. The pain of the Great Depression was 
attributed to policy mistakes in the wake of the Wall Street crash. In contrast, in 1987 
Greenspan had contained a stock market collapse that left the economy largely unscarred. The 
conclusion was that the consequences of bubbles “need not be catastrophic for the 
economy”—that is, if the fallout is contained.17 
 
 
                                                      
16 Alan Greenspan, “Monetary policy and the economic outlook,” Testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, June 17, 1999 
17 Greenspan, “Monetary policy and the economic outlook,” 1999 
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Delineating the Period under Investigation 
The period under investigation is delineated by the developments for monetary policymaking 
that emerged after the Great Inflation loosened its grip on the economy in the mid-80s and up 
to the Great Panic and Recession that erupted towards the end of the 2000s. The roughly two 
decades in between could, in line with economist Hyman Minsky, perhaps be described as a 
“period of tranquility,” in which macroeconomic volatility substantially subsided and 
inflation trended downwards to its lowest level in close to a generation.18 However, at closer 
inspection, there were several troubling signs surfacing, especially in the latter part of this 
period. These two decades largely coincide with Greenspan’s tenure as Fed chairman, and 
could be referred to as the “Greenspan era” (1987-2006).19 
After exploring the implications of the Great Moderation and the fight against inflation, the 
investigation will focus in on the latter part of the Greenspan years, when a new direction to 
monetary practices became increasingly apparent—a period that could perhaps, in following 
the former Fed Chairman, be labeled the “Age of Turbulence.”20 From 1997, monetary 
policymakers were faced with a whole new set of challenges, most of which were related to 
developments taking place in domestic and global financial markets.  
A taste of things to come was Greenspan’s baptism of fire, the “Black Monday” stock market 
crash of October 1987, only a few weeks after he took office. This episode suggested the 
dangers of what could happen when domestic asset markets underwent unsustainable booms, 
necessitating a substantial market correction. It also suggested that determined monetary 
policymakers could contain the fallout of financial distress by rapid injections of liquidity and 
assurances “to support the economic and financial system.”21 
To return to the Bush preemption doctrine analogy, not unlike the first Gulf War, it would 
seem that the perceived success of determined government intervention gave rise to more 
ambitious approaches to policy. As with operation “Desert Storm,” the Fed’s rescue operation 
in 1987 would not materialize in a consistent set of practices until a decade later, when 
policymakers were faced with a new set of perceived threats to their overarching goal of 
stability—be it geopolitically or economically. 
As with national security issues, in the economic sphere several of these threats were 
identified abroad. An early warning sign was the “Tequila” crisis of 1994, when stress in the 
                                                      
18 Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, McGraw Hill, 2008, p. 197 
19 Blinder and Reis, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2005, p. 12 
20 Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Penguin Press, 2007 
21 Public statement by the Fed, quoted in Greenspan, Age of Turbulence, 2007, p. 108 
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market for Mexican government debt nearly led to sovereign default. The U.S. government, 
acting with the Fed in an advisory role, intervened, creating a precedent for large-scale 
bailouts that would weigh heavily in subsequent global financial developments. Moral hazard 
seems to have played its part when U.S. and European banks deemed it safe to lend 
substantial amounts of short-term money to emerging markets in Asia. Similar assessments 
pertained to Russia, thought to be “too nuclear too fail.”22 The Mexican crisis was thus a 
forerunner to the much more destabilizing and contagious Asian crisis of 1997-98, setting off 
a wave of currency crises and defaults around the world, finally coming to an end with the 
Brazilian and Argentinean crises at the turn of the century. In the words of Greenspan, the 
Asian crisis, and especially the Russian default, was a “rude awakening.”23 
Other threats loomed on the horizon as well. A Y2K scare caused some concern, as many 
people came to believe that computer systems worldwide could crash, not being able to tune 
into the next millennium. Soon thereafter, one of the most dramatic financial busts in history 
happened inside the U.S. itself as equity markets plunged with the bursting of the dotcom 
bubble. Following on its heels, the terror attacks on the financial heart of the U.S.—the World 
Trade Center in New York City—created concerns that an already weakened economy could 
be pushed further into recession. 
All of these considerations came together in the FOMC decision to preemptively ease policy 
by pushing down U.S. short-term money market rates to historical low levels and keep them 
there for an extended period of time during the first half of the 2000s.  
 
Historiography 
The period in question has been widely discussed and researched among macroeconomists 
working within academia, international policy institutions and at the Federal Reserve itself. 
Much attention has been directed to explaining the apparent stabilizing and beneficial 
developments taking place within the economy, associated with the Great Moderation. Parts 
of this literature will be treated as primary sources, that is, records of how those shaping the 
evolving consensus thought about the problems at hand and how this informed the emerging 
monetary practices. 
                                                      
22 Robert Hetzel, The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History, Cambridge University Press, 
2008, pp. 206-215 
23 Alan Greenspan, “Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook,” Testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, June 17, 1999 
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Few researchers have taken a bird’s eye view, analyzing these intellectual developments from 
without, and the literature that does exist usually stops short at developments sometime in the 
1990s. Robert Hetzel, a senior economist at the Research Department of the Richmond Fed, 
covers the history of U.S. monetary policy in the 20th century. He traces the “grand monetary 
experiment” of moving from a gold standard at the beginning of the century to pure fiat 
money at the end. In his assessment, pure paper money initially spurred a period of instability. 
Eventually a new “nominal anchor” was found in the “Volcker-Greenspan monetary 
standard,” emerging in the 80s and early 90s.24  
Hetzel contends that the “U.S. monetary standard has evolved pragmatically rather than by 
conscious design”—as a result of attempts by the Volcker and Greenspan FOMC to “reanchor 
inflationary expectations” and establish a policy framework free of the disturbing stop-go 
policies of the past. This consistent approach paid off in the form of increased central bank 
credibility and the restoration of the “expectational stability” ascribed to the gold standard.  
The story does not end here. Hetzel hypothesizes that “Greenspan pursued price stability as a 
‘provisionally’ desirable long-run objective until the Asia crisis.”25 After that, policy 
objectives changed. Actions undertaken in 1998 did, in his assessment, not point towards any 
intentions on the part of the FOMC to preserve price stability. As a result, inflation 
expectations moved significantly up and down.26  
This analysis seems to imply that policy became more expansionary after 1997 because the 
FOMC was more concerned with other issues, related to episodes of financial distress. 
Moreover, inflation had at this point in time reached a low level. Hetzel’s analysis of the 
development of Fed practices is colored by his specific set of theoretical lenses, those of 
monetarism. Thus in his assessment, the Fed failed on several accounts to push for “price 
stability,” defined as zero inflation. He does not venture into a deeper investigation of the 
intellectual developments underpinning these policy shifts, nor scrutinize the theoretical case 
they rest upon. 
Likewise, Richard Timberlake, a retired professor of economics and finance at the University 
of Georgia, sees the quest for price level stability as a “road not taken,” thinking that the 
“FOMC’s performance in the mid-1980s is an example of a golden opportunity not 
grasped.”27 He attempts at an encompassing intellectual and institutional history of U.S. 
                                                      
24 Robert Hetzel, Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History, Cambridge University Press, 
2008, p. 1 
25 Hetzel, Monetary Policy, 2008, p. 197 
26 Hetzel, Monetary Policy, 2008, p. 224 
27 Timberlake, Monetary Policy, 1993, p. 389 
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monetary policy from a monetarist perspective. He covers the 19th as well as 20th centuries, 
but barely enters into the period presently under investigation and only briefly discusses the 
role of price stabilization under Greenspan. Published in 1993, the book does not foresee the 
new directions that would emerge in response to concerns with financial instability or 
deflation in the decade to come.28 
Writing from a New Keynesian (NK) perspective, macroeconomists Christina and David 
Romer have commented upon the “evolution of economic understanding and postwar 
stabilization policy,” tracking developments from the 1950s till the end of the century. They 
start out from the hypothesis that stabilization policy, as practiced in the United States, 
underwent two major shifts in the postwar period. They attribute these shifts not to changing 
policy goals, but rather to changes in economic understanding. In their assessment, policy 
went off track during the Great Inflation, but was substantially improved during the Great 
Moderation due to a better understanding of how the economy works and what can 
realistically be achieved through the use of macroeconomic policy. 
In contrast to Timberlake and Hetzel, telling a monetarist tale, the Romers see the evolution 
of stabilization policy as confirming the NK understanding as it formed during the Great 
Moderation. They write that the ”end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s saw the 
emergence of an important new consensus among policymakers about the functioning of the 
economy and the effects of policy.”29 This new consensus is largely in line with today’s 
textbook model of the macro-economy, seen in light of the “natural-rate hypothesis,” which 
rejects the notion of a trade-off between unemployment and inflation in the long run and 
which assesses the implied policy trade-off in the short run in more realistic terms.  
One notable shortcoming of their analysis, from the perspective of this study, is that it was 
written during the period under investigation and within the perspective of those forming the 
consensus currently under investigation. However, this could of course also be a major 
strength, all depending on how this literature is made use of. Their analysis and the 
perspectives involved can inform later researchers on how major actors within the field of 
monetary policy debate, such as the Romers themselves, looked upon developments during 
this period, and which cues they took from history in formulating their own beliefs. Since 
exploring how specific lessons drawn from history contributed in shaping the policy regime is 
a major task of this investigation, their narrative is of great interest to understand how 
doctrines were formed. 
                                                      
28 Timberlake, Monetary Policy, 1993 
29 Christina Romer and David Romer, “The Evolution of Economic Understanding and Postwar 
Stabilization Policy,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 33 
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The Romers hold that “[t]he central features of policy-makers beliefs have undergone 
remarkably little change over the past twenty years.”30 The present investigation attempts to 
cast this statement into doubt, instead arguing that policymakers’ understandings have in fact 
undergone major changes, reflecting economic experiences and the lessons drawn during the 
Great Moderation. The Romers acknowledge the change in policy practices represented by 
actions to preempt inflation in the 1990s, but do not touch upon the issue of preemptive 
easing, which emerged more clearly in the early 2000s. Moreover, their overall assessment is 
one of continuity, thinking that policymaking had come “full circle” when comparing beliefs 
at the beginning and end of their period of investigation (1950-2000), interrupted by “an 
extended detour” during the Great Inflation.31 
The scope of the Romer analysis is largely confined to the emerging views on unemployment, 
inflation and the efficacy of aggregate demand management in controlling both. They stress 
that “[m]onetary policymakers have remained passionate in their views  of  the  harms  of  
inflation.”32 What is largely left out of the picture, are the understandings among historical 
actors of other issues emerging in this period—issues that would have important implications 
for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Writing from a somewhat more heterodox position, macroeconomist and former Fed Vice 
Chairman Alan Blinder, who could perhaps be labeled an “Old” Keynesian, offers some 
insights to these other issues. Along with co-author Ricardo Reis, he presents an interesting 
analysis of the “Greenspan standard,” though their assessments at times seem a bit panegyric, 
as testified by the quote at the beginning of this chapter.33 Blinder and Reis seem content that 
most policy actions were the right ones, leaving little scope for a critical review of the former 
chairman’s track record.  
It would seem that most writers as well as monetary policymakers were blindsided by the 
apparent stability of the Great Moderation, thus underplaying destabilizing forces that could 
emerge, upsetting the balance of the economy and policymaking within it. In the words of one 
influential researcher, New Keynesian Olivier Blanchard, the “great moderation lulled 
                                                      
30 Romer and Romer, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 36 
31 “Despite these changes at the end of the century, the analysis of the narrative record for the postwar 
era fundamentally leaves one with the sense that policymakers’ beliefs have almost come full circle. 
Both in the 1950s and in the 1980s and 1990s, the key features of policymakers’ model of the economy 
were a realistic view of sustainable unemployment and a conviction that inflation was very costly.” 
Romer and Romer, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 39 
32 Romer and Romer, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 36 
33 They concede to “some possible negative aspects of the Greenspan legacy […] though not many,” 
mainly questioning the “wisdom of a central bank head taking public positions on political issues 
unrelated to monetary policy” and whether the “extreme personalization of monetary policy under 
Greenspan has undercut his ability to pass any ‘capital’ on to his successor […]” Blinder and Reis, 
Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2005, p. 13 
 12 
macroeconomists and policymakers alike in the belief that we knew how to conduct 
macroeconomic policy.”34 With the benefit of hindsight, as the Great Moderation came to a 
close with the dramatic events at the end of the 2000s, yesteryear’s certainties do not appear 
that certain anymore. Thus, reassessing the doctrines of this period and the practices they 
informed, seen from without the consensus that prevailed at the time, seem like a worthwhile, 
not to say necessary, endeavor. 
 
Primary Sources and Historical Actors 
In order to assess the development of monetary doctrines and practices, an investigation into 
actual policy decisions will be accompanied by exploring sources that could hopefully reveal 
the underlying worldviews informing policymakers. In the words of Romer and Romer, 
“[p]olicymakers are often required (or simply desire) to explain the motivations of their 
policy actions.”35 A prime example is Greenspan, who on numerous occasions, including 
frequent testimonies before congressional committees, set out to explain his beliefs and the 
historical developments that contributed in shaping them. In a similar manner, his 2007 
autobiography seems to be motivated by the desire to retrospectively explain his evolving 
worldview and the rationale behind FOMC decisions during his tenure as Fed Chairman.36  
A usual drawback of such memoirs is that the understandings and beliefs of the actor in 
question could be colored by later developments. In the case of Greenspan, his accounts were 
formulated shortly after leaving office and before his “whole intellectual edifice” collapsed, 
in light of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007.37 Hence the beliefs expressed are much in 
line with what he held at the time as chairman, though they are undoubtedly shaped by 
experiences during his long-lasted tenure and could thus be more representative of his 
understandings towards the end of this period. 
Still, this source is useful in that it points to several key issues preoccupying the chairman as 
well as voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee during the period under 
investigation. The importance of these issues are confirmed by other studies and, more 
importantly, contemporaneous sources. Key sources in this regard are records of what was 
discussed at the time of decision-making as well as various statements of main actor’s beliefs. 
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By analyzing the views of policymakers “about the economic conditions and relationships 
that warranted policy actions, it is often possible to get a sense of policymakers’ 
understanding of the economy at the time decisions were made.”38 
Important sources in this regard are statements of the Fed Chairman before Congressional 
committees responsible for monetary oversight. These statements accompanied semi-annual 
monetary policy reports to Congress, mandated by the Humphrey-Hawkins act of 1978. The 
documents related to these reports and the hearings that surrounded them will thus be referred 
to as Humphrey-Hawkins in the subsequent analysis. 
Policy decisions and discussions can be accessed in the written records of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC), published by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Key sources are 
the minutes of FOMC meetings, which provide a “summary of significant policy issues 
addressed by meeting participants” and record all FOMC decisions “with respect to these 
policy issues and explain the reasoning behind these decisions”—according to the stated 
intentions of the Federal Reserve Board.39  
Before 1993, the minutes were published in two separate documents, the Record of Policy 
Actions and the Minutes of Action. From February 1993, the Minutes were usually published 
three days after the subsequent FOMC meeting. Starting in December 2004, this time lag was 
shortened to three weeks, thus being published in advance of the subsequent FOMC meeting. 
Transparency was given an additional push by publishing explicit statements of FOMC policy 
intentions at the close of each meeting. In February 1994, the FOMC made its first move 
towards announcing its key policy decisions. This procedure was formalized the year after; 
from now on “all changes in the stance of monetary policy would be immediately 
communicated to the public.” A new breakthrough on the road to disclosure came in January 
2000, when the committee announced “it would issue a statement following each scheduled 
meeting, regardless of whether there had been a change in monetary policy.”40 
These statements are helpful in analyzing the policy records, as they can point to key 
decisions and the main rationale behind them. Moreover, starting in May 1999, the FOMC 
consistently revealed its policy “bias” in its issued statements. In February 2000, the “bias” 
was replaced with a “balance of risks” sentence, “stating whether the FOMC was more 
concerned with ‘heightened inflationary pressures’ or ‘economic weakness’ (or neither) in 
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‘the foreseeable future.’”41 In other words, the “balance of risks” statement refers to whether 
the FOMC was more concerned with the “upside” risk of inflation and overheating or the 
“downside” risk of too low inflation and a drop in activity. 
Blinder and Reis cite May 1999 as “a watershed in the history of the Fed’s reluctant 
peregrination toward transparency.”42 This direction would seem to be important for the 
efficacy and legitimacy of policy. Nonetheless, it brings with it some challenges in assessing 
the motivations of historical actors. Before initiating new disclosure practices, FOMC 
decisions were mired in secrecy. Monetary policymakers, relieved of potential public scrutiny 
in the aftermath of committee meetings, would likely have felt more free to express their 
concerns and opinions. As the FOMC has become more transparent, discussing the issues at 
hand is done in a context in which members must be prepared to defend their views against 
outside criticism. FOMC records could thus become less reliable as a source of the actors’ 
underlying motivations and outlooks. 
Supporting sources, though inhering the same shortcomings as the Minutes, are the full 
transcripts of FOMC meetings, which more closely show the verbatim arguments made by 
FOMC members during policy deliberation. These will be drawn upon when necessary. 
Policy records will be annotated Minutes, Statement, and Transcript. These citations will 
mostly figure in footnotes. (Minutes and Statements do not come with page numbering.) 
Another set of indispensible sources is, of course, official statistics collected by the central 
bank. Most of the monetary data can be accessed through the FRED database of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (cited as St. Louis Fed, FRED). Relevant data include 
comprehensive time series on the monetary policy rate (the federal funds target rate), 
monetary aggregates (such as base money, M1, and M2), bond rates (such as the yield on 
government securities) and consumer prices (core and headline inflation). 
These statistics show some of the underlying data policymakers make use of in assessing the 
state of the economy, as well as the trajectory of the main policy instrument, the fed funds rate. 
However, most attention will be directed at the narrative record, pointing to a wide range of 
actors influencing the policy process, either directly through policy prescriptions or indirectly 
by contributing to the beliefs of decision-makers. For the sake of simplicity, these actors can be 
placed along two axes—one reflecting whether they are consensus builders or consensus 
critics, the other whether they are operating within the monetary policy circle or assessing 
policy from without. This leads to a typology of four kinds of actors, as described in table 1. 
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Table 1.1 Typology of Historical Actors 
 Consensus builders Consensus critics 
Fed officials Most policymakers within the Fed, 
including the Board of Governors and 
its Chairman 
Some few critics among FOMC voting 
members, especially among the more 
independent regional Fed Presidents 
Non-Fed 
officials 
Academic economists contributing to 
the emerging consensus 
Economists in international institutions 
contributing to the emerging consensus 
Academic economists criticizing Fed 
practices 
Economists in international institutions 
criticizing Fed practices 
 
Consensus builders are those who contribute to constructing core beliefs during the period 
under investigation. Critics are those who challenge some or most of the beliefs forming the 
prevailing consensus. The second distinction relates to whether actors are within or outside 
the policy circle. The insiders are actors actively engaging in policy deliberation at the central 
bank, notably the voting members of the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC). This 
committee is the main monetary decision-making body within the Fed, setting short-term 
targets for the federal funds rate—the main policy instrument. The FOMC consists of the 
Board of Governors, including the Chairman of the Board, as well as the Presidents of the 
twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. Only five presidents serve as voting members at a 
time on a revolving basis, with the head of the New York Fed as a permanent voting member. 
Core beliefs among leading Fed officials, notably the voting members of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, including the appointed Fed Governors, can also be traced through the 
manifold speeches and testimonies given at frequent intervals. Most attention will be given to 
actors identified as leading architects of the emerging doctrines. Alan Greenspan would seem 
to be the major candidate. He has been described as a dominating force in FOMC meetings. 
In his own words, however, he stresses the fact that the “chairman has less unilateral power 
than the title might suggest.”43 In contrast, other FOMC members testify to the predominance 
of Greenspan’s views. For instance, in his memoirs, former Governor Laurence H. Meyer 
writes that FOMC members “sometimes got giddy with the prospect of actually having an 
opportunity to debate some aspect of the policy decision at the meeting and decide on it, as 
opposed to accepting the Chairman’s recommendation.”44 Alan Blinder, himself a Vice 
Chairman of the Board of Governors and a voting member of the FOMC from June 1994 to 
January 1996, writes that “no one has ever doubted that Alan Greenspan [was] ‘more equal’ 
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than the others.” He goes on, pointing out that the chairman is “virtually never on the losing 
side of a monetary policy vote.” Thus to a significant degree, “FOMC decisions are his 
decisions” (emphasis in original).45 Later he added “dissent has been minimal during the 
Greenspan era, especially in recent years.” In the span of seven full years and 60 FOMC 
meetings from 1998 to 2004, the number of recorded dissents was 14. Thus Blinder 
concludes, “[u]nder the Greenspan standard, his rule is rarely questioned.”46 
Still, the chairman’s decisions are tempered by the other FOMC members, so that a 
“chairman who needs to build consensus may have to move more slowly than if he were 
acting alone.” Greenspan’s statements and policy proposals at FOMC meetings should thus 
be seen in the context of “decisionmaking by committee,” creating a dynamic of its own. 
Importantly, such a setting for policymaking “makes it very difficult for idiosyncratic views 
to prevail.”47 One example was Greenspan’s controversial views on changes in American 
productivity growth. When trying to convince other FOMC members in the spring of 1997, 
“the Chairman’s insight played to an unresponsive audience,” according to FOMC member 
Laurence Meyer. “The staff and most of the other committee members [were] not 
convinced.”48 Thus the chairman moved carefully when presenting his arguments before the 
committee, slowly building consensus on how to incorporate this factor into decision-making. 
The above discussion suggests that the core beliefs of the Fed chairman are key to 
understanding the evolving monetary doctrines and practices. However, FOMC decisions 
were also extensively informed by ongoing research and discussions, taking place within 
monetary policy circles and in wider spheres of monetary debate. Thus it is important to look 
into the evolving intellectual framework of a broader set of players.  
One influential voice was that of Ben Bernanke. He dedicated his academic career in large 
part to monetary issues. Insights gained through years of painstaking research would weigh 
heavy on decisions and advice given as he left academia to enter the inner policy circles of 
national macroeconomic policymaking, first as Fed Governor (September 2002-June 2005), 
then briefly as head of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers (June 2005-January 
2006) and eventually as Fed Chairman (February 2006-present), taking over the monetary 
reins after Greenspan. Bernanke has explicitly stated that “it was my objective to bring my 
knowledge, my research on the Great Depression, on financial markets, on the economy to do 
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the best I could to bring that to the actually policy-making arena.”49 The interpretations of the 
troubling events of the 1930s and the lessons drawn from this analysis would influence how 
he interpreted and framed the challenges facing monetary authorities while serving as Fed 
official. It will be argued that his views on the Great Depression would color his 
understanding of the “Japanese disease” and the likelihood of similar problems emerging in 
the U.S. economy. These views seem to have had a significant impact on policymakers’ 
understandings of deflationary pressures—the topic of a separate chapter dedicated to the 
Fed’s deflation scare of the early 2000s. Moreover, Bernanke’s views on the initial causes of 
the Japanese crisis as well as the onset of the Great Depression would color his understanding 
of how the Fed should react to asset bubbles as they formed, and after they crashed—the topic 
of a chapter on the Fed’s fear of financial fallouts. Being a leading authority on the monetary 
issues of the Great Depression and a towering figure within monetary research circles, it 
should be expected that his opinions would have a significant impact on Fed thinking about 
these important issues, as Bernanke entered the inner monetary policy circle in 2002.  
Another important figure, though perhaps more of a practitioner than an academic, is Donald 
Kohn. Having served as Director of the Division of Monetary Affairs and Secretary of the 
Federal Open Market Committee (1987-2002), before himself becoming a permanent voting 
member of the committee as Fed Governor from 2002, he experienced at close hand how Fed 
doctrines and practices evolved during the Greenspan era. Kohn started his central banking 
career even earlier, first as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (1970-75) 
before moving on to the Board of Governors in Washington D.C., where he served in various 
positions. Given his long service at the Fed, it should be expected that he would reflect the 
prevailing consensus and core beliefs as they evolved over the span of the Great Moderation. 
Being a Fed official rather than an independent thinker within academia, in contrast to the 
background of Bernanke, Kohn is likely to have internalized his role as a Fed spokesman, 
explaining and rationalizing Fed actions and policy opinions. His numerous speeches and 
writings should thus be read with this perspective in mind.  
There is a rich body of source material to draw upon in assessing the monetary doctrines of 
the Fed during this time period, besides those related directly to policy deliberations. One way 
to access intellectual developments influencing policies and beliefs is to explore papers 
presented and discussions undertaken at the annual central banking symposiums organized by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City at Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Many of the ideas 
presented by monetary policymakers and researchers at these conferences reflect an emerging 
consensus on the issues at hand: What should be the goals of monetary policy? What is the 
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appropriate policy tool and how does this tool affect overall market conditions? What, if any, 
should be the role of monetary policy in regard to asset booms and busts? 
A rough body count of the participants at the 2005 symposium discussing the merits of 
Greenspan shows more than 30 Fed officials, around 25 central bankers from various 
emerging markets and European countries (including the Governor of the central bank of 
Norway), around 15 journalists from the financial press, around 10 executives and chief 
economists from the financial services industry, 5 officials from international policy 
institutions (including the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank) and a wide range of economists.50 
Several researchers have developed important contributions to the development of U.S. 
monetary doctrines. Some of this research centers upon the importance of historical 
experience informing subsequent monetary policy. An important body of research is aimed at 
explaining what went wrong during the Great Depression and what constituted the main 
drivers of the recovery. Another set of research investigates what went wrong during the 
Great Inflation of the 1970s and what assumedly went right during the Great Moderation that 
followed. Christina Romer stands out in both regards. She is a long-time economist at the 
National Bureau of Economic Researcher where she co-directs the Program in Monetary 
Economics with her husband David Romer. This program is dedicated to the study of “the 
mechanisms through which monetary policy operates” and how “alternative approaches to 
making monetary policy” affects the economy.51 The roster of this program reads like a who’s 
who of mainstream monetary economics and history, including names such as Robert Barro, 
Olivier Blanchard, Alan Blinder, Michael Bordo, Bradford DeLong, Barry Eichengreen, 
Marvin Goodfriend, Gregory Mankiw, Bennett McCallum, Frederic Mishkin, Ricardo Reis, 
Kenneth Rogoff, Anna Schwartz, Lawrence Summers, John Taylor, and Michael Woodford—
all prolific researchers and writers, some of which will figure in later discussions. 
The body of literature emanating from these researchers and numerous others has had an 
important influence on Fed officials and thus on the development of monetary doctrines and 
practices during the Greenspan years. Ideas coming out of these research circles figure 
prominently in the presentations given at the Jackson Hole symposiums, and the recorded 
discussions taking place after any given presentation can give some insight into the 
immediate responses by Fed officials and other central bankers to the views presented. Thus a 
part of the investigation should focus in on research papers discussed at these annual 
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conferences, both when the papers present views contributing to the forming consensus as 
well as views confronting the consensus. 
Among those confronting the prevailing worldviews of central bankers are economic 
researchers operating within important international policy and research institutions, such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In 
2005, an IMF chief economist created some controversy in the otherwise congenial 
atmosphere at Jackson Hole when questioning some of the basic beliefs encapsulated in the 
so-called “Greenspan doctrine”—the notion that financial developments during the Great 
Moderation was almost exclusively a beneficial and stabilizing factor for the American 
economy.52 Likewise, two years earlier, a BIS chief economist presented views that were 
largely dismissed by leading Fed officials, including Greenspan and Bernanke, giving rise to 
a still not resolved controversy on monetary policy and asset bubbles.53 
These debates will be explored in later chapters, hopefully revealing some of the major issues 
of contention as well as profound beliefs forming the core of monetary doctrines as they 
evolved, especially in the second half of the Great Moderation. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
In light of the Great Inflation, revealing weaknesses in the postwar practice of policy, a new 
body of literature emerged pointing to the importance of the institutional framework within 
which policy is formulated and implemented. This gave rise to a debate on “rules” versus 
“discretion.”54 The concerns raised point to problems arising from incentives among central 
bankers and their constituents, stemming from what could be labeled the “incentive 
problem”—behavioral constraints arising from the specific institutional context within which 
decisions are made. What is largely missing from this literature, which stresses the need to 
build reputational capital or tie policymakers hands by some set of rules,55 is the equally 
important question of the informational capital of the monetary authorities. In other words, 
even if institutional framers could somehow solve the incentive problem, one would still be 
faced with the not inconsequential problem of acquiring the right information in order to 
reach well-informed decisions and implement policy that will perform its intended functions. 
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In other words, policymaking is confronted with the inescapable “knowledge problem,” 
namely whether the models policymakers make use of correspond to reality in a satisfactory 
way.  
The market process and the political process possess fundamentally different knowledge-
generating properties. Rather than continuous market signals, policymakers must make use of 
proxy signals, gathered through the cumbersome process of collecting data and constructing 
statistical time series. Central bankers are thus in the business of data processing, going 
through a wide range of statistics before formulating policy responses to perceived risks 
surfacing in the economy.  Greenspan has been portrayed as an “empiricist par excellence,” 
scrutinizing “the details in the data.”56 Moreover, before each FOMC meeting, the Fed staff 
collects and interprets a wide range of data, handed over to committee members. 
However, the implications of the data at hand are dependent upon the actors’ models of how 
the economy works and the way in which monetary policy influences the policy goals. Such 
models are subject to revisions, sometimes gradual and sometimes dramatic. Episodes in 
which policy is perceived to be dysfunctional on some level would predictably lead to 
thorough revisions. One such episode was the Great Depression of the 1930s, another the 
Great Inflation of the 1970s. It would seem that monetary policy is in the process of going 
through a new set of revisions in light of the recent financial crisis and Great Recession. 
Other revisions are more gradual, as when perceived changes in the economic landscape and 
policy challenges lead decision-makers to incrementally change their worldviews. 
One unresolved issue within macroeconomic thought is the conception of the interest rate and 
an agreed upon understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism, that is, how 
monetary policy (and interest rate setting by the banking sector) affects the economy. In the 
words of Axel Leijonhufvud, a Swedish-born economist who have written extensively on the 
history of economic ideas, the “theory of the interest rate mechanism” has been “at the center 
of the confusion in modern macroeconomics.57 The mainspring of this issue is the writings of 
the late 19th century Swedish economist Knut Wicksell, who made important contributions 
towards developing a modern framework for understanding monetary policy. According to 
Leijonhufvud, modern monetary and macroeconomic theory starts with Wicksell’s Geldzins 
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und Güterpreise (1898).58 The English title is Interest and Prices, which neatly sums up the 
main message of the book—how the price level is determined by the rate of interest.59 
Wicksell hypothesized a “natural rate of interest,” that is, the rate “which is neutral in respect 
to commodity prices, and tend neither to raise nor to lower them.” This notion of the interest 
rate mechanism gained new ground during the Great Moderation and can be seen as a main 
academic approach to monetary issues today, as witnessed by Michael Woodford’s influential 
Interest and Prices (2003), sharing the title of Wicksell’s work.60 The modern twist is that the 
natural rate is the one which ensures a stable rate of inflation (rather than zero inflation, as 
Wicksell hypothesized). Moreover, it is believed that a “neutral” interest rate ensures that 
output and employment grow along their “natural” level, that is, at maximum sustainable 
capacity.61 
As pointed out by Leijonhufvud, there is however a second theme of the book, which “hovers 
in the background,” namely, the issue of “intertemporal disequilibrium as the key to the 
understanding of the business cycle.” Wicksell thought that the “natural rate” was determined 
by the voluntary levels of saving and investment. This perspective suggests that market rates 
diverging from the equilibrating natural rate will cause imbalances, which could lead to 
economic crises.  
Importantly, there seem strong reasons to believe that prices will in fact not remain stable 
when market rates converge with this conception of the natural rate, due to the fact that 
productivity growth tends to push down prices. Thus maintaining low inflation or zero price 
growth in the face of strong economic growth will tend to push down the central bank 
manipulated money market rate below the natural rate. Such an understanding is engrained in 
the monetary equilibrium approach, stressing real and financial imbalances that can arise 
when the money supply temporarily exceeds money demand.62 
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The original Wicksellian framework incorporates the banking sector in macroeconomic 
analysis as a potential destabilizing and dis-equilibrating force, and emphasizes the interest 
rate as a coordinating mechanism for savings and investment decisions. Such an 
understanding is largely absent in modern macroeconomics. Instead, the interest rate tends to 
be seen as a policy lever and the banking system is assumed to perform its intermediating role 
between savers and investors. In contrast, with the savings-investment-interest rate nexus 
intact, a potential unifying framework for macroeconomic thought and analysis emerges—
incorporating the role of money, banking, interest rates, financial markets, pressures on 
consumer prices and booms and busts. 
An alternative vision to the “price stability” and “monetary equilibrium” approaches outlined 
above is that of Hyman Minsky, the originator of the “financial instability hypothesis.” This 
perspective underlines the dynamic nature of financial markets, and seriously questions “all 
those theories that treat capitalist economies with well-developed financial structures as 
stable.”63 Thus Minsky sees capitalism as inherently unstable. In his analytical framework, 
“good times” or “periods of tranquility” lead financial market participants to take on more 
risk or what is described as “balance sheet adventuring.” In the end, unsustainable financial 
activities give rise to a systemic crisis adversely affecting the real economy as well. Thus 
“full employment with stable prices cannot be sustained” because of the forces at work within 
the financial sector eventually leading to “the disruption of tranquility.”64 What is largely 
missing from this perspective is the potential dis-equilibrating role of monetary policy related 
to savings and investment. Such a view is notably absent in Fed doctrines as well.  
These differing visions of how the macro-economy works, and the policy implications 
involved, can be sighted in the discussions of monetary doctrines in the following chapters. 
Notably, some Fed critics seem to adhere to a perspective emphasizing the distortive nature of 
low interest rates, pointing out that “price stability was not enough” to ensure stable and 
sustainable economic growth during the Great Moderation, thus coming close to the monetary 
equilibrium position.65 Consensus builders, on the other hand, seem to stress the desirability 
of price stability, defined as low, constant inflation. Moreover, both Fed policymakers and 
critics from time to time make arguments that seem to imply that the macroeconomic stability 
of the Great Moderation could give rise to periods of financial instability, as suggested by the 
Minsky perspective. This simplifying, though hopefully illuminating, distinction between 
opposing models will figure in the background in the subsequent analysis. 
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As the above discussion suggests, this study will focus in on epistemic problems, not 
behavioral constraints, facing monetary policymakers. Chapter two will start off the 
investigation by briefly discussing the main elements of the emerging consensus of this 
period. The subsequent four chapters will investigate the historical events and intellectual 
responses that helped shape this consensus as well as the specific policy practices of the Fed. 
Chapter three will explore the lessons drawn from the Great Depression and Great Inflation 
and how they influenced the course of policymaking and monetary doctrines in the U.S. 
Chapter four will assess how these lessons were applied to policymaking during the first 
decade of the Greenspan era, and how ongoing challenges gradually changed the policy 
regime. Chapters five and six will explore how new challenges, arising in the second half of 
the Greenspan era, led to additional shifts to the policy regime. 
The analysis will trace how policy doctrines and practices evolved in response to different 
perceived threats—those of inflation, financial fallouts and deflation—giving ample attention 
to three key policy episodes that most clearly display these concerns, as outlined above. The 
question of the decision-making context will be briefly revisited in the conclusion, assessing 
whether the evolving monetary framework under Greenspan represented a move towards 
increased discretion.  
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2. THE JACKSON HOLE CONSENSUS 
“One of the most striking features of the economic landscape over the past twenty years 
or so has been a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility. […] Several writers on 
the topic have dubbed this remarkable decline in the variability of both output and 
inflation ‘the Great Moderation.’”66 
—Ben Bernanke (2004) 
At the end of the 20th century four Fed researchers, including future Fed Governors Ben 
Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin, reflected upon the newly formed consensus on economic 
policy in the industrialized countries. Communism had come to an end and with it the 
apparent end of state-directed development. A newfound belief in giving markets a freer reign 
had emerged. However, as the authors noted, it would be a mistake to “conclude that no room 
is left over for government policy to promote economic growth and stability.” Besides the 
continued importance attached to fiscal policy and various regulatory responsibilities (such as 
environmental and financial regulation), in addition to the government’s classical role of 
maintaining infrastructure, both institutional (such as the legal system) and physical (such as 
roads and bridges), a defining characteristic of the new political economy was the fact that 
monetary policy “has emerged as one of the most critical government responsibilities.”67 
In other words, the central bank had emerged as a dominant institution for conducting 
economic policy. A key element of the new strategy for promoting growth and stability was 
to ensure low, stable inflation. The consensus centered upon monetary policy as the most 
effective tool to attain these goals. 
Under this new regime, both inflation and output displayed a remarkable tendency to stabilize 
around the desired goals. Inflation was moderate and relatively invariable, accompanied by 
robust growth interrupted by few and short-lived recessions. After recovering from the 
painful Reagan recession of the early 1980s, resulting from deliberate monetary tightening to 
bring down inflation, the U.S. economy went through long periods of expansion—one from 
1982 to 1990 that lasted almost eight full years, followed by one that more or less lasted all 
the way up to the Great Recession (2007-2009), slightly punctured by a brief and mild 
recession in 2001.68 
                                                      
66 Ben S. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,“ remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic 
Association, Washington, DC, February 20, 2004 
67 Ben S. Bernanke, Thomas Laubach, Frederic Mishkin and Adam Posen, Inflation Targeting: Lessons 
from the International Experience, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 3 
68 Olivier Blanchard and John Simon,  “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1, 2001, p. 135 
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These developments strengthened the reputation of central bankers as successful inflation 
stabilizers and recession preventers. Some ascribed these benign circumstances to the talents 
of Greenspan or, more generally, to an improved framework of conducting monetary policy 
in the advanced countries, most of which experienced similar developments.69 This reinforced 
the view that stabilization policy was best left to central bankers; that price stability was a 
noble and highly beneficial goal; and that monetary policy was a predictable and powerful 
tool in preventing adverse economic outcomes. 
Looking back at the pre-crisis consensus, Charles Bean, Deputy Governor at the Bank of 
England, reflected upon the beliefs of policymakers during the Great Moderation. The 
prevailing worldview had been apparent in many of the arguments presented by leading 
monetary policymakers and researchers at the annual Jackson Hole symposiums. Thus it was 
only fitting that it should be named the “Jackson Hole consensus.” Bean summed it up as a set 
of core beliefs that had evolved among central bankers and central banking experts, ranging 
from a belief in the authorities’ ability to manage inflation expectations among the public to 
the disbelief in any constructive role for monetary policy in reining in asset booms.70 
Monetary, not fiscal, policy was the main instrument in the conduct of stabilization policy. 
Apart from the role of “automatic stabilizers” (fiscal stimulus arising automatically in a 
downturn, due to falling revenues and rising expenditures), fiscal policy was seen as 
“unsuitable as an instrument of macroeconomic demand management.” Monetary policy was 
thus “assigned the primary role in short-term aggregate demand” through the manipulation of 
short-term interest rates.  
In other words, monetary policy was the main instrument in the conduct of macroeconomic 
stabilization policy, or “macroeconomic demand management” according to professional 
jargon. The main tool of monetary policy was some short-term money market rate—in the 
U.S. the overnight rate in the market for reserve balances (the federal funds rate)—controlled 
by the use of open market operations (central bank purchases or sales of assets by money 
creation or destruction). 
The transmission mechanism by which monetary policy affected the targeted goals of 
inflation, output and employment was through the public’s expectations of future inflation 
                                                      
69 Blanchard and Simon (2001, p. 135) takes issue with this view, contending that the decline in output 
volatility “is not a recent development—the by-product of a ‘New Economy’ or of Alan Greenspan’s 
talent. Rather it has been a steady decline over several decades, which started in the 1950s […], was 
interrupted in the 1970s and early 1980s, and returned to trend in the late 1980s and the 1990s.” 
Bernanke puts more weight on monetary policy as a major contributing factor. Ben S. Bernanke, “The 
Great Moderation,” remarks at the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, February 20, 2004 
70 Charles Bean, Matthias Paustian, Adrian Penalver, and Tim Taylor, “Monetary Policy after the Fall,” 
Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2010 
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and the immediate impact the manipulation of short-term interest rates had on longer-term 
interest rates (such as bond yields) and asset prices. There was always the danger that this 
transmission mechanism might be impaired by problems in the “credit channel”—a concern 
raised by Bernanke—but the banking system was mostly out of sight in the models monetary 
policymakers and policy prescribers were making use of—the models of the New Keynesian 
synthesis that had emerged during the Great Moderation.71 
The weight given to the role of expectations in the performance of the economy on a macro 
level led to a pronounced belief in the need to “anchor” inflation expectations. One preferred 
tool was establishing an inflation target, communicated to the public and credibly committed 
to by the monetary authorities. Many industrial countries established formal inflation targets, 
usually somewhere around 2 percent. However, in the U.S., such a target was never 
formalized, but rather emerged informally. The public came to expect such a ceiling, and 
monetary policymakers themselves came to prefer stabilizing inflation somewhere around this 
ideal.72 
In order for the central bank to credibly stabilize inflation expectations in the long run, the 
consensus held that monetary policymakers should be shielded from external pressure by 
legislators or administrators believed to have shorter time horizons and less benign incentives. 
Thus the need for central bank independence, understood as “instrument independence.” The 
policy goals were set by the legislature giving the central bank its mandate, but policymakers 
at the central bank could themselves decide upon the preferred instruments and how to make 
use of them in the conduct of policy.73 
The case for independence was further strengthened by the academic literature that stressed 
the problem of “time inconsistency” in the dynamic interplay between the authorities 
conducting stabilization policy and the public’s expectations. If the authorities tried to engage 
in “optimal policy,” based upon the ever-changing dictates of circumstances, this would 
                                                      
71 Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler, “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 4, 1995 pp. 27-48 
72 In 1996, Greenspan defined “price stability” as zero inflation. See Transcript, July 2, 1996; quoted in 
Hetzel, Monetary Policy, 2008, p. 197. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis and the dotcom bust, the 
FOMC developed an aversion to inflation falling below 1 percent. The preferred ceiling seems to have 
been around 2 percent. 
73 As explained by Bernanke, “A useful distinction is that between ‘goal independence’ and 
‘instrument independence.’ Goal independence for central banks—the freedom of the central bank to 
set its own goals—is difficult to justify in a democratic society, but, as I will argue today, instrument 
independence—the ability of the central bank to determine the appropriate settings of monetary policy 
without interference—is vital for economic stability.” Ben S. Bernanke, “Central Bank Independence, 
Transparency, and Accountability,” speech at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies 
International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan, May 25, 2010, fn. 2 
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change people’s expectations and behavior in such a way as to lead to poorer performance, 
not improved outcomes.74 
However, there was still scope for the authorities to stabilize output and employment to some 
degree, as long as this was done within the overall framework of “price stability”—low and 
stable inflation. Certain perceived imperfections of the economy, notably the inability of 
wages and prices to perfectly adjust to changes in the short run, gave room for ”constrained 
discretion,” in the words of Bernanke.75 Thus the notion of “flexible” inflation targeting, 
which emerged in most countries during the Great Moderation, usually formalized in central 
bank mandates as the combination of inflation and output targeting, though with more weight 
given to the former goal.76 In the U.S., the Fed was given a dual mandate of “stable prices” 
and “maximum employment” (of which the latter can be understood as an output goal). In 
contrast to central banks of other major industrial countries, this legislation put equal weight 
on the two goals.77 The output target was formalized as zero deviance from the idealized 
long-term growth rate. Any divergence was ascribed as an “output gap,” to be corrected by 
the monetary authorities, as long as the long-term goal of stable inflation was ensured. 
The notion of monetary targets was scrapped, as central bankers focused in on the interest rate 
as the main policy tool and the price level as the ultimate policy target. The academic 
literature that emerged ignored monetary aggregates altogether, including credit aggregates, 
stressing instead the idea of a “neutral” interest rate delivering constant inflation and a zero 
output gap.78 The neutrality was ensured by anchoring expectations to the inflation target, 
causing prices and wages to be well adjusted, thus ensuring optimal capacity utilization. 
The narrow focus on movements in the average level of consumer prices (inflation) and the 
desired level of output and employment, led central bankers and their intellectual supporters 
within academia to largely ignore dysfunctional developments that could arise in asset 
                                                      
74 Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85, no. 3, 1977, pp. 473-492 
75 Ben S. Bernanke, “‘Constrained Discretion’ and Monetary Policy,” remarks before the Money 
Marketeers of New York University, New York, N.Y., February 3, 2003 
76 For instance, the legal mandate of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) stressed that “the 
primary objective […] shall be to maintain price stability,” adding that “without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community.” 
The policy “remit” of the Bank of England similarly states that the ordering of the two goals as “(a) to 
maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s 
Government, including its objectives for growth and employment.” 
Blinder and Reis, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2005, pp. 28-29 
77 In fact, as discussed later, the legislation state three goals, maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates. But the interest rate goal is implied by the price goal, since stable 
prices ensure moderate nominal interest rates. 
78 Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Paolo Mauro, “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy,” 
International Monetary Fund, 2010 
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markets and the importance of the overall functioning of financial institutions. Moreover, 
financial markets were widely believed to be efficient—a notion propounded by Chicago 
School efficient market thinking. It was also suggested by the Greenspan notion of fully 
functioning financial markets within the institutional framework that emerged during the 
Great Moderation, a belief that was encapsulated in the “Greenspan doctrine.”79 Little 
attention was given to the dynamic interplay of financial market participants and monetary 
policy actions such as commitments by the central bank to contain financial stress. 
Even though asset markets could undergo periods of “irrational exuberance” from time to 
time,80 the consensus was that the authorities should refrain from intervening in incipient 
asset booms. Fed officials held that it could prove hard to diagnose whether rapid asset price 
growth was in fact unsustainable or rather reflecting strong fundamentals. Instead, the central 
bank should “mitigate the fallout” and “ease the transition to the next expansion”—a 
commitment to cushion off drops in asset markets that was dubbed the “Greenspan put.”81 
Even if the monetary authorities were to correctly diagnose a bubble in the making, the use of 
monetary policy tools to curb the boom would still not be appropriate as higher interest rates 
and tighter money would come with the cost of lowered output and higher unemployment.  
The final major component of the Jackson Hole consensus was the widespread notion that 
large-scale financial crises was something relegated to the past in the case of the 
industrialized world, and at present mainly a problem for emerging markets with less 
sophisticated financial institutions and a more volatile macroeconomic framework. Thus there 
was little concern that a systemic crisis could arise in the U.S. or elsewhere among the 
advanced countries.82 
Great faith was placed in the role of price stability to ensure overall soundness and stability. 
In the words of Bean, “price stability and financial stability were natural bedfellows, the 
successful achievement of one facilitating the attainment of the other.”83 In other words, price 
stability was seen as a prerequisite for stability in both financial markets and the wider 
economy.  
                                                      
79 For Greenspan’s views on financial market developments and regulations, see for instance Alan 
Greenspan, “Government regulation and derivative contracts,” remarks at the Financial Markets 
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Coral Gables, Florida, February 21, 1997 
80 Alan Greenspan, “The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society,” speech at the Annual 
Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, D.C., December 5, 1996 
81 Alan Greenspan, “Monetary policy and the economic outlook,” testimony before the Joint Economic 
Committee, U.S. Congress, June 17, 1999 
82 Several researchers have commented upon this. See, e.g., Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, 
This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, 2009; See also 
Bean et al., “Monetary Policy After the Fall,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2010 
83 Bean et al., “Monetary Policy After the Fall,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2010, p. 3 
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While the causes of the observed moderation in output volatility and inflation are open to 
debate, policy makers attributed an important part of the perceived improved macroeconomic 
performance to better policy. Ben Bernanke is a prominent proponent of the view that 
improved macroeconomic management, especially within the field of monetary policy, was a 
major cause of the Great Moderation. The stability of inflation and output was all the more 
impressing when compared to developments of the 1970s—years of high and accelerating 
inflation combined with a volatile economic environment. 
In the words of Bernanke, policymakers of this period suffered from “inflation pessimism” 
and “output optimism.” They were pessimistic about the ability of monetary policy to hold 
inflation in check. At the same time, they were overly optimistic about the possibility to 
smooth out fluctuations in output and permanently pull down the unemployment rate. The 
economy went off track “because monetary policymakers labored under some important 
misconceptions about policy and the economy.”84 As these misconceptions were corrected, 
central bankers took control of inflation, stabilizing its rate at a low level, in effect becoming 
“heroes of the zeroes.”85  
Figure 2.1 Consumer Prices, 1970-2010 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (CPIAUCNS, % change from a year ago) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the change in inflation behavior—both its downward trajectory as well 
as the decrease in volatility—by depicting the annual percentage changes in prices for all 
urban consumers (headline inflation) during the last 40 years. As shown, inflation reached its 
peak at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, then trended downwards before reaching a low 
point in the early 2000s. A moderation in output volatility was likewise pronounced in this 
period. Commentators agreed that these developments were beneficial to the economy, 
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compared with the volatile, unpredictable 1970s. Low and stable inflation was seen as a 
prerequisite to overall economic stability and as a yardstick by which the success of policy 
was measured.  
In 2001, Olivier Blanchard, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, and John Simon, a researcher at the Reserve Bank of Australia, stated that they 
were “reasonably confident in predicting” that “the increase in the length of expansions is 
here to stay.” A “major reversal” to the moderation in output volatility appeared “unlikely.” 
The implications were clear, namely “a much smaller likelihood of recessions.” However, on 
a casual note they remarked: “Interestingly, the decrease in output volatility has not been 
reflected in a parallel decrease in asset price volatility.”86 
Notably, stock prices went through two major boom-bust episodes during the 1990s and 
2000s, in addition to one dramatic crash in October 1987. (See figure 2.2.) 
Figure 2.2 Stock Prices, 1985-2010 
 
Source: S&P/Robert Shiller 
Asset price fluctuations was of secondary concern to monetary practitioners and theoreticians 
during most of the postwar period and up towards the end of the century, as macroeconomic 
thought focused in on another major puzzle, how to cope with fluctuations in output, 
employment and consumer prices. 
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3. THE EVOLVING MONETARY FRAMEWORK 
“Our objective is to promote maximum sustainable employment and stable prices 
over time. These goals are enshrined in law, and they also make sense in economic 
theory and practice.”87 
—Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn (2009) 
In order to gain a better understanding of how monetary doctrines and practices evolved 
during the Great Moderation, it is useful to place these developments in a broader historical 
context. Both the monetary doctrines guiding Fed decisions and the academic debate related 
to stabilization policy can be seen in light of historical experience.  
The first major monetary episode in the history of the Fed, and one that profoundly shaped 
the thinking of U.S. monetary policymakers, was the “Great Contraction”—the early phase of 
the Great Depression in which output, prices and employment dropped at record rates. Not 
only did this episode leave its lasting mark on policymakers’ understandings and priorities, it 
also gave rise to a new understanding of economic dynamics and challenges on an aggregate 
or “macro” level among the economics profession. In the words of Ben Bernanke: 
“To understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macroeconomics. Not only did 
the Depression give birth to macroeconomics as a distinct field of study, but also—to an 
extent that is not always fully appreciated—the experience of the 1930s continues to 
influence macroeconomists’ beliefs, policy recommendations, and research agendas.”88 
According to UC Berkeley economist J. Bradford DeLong, the memory of the Great 
Depression created a “predisposition on the left and center of political opinion that 
any unemployment rate was too high […]” Thus when center-left political forces 
gained the upper hand in the 1960s, the stage was set for an inflationary episode—
“America’s only peacetime inflation.”89 The Great Inflation would dominate policy 
concerns for the next generation of practitioners and academic thinkers. Among the 
lessons drawn were that inflation comes with high costs and that there are limits to 
what the federal government can achieve through expansionary macroeconomic 
policies in attempts at stimulating employment and output. Thus a more “realistic 
view” emerged among policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s.90 
 
                                                      
87 Donald L. Kohn, “Monetary Policy in the Financial Crisis,” in John D. Ciorciari and John B. Taylor 
(eds.), The Road Ahead for the Fed, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 2009, p. 52 
88 Ben S. Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 1 
89 J. Bradford DeLong, “America’s Only Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s,” NBER Working Paper 
Series, no. h0084, May, 1996 
90 Romer and Romer, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 39 
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From Keynesianism to Monetarism 
Both episodes—the Great Contraction and the Great Inflation—were followed by major 
changes in macroeconomic theorizing. The 1930s gave birth to the “Keynesian” revolution, a 
strand of thought focusing on the need for the government to conduct “countercyclical” 
policies and “fine tune” unemployment and output to ensure that the economy was humming 
along at the right speed. The impetus for Keynesian thought and policy-prescription was 
based on the fear of reliving the economic trauma of the depression. In result, a new set of 
beliefs profoundly penetrated mainstream academia. According to Paul Samuelson—the 
leading postwar Keynesian textbook author—the “Keynesian revolution was the most 
significant event in 20th-century economic science.”91 
This new thinking took some time to be adopted into actual U.S. policymaking. Keynesian 
policies were only deliberately implemented with the Kennedy-Johnson administration in the 
1960s.92 Combined with “optimistic estimates of sustainable employment and deep pessimism 
about the ability of economic slack to reduce inflation,” the new understanding created an 
inflationary bias. Fiscal and monetary authorities overestimated the sustainable (non-
inflationary) level of economic activity and underestimated the central bank’s ability to rein 
in inflation.93 Thus the move towards more activist macroeconomic policies, based on the 
desire to stimulate output and employment, ended up in 1970s stagflation—rising 
unemployment, volatile output and accelerating inflation. This episode, in turn, led to a loss 
of faith in traditional Keynesian thought and policymaking.  
Within academia this experience gave rise to the “Chicago” counter-revolution, which 
discarded many of the basic Keynesian tenets and led to new developments within 
macroeconomic thought and policy prescriptions. The Chicago school of economics has, as 
such, had a major impact on monetary policy, but in a less straightforward manner than is 
sometimes assumed. Its leading postwar intellectual figure, Milton Friedman, developed a 
“Monetarist” interpretation of the Great Depression and the business cycle that put money at 
                                                      
91 Paul A. Samuelson, “Keynesian Economics and Harvard: In the Beginning,” Challenge: The 
Magazine of Economic Affairs, 31, 1988, pp. 32-34; quoted in N. Gregory, “The Macro-economist as 
Scientist and Engineer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 20, 2006, p. 32 
92 It could be argued that Keynesian ideas were embodied in the Annual Report of the Secretary of 
Commerce of fiscal year 1939 as well as the Employment Act of 1946, two documents that bear the 
imprint of Keynesian economists. However, “the most important contribution during the 1960s to 
institutionalizing Keynesianism in government policy was probably the tax cut of 1964 […] heralded 
as the beginning of a ‘new fiscal policy.’” Walter S. Salant “The Spread of Keynesian Doctrines and 
Practices in the United States,” in Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: 
Keynesianism across Nations, Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 29, 49 
93 Romer and Romer, Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 25 
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center stage, thus challenging the dominant Keynesian view, which tended to downplay the 
role of money. In the words of Harvard University economist N. Gregory Mankiw:  
“Most Keynesians viewed the economy as inherently volatile, constantly buffeted by 
the shifting ‘animal spirits’ of investors. Friedman [and his co-author] Schwartz 
suggested that economic instability should not be traced to private actors but rather to 
inept monetary policy. The implication was that policymakers should be satisfied if 
they do no harm by following simple policy rules.”94 
Policymakers of the 1960s came to believe that inflation should be attributed to cost-push 
shocks rather than monetary forces. In the words of Bernanke, “[c]ost-push shocks, in the 
paradigm of the time, included diverse factors such as union wage pressures, price increases 
by oligopolistic firms, and increases in the prices of commodities such as oil and beef brought 
about by adverse changes in supply conditions.”95 Importantly, these shocks were outside of 
monetary policymakers’ control. Thus inflation was believed to be largely outside of their 
control as well, an understanding reinforcing the “inflation pessimism” of the time.  
One explanation to how these beliefs arose can be traced back to the optimistic assessments 
of output and employment. If neither output nor unemployment is deemed too high—that is, 
they are assessed to be within sustainable, non-inflationary limits—it follows that forces other 
than excess demand must be at the root of the problem.96 Thus other measures than aggregate 
demand restraint were pursued in attempts at curbing inflation, including wage and price 
controls. Friedman questioned this thinking, offering the view that “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Hence, he pointed to the need for controlling the 
growth in monetary aggregates to hold inflation in check. 
Even though Friedman’s monetarism gained some influence in the early 1980s, especially in 
the U.S. and the UK, as monetary policymakers were trying to rein in inflation, central 
bankers mainly used these ideas on pragmatic grounds. In the U.S., Fed Chairman Paul 
Volcker (1979-1987) drew upon monetarist ideas to battle the inflationary foe through 
targeting money growth and letting interest rates rise to unprecedented levels. Figure 3.1 
displays the behavior of the real fed funds rate during the chairmanship of Volcker in contrast 
to the rate under his predecessors Arthur Burns (1970-78) and William Miller (1978-79). 
 
                                                      
94 Mankiw, “The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer,” 2006, pp. 32-33 
95 Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,” 2004 
96 “Fiscal policymakers in the 1960s were sufficiently confident of their estimates of the sustainable 
rate of unemployment that they consistently attributed inflation that arose before unemployment 
reached this level to sources other than excess demand.” Romer and Romer, Kansas City Fed 
Symposium, 2002, p. 20 
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Figure 3.1 Inflation-adjusted Monetary Policy Rate, 1970-1987 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED; Author’s calculations (DFEDTAR, CPIAUCNS) 
FOMC policy actions under Chairman Burns (1970-78) tended to fall behind the curve, 
letting inflation rise faster than the nominal fed funds rate, thus pushing the real fed funds rate 
to record low levels, even into negative ground. Volcker tried to reverse course, first in 1979, 
an attempt which was aborted in 1980, then implemented more forcefully in 1981, which 
explains the large swings in the real fed funds rate around the turn of the decade, as seen in 
figure 3.1. A novel move was putting more weight on monetary aggregates. The new policy 
procedures were spelled out at the October 6, 1979 FOMC meeting, in which emphasis was 
shifted onto “supplying the volume of bank reserves estimated to be consistent with the 
desired rates of growth in monetary aggregates, while permitting much greater fluctuations in 
the federal funds rate” than before.97 
During his 1979 Senate confirmation hearing, Volcker stated a point of view that sounded 
unmistakably monetarist, namely that “if we’re going to have price stability” it was 
“indispensable” to bring down the growth of monetary aggregates.98 However, he never 
intended to impose some kind of Friedman monetary rule—a main staple of monetarist policy 
prescription. Such a rule would have tied the hands of policy-makers by setting the future 
course of monetary policy within clear boundaries. Instead, Volker sought an effective way to 
bring down inflation rates, and the monetarist emphasis on the direct control of monetary 
aggregates gave him this very tool. Milton Friedman was among the most outspoken critics of 
Volcker’s alleged “monetarist” policies. In 1983, he wrote that the “rhetoric of the monetary 
authorities has indeed been monetarist, but their policies have not been—or, to be generous, 
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have been only partly so.”99 He was concerned that this rhetoric had permanently discredited 
the belief in a “proper monetarist policy,” a concern that turned out to be well founded.  
Monetarism soon fell out of fashion as unfolding events discredited this policy approach. For 
one thing, monetary targets were seemingly harder to pin down than Friedman originally 
expected. At the same time, the relation between monetary aggregates and prices as well as 
nominal spending became harder to predict as money velocity (the speed at which money 
changes hands)100 became less stable due to financial developments following new U.S. 
banking legislation in 1980 and 1982.101  
A full three years after the initial change in operating procedures, in October 1982, the FOMC 
could satisfactorily notice that “progress in reducing the rate of inflation had been substantial, 
exceeding expectations of many,” but the committee “continued to face uncertainties about 
the interpretations of the behavior of monetary aggregates in general,” due to unstable money 
demand. Because of “difficulties in interpreting the behavior of M1,” the FOMC decided that 
it “would place much less than the usual weight on that aggregate’s movements during this 
period and that it would not set a specific objective for its growth.”102  
Figure 3.2 The Erratic Behavior of M1, August 1979-August 1987 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (M1, M1V) 
                                                      
99 Milton Friedman, “Monetarism in Rhetoric and in Practice,” Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank 
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100 The velocity of money refers to how many times money changes hands through transactions during 
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but no basis existed for predicting its magnitude.” Record of Policy Actions, October 5, 1982, p. 8 
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The unpredictable behavior of M1 and its velocity during the Volcker era is depicted in figure 
3.2. In the words of Gerry Bouey, a former Governor of the Bank of Canada, “We didn’t 
abandon the monetary aggregates, they abandoned us.”103 Thus ended the short-lived 
“monetarist experiment,” or “pseudo-monetarism” as one adherent of this school of thought 
would characterize it.104 Looking back, Alan Blinder concludes that “the brief and tumultuous 
experiment with monetarism between 1979 and 1982 was probably more a marriage of 
convenience than infatuation. Monetarist rhetoric provided the Fed with a political heat shield 
as it raised interest rates to excruciating heights.”105 
However, there was another insight coming out of the Chicago-school that would gain more 
prominence and lasting recognition by the macroeconomics profession—this idea also 
stemming from Friedman’s critique of postwar Keynesian policymaking. Early on, Friedman 
predicted that attempting to drive down the unemployment rate would have adverse 
consequences for the economy. This critique gave rise to a debate among economists, which 
could be referred to as the “Philips Curve controversy.” 
 
The “Natural Rate” Framework 
The Phillips curve was a simple model of the economy that captured the essence of 
policymaking and beliefs in the 1960s.106 It portrayed a permanent trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. The conventional wisdom was that acceptable doses of inflation 
would cure unemployment.107 In 1960, two prominent American economists, Paul Samuelson 
and Robert Solow, estimated that an inflation rate of 4 to 5 percent would keep the 
unemployment rate below 3 percent, stating that such a “price rise would seem to be the 
necessary cost of high employment and production in the years immediately ahead.”108 Thus 
“[p]olicymakers in the 1960s adopted a highly optimistic view of the levels of output and 
employment that could be reached without triggering inflation,” believing “in a long-run 
trade- off between unemployment and inflation.”109 
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The new formal models and the estimates that went into them pictured inflation as a low-cost 
remedy in the fight against unemployment, a means to fulfill the commitment to combat this 
social ill as embodied by the Full Employment Act of 1946. This fight was given new 
impetus by President Kennedy (1961-63), who asserted that “[w]e cannot afford to settle for 
any prescribed level of unemployment.”110 Taking its cues from Keynesian economists, the 
first Economic Report of the President published by the new administration initially targeted 
an unemployment rate of 4 percent—below what previous policymakers had assessed to be 
sustainable and non-inflationary.111  
In the 1950s, unemployment rates at 5 percent or higher were seen as normal. In the 60s, 
however, FOMC members came to share the beliefs of fiscal policymakers that 
unemployment hovering between 5 and 6 percent indicated a large degree of unutilized 
resources, implying that inflation due to excess demand was not a concern. As an example of 
the optimistic assessments of the time, in its May 1964 meeting, the FOMC assessed nominal 
GDP growth of 7.5 percent as a “moderate, sustainable pace.”112 
The relation between inflation and unemployment became increasingly unstable as the 
unemployment rate had a tendency to bounce back after each attempted expansion of the 
economy through monetary and fiscal stimulus. In his 1968 presidential address before the 
American Economic Association (AEA), Friedman confronted the conventional wisdom, 
arguing that attempts at reducing unemployment at the cost of increased inflation would only 
have, at most, a temporary effect, since rising price growth would change inflation 
expectations among wage earners, thereby leading to calls for higher nominal wages to catch 
up with inflation. This would then push real wages (nominal wages adjusted for inflation) 
back up to the level they were before the last bout of inflation, thereby reestablishing the 
previous level of unemployment, but now at a higher level of inflation. Friedman concluded: 
“there is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no 
permanent trade-off.”113 
This analysis led to the notion of a “natural rate of unemployment,” a level that neither pushes 
inflation up, nor down. It would later be referred to as the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU). This model of the economy attributes inflationary pressures to 
employment exceeding its natural level. By implication, inflation can be brought down by 
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inducing economic slack, that is, a period in which employment and output is pushed below 
potential by aggregate demand restraint.  
Policymakers quickly adopted the “natural rate” framework. An early indicator was the 1970 
Economic Report of the President (the first under the Nixon Administration), which stated 
that “inflations have seldom ended without a temporary rise in unemployment,” implying that 
aggregate demand restraint “should ultimately produce high employment with much less 
inflation than we have recently experienced.” Fiscal policymakers pictured a transition, in 
which unemployment and inflation might “be higher than would have been desirable if the 
inflation had not been allowed to persist so long.” They concluded that this is “the price we 
must pay for having long pursued inflationary policies. Once inflation has been set in motion, 
there is no way of correcting it without some costs.”114 
Thus the new framework led policymakers to believe that changes in inflation were 
dependent upon the divergence between actual unemployment and the “natural” level. 
However, the estimates of the natural rate of unemployment went through substantial 
revisions. Overestimating the sustainable level of output and employment and 
underestimating the ability of demand restraint to pull down inflation, led to inflation trending 
upwards throughout the decade and into the next.115 
As a result, the inflation pessimism among policymakers became more entrenched. Chairman 
Burns early on came to the conclusion that “the old rules were no longer working.” This view 
was reiterated at the end of the decade, as the President’s economic advisors came to believe 
that “experience has demonstrated that the inflation we have inherited from the past cannot be 
cured by policies that slow growth and keep unemployment high,” concluding that 
“[e]conomic stagnation is not the answer to inflation.” Fed Chairman Miller, who was 
appointed in 1978, agreed, saying that “an appreciable slowing of inflation would prove more 
difficult to achieve than previously had been anticipated.”116 
Symptomatically, the Congressional Joint Economic Report of 1979 stated that inflation 
“cannot be dealt with […] through demand restrictions alone without exacting intolerable 
costs in terms of lost output and high unemployment.” Moreover, inflationary pressures were 
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in large part attributed to “rising energy and food costs” as well as a host of other factors, 
including weak productivity gains and a depreciating dollar.117  
The beliefs of monetary policymakers would change profoundly under the chairmanships of 
Volcker (1979-1987) and Greenspan (1987-2006), firmly believing in the need to restrain 
inflation. At the same time, the emergence of a new set of doctrines based on the notion of 
“rational expectations” would come to influence macroeconomic practitioners and theorists. 
 
The Rational Expectations Revolution 
The natural rate framework led to a new focus on expectations among monetary 
policymakers.118 Forward-looking behavior on the part of the public plays a central role in 
this model, because unions base their wage claims on inflation expectations. Thus if inflation 
exceeds expectations, real wages will be pushed down in the short run (since nominal wage 
demands will fall behind inflation). If actual inflation falls short of expectations, real wages 
will tend to trend upwards. Such a dynamic could be characterized as “adaptive expectations” 
in that the public adjusts their behavior based on recent experience with inflation and 
macroeconomic policy actions. 
Robert Lucas Jr., a Chicago school economist, picked up on Friedman’s critique of postwar 
stabilization policy embodied in the natural rate hypothesis and expanded it into a full 
theoretical paradigm based on the notion of “rational expectations.” In attempting to reconcile 
macroeconomics with microeconomic theory, he started out from a core assumption of human 
behavior, namely that people are rational. Extending this analysis to the macro sphere, he 
came to believe that the public could assess the model of the economy that fiscal and 
monetary authorities make use of, thus forming expectations on observed policy actions.119 
By implication, policymakers could only pull down unemployment by surprising the public 
with monetary stimulus exceeding their expectations. This thinking gave rise to the “Lucas 
critique,” which asserted that the macro-econometric models used in policymaking relied 
upon empirical equations and estimates from periods in which the public had formed certain 
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expectations about macroeconomic policy. If these expectations changed, due to changes in 
policy, so would these equations.  
Lucas would become the intellectual figurehead of “New Classical” economics. This school 
of thought questioned most of the central tenets of post-war Keynesianism, and largely 
discarded notions of market imperfections—such as the Keynesian idea of “sticky” prices and 
wages.120 Along with this new thinking, came a skeptical attitude towards the need for 
government stabilization policies. 
When Lucas and his New Classical comrades-in-arms launched the “rational expectations 
revolution” in the late 1970s, they did so by fervently attacking Keynesianism. In a 1978 
paper titled “After Keynesian Macroeconomics,” Lucas and Thomas J. Sargent triumphantly 
wrote: “That the predictions [of Keynesian economics] were wildly incorrect, and that the 
doctrine on which they were based was fundamentally flawed, are now simple matters of 
fact.” The task confronting “contemporary students of the business cycle,” then, was to sort 
through the “wreckage” to see “what features of that remarkable intellectual event called the 
Keynesian Revolution can be salvaged” and “which others must be discarded.”121 To add 
insult to injury, Lucas and Sargent further denigrated the Keynesian paradigm by questioning 
whether the theory had any scientific foundations at all: “For policy, the central fact is that 
Keynesian policy recommendations have no sounder basis, in a scientific sense, than 
recommendations of non-Keynesian economists or, for that matter, noneconomists.”122  
Looking back at these developments, Olivier Blanchard described the discipline as a 
“battlefield.” However, in spite of the vitriol of the late 70s and early 80s, the main idea of the 
New Classical “assault”—rational expectations—was widely accepted by the economics 
profession, including a new generation of economists that wished to revive some of the basic 
assumptions of Keynesianism, at the same time incorporating the critique by Lucas and other 
New Classicals. Keynesian and New Classical economics were fused into a new set of 
thought—a synthesis named “New Keynesian” economics. 
A major area of contention between the two emerging main strands of macroeconomics was 
whether the economy, on a macro level, was inherently unstable, and thus in need of 
government intervention. In line with Keynes’ critique of the capitalist system as inherently 
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unstable and prone to below potential performance in the absence of the guiding hand of the 
authorities, New Keynesians came to regard the economy as characterized by certain 
imperfections, even though they tended to have a more optimistic outlook on its overall 
performance. New Classicals, on the other hand, would downplay such imperfections, at the 
same time stressing the shortcomings of government macro interventions. 
New Keynesian thought and policy prescriptions became the prevailing wisdom among 
would-be economic “engineers”—those looking to influence macroeconomic policy during 
the Great Moderation. According to N. Gregory Mankiw, a self-styled New Keynesian, these 
economists were “by temperament, more inclined to become macroeconomic engineers than 
were the economists working within the new classical tradition.”123 He adds that, to his 
knowledge, no New Classical economist ever left academia to pursue a career in public 
policy. By contrast, several influential New Keynesians entered into public service, including 
Larry Summers (former Treasury Secretary), John B. Taylor (former Under Secretary of the 
Treasury), Richard Clarida (former White House economic advisor)—not to mention Ben 
Bernanke (former Fed Governor, now Fed Chairman), Olivier Blanchard (Chief Economist of 
the IMF) and Mankiw himself (former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers). 
Even though many New Keynesians found their way into high-ranking positions within the 
federal government, including the Federal Reserve, it has been argued that the application of 
New Keynesian models to actual policy-making was somewhat limited. According to Alan 
Blinder, the Fed continued to rely upon traditional Keynesian models.124 Mankiw thinks the 
same could be said of fiscal policymakers and concludes that business cycle theorizing by 
contemporary schools of thought “has had close to zero impact on practical policymaking.”125 
This could be pushing the argument a bit too far. After all, formal models are not all that 
matters within policymaking. The historical record suggests that the core idea of rational 
expectations had a profound impact on how monetary policymakers think. This was the main 
lesson learned from the wage-price spiral of the 1970s. By looking at the development of 
actual policy models, it would seem that Mankiw misses the mark even in a formal sense. The 
FRB/US model, developed in the mid-90s, makes extensive use of the theoretical 
contributions by New Keynesians and New Classicals.126 “A key feature of the new model is 
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that expectations of future economic conditions are explicit in many of its equations.”127 Other 
central banks have followed in the same direction.128 Moreover, speeches by leading Fed 
officials are ripe with references to recent research literature. For example, in a speech 
emphasizing the “science of monetary policy,” Fed Governor Frederic S. Mishkin told a 
group of economics students at MIT that the “key element of the macroeconomics revolution 
in recent decades has been the recognition that the dynamic structure of the economy is not 
purely mechanistic but instead reflects the fundamental role of expectations in the economic 
decisions of households and firms.”129 (Emphasis added.)  
On a practical level, this thinking gave rise to the idea of inflation targeting, a means by 
which the government attempts to manage the inflation expectations of the public. The 
stabilization of inflation expectations through what central bankers referred to as a “nominal 
anchor” was seen as both the central goal and the most important achievement of central 
banks during the Great Moderation.130 Price stability, or constant and moderate inflation, was 
in turn seen as a prerequisite for achieving stability in output and employment. 
The monetarist emphasis on the importance of monetary policy became a staple belief among 
the economics profession, though not in the way Friedman had envisioned. At the center of 
monetarist thought was a firm belief that “money matters,” stressing the need to monitor and 
control monetary aggregates to stabilize prices and dampen the business cycle, preferably 
through a “monetarist” rule. This basic tenet was discarded and replaced by the looser notion 
of “monetary policy matters” as the forming consensus centered upon the policy rate of the 
central bank as the main tool of conducting stabilization policy.131 
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Monetary policy was identified as a more potent tool for influencing the business cycle and 
real variables such as output and employment in the short run than traditional post-war 
Keynesian fiscal remedies. Interest rates can be cut on short notice and without the potential 
political pitfalls and duress that accompany budgetary appropriations, a realization that 
dawned upon activist economists during this period.132 Former Clinton Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence Summers succinctly summed up the new consensus: 
“Fierce debates continue about how the Federal Reserve Board and other central banks should 
set monetary policy. But the debates take place within the context of nearly complete 
agreement on some basics: Monetary policy can shape an economy more than budgetary 
policy can; extended high inflation will not lead to prosperity and can lead to lower living 
standards; policy makers cannot fine-tune their economies as they fluctuate.”133 
Thus Friedman’s principle legacy was threefold: First, he put expectations on center stage 
within macroeconomic thought. Second, he convinced policymakers and economic 
“engineers” that monetary policy was the most effective tool to influence real variables such 
as output and employment in the short-run. Third, he convinced central bankers that the Great 
Depression could have been mitigated if the Fed had followed an expansionary policy in the 
early 1930s. These three core beliefs came to play an important role in the development of the 
Fed’s monetary doctrines during the Great Moderation. 
The evolving doctrines and practices, influenced by the intellectual response to the Great 
Inflation as well as to unfolding events during the Great Moderation, will be the topic of the 
next three chapters. However, a brief discussion of the Federal Reserve’s legal mandate and 
how it has evolved through time is necessary to gain some understanding of the institutional 
context within which policy is formulated and implemented. 
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The Fed’s Dual Mandate 
The Federal Reserve System was established through law in 1913. Since then its legislative 
mandate has changed several times during its near one century of existence. The original 
stated goal was to maintain an “elastic currency” to ensure a sufficient supply of liquidity to 
smooth out the seasonal fluctuations in the demand for money, as well as function as a 
“lender of last resort” in order to stave off banking panics.134 In the following decades, the 
newly created monetary authority was put to the test.  
During the financial crisis and severe downturn following the crash of 1929, the Fed was 
unable to prevent a severe monetary contraction, or effectively fulfill its role as lender of last 
resort. The monetary contraction led to a rapid fall in output and employment. In 1933, gross 
domestic product (GDP) was more than 30 percent below its 1929 level. The unemployment 
rate reached 25 percent and stayed at a high level all the way up to the Second World War.135 
The persistent high unemployment rates of the 1930s led to a reorientation of economic 
policy. The fight against unemployment was now seen as the most important task facing the 
authorities when it came to domestic economic policy. This goal was stipulated in the Full 
Employment Act of 1946. Even though this piece of legislation did not mention the Fed 
specifically, it required the federal government to foster “conditions under which there will be 
afforded useful employment opportunities […] for those able, willing, and seeking to work, 
and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.”136 
However, the term “full employment” is rather vague and, as such, can be interpreted to mean 
either a commitment to counteract drops in employment, to avoid what happened in the 
1930s, or a commitment to push the unemployment rate down to very low levels through 
expansionary measures, as was done in the 1960s and 70s. As noted, the major shift in 
policymaking was introduced with the Kennedy-Johnson Administration (1961-69). 
Consistently overestimating sustainable output and employment and underestimating how 
policy affected inflation led to policy mistakes during the 60s and 70s. The stagflation and 
Great Inflation that followed what could be seen as an over-ambitious interpretation of the 
employment mandate led to revisions of the macroeconomic goals, which were captured in 
the 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act. The new mandate of the Fed stated that it 
“shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the 
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economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of 
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”137 
The goal of full or “maximum employment” remained. However, with the 1970s inflationary 
experience in mind, the interpretation of this goal changed to one in which “full employment” 
was explicitly defined as the employment level “commensurate with the economy’s long run 
potential to increase production,” that is, with the assumed long-term sustainable growth path 
of the economy. Moreover, “promoting full employment can be interpreted as a 
countercyclical monetary policy in which the Fed aims to smooth out the amplitude of the 
business cycle.”138 Thus, this goal can be understood as a mandate to stabilizing short-term 
fluctuations in output. In addition to this output goal, the central bank was explicitly given the 
mandate to ensure “stable prices,” a reflection of the unpleasant experience with the Great 
Inflation. The third goal listed in the 1977 legislation was “moderate long-term interest rates.” 
However, this is implied by the goal of stable prices, since moderate price growth (low 
inflation) also entails low nominal interest rates. The Fed was thereby in effect given a “dual” 
mandate, to pursue price and output stability. 
Monetary policymakers came to believe that the stabilization of the year-on-year growth in 
consumer prices and the “anchoring” of inflation expectations to that target was the best way 
to achieve the goal of output stabilization. As witnessed by Vice Fed Chairman Donald 
Kohn’s comments on the subject in the opening quote of this chapter, the objective for the 
Fed is “to promote maximum sustainable employment and stable prices over time,” two goals 
that are intimately linked in theory and practice because “promoting price stability” will 
“contribute to maximum employment and growth over time by eliminating the uncertainties 
and distortions of high and unstable inflation.”139 
The new understanding of the government’s macroeconomic goals was further confirmed in 
the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, also named the Humphrey-Hawkins 
Act after its main sponsors. This piece of legislation mandates the federal government to 
“promote full employment and production, increased real income, balanced growth, a 
balanced Federal budget, adequate productivity growth, proper attention to national priorities, 
achievement of an improved trade balance […] and reasonable price stability.”140 (Emphasis 
added.) 
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The legislation on “price stability” did not specify a target range for inflation. In contrast to 
several other industrial countries, there is no formalized target for the U.S. inflation rate. 
However, there seemed to be an informal target around 2 percent, even though there has been 
some academic debate on whether the Fed has implicitly conducted policy with such a target 
in mind.141 The other stated goal, that the central bank should move to stabilize the level of 
output, is usually expressed by the so-called “output gap.” This gap is any deviation from the 
long-term “trend” growth of GDP, assumed to be the optimal and sustainable rate of growth 
for the economy. 
If the level of economic activity is too high, there is a positive output gap. If in addition 
inflation is anticipated to exceed 2 percent, the central bank is expected to tighten monetary 
policy by raising interest rates and halting money growth. Conversely, if expected price 
inflation falls below the stated target and employment and output levels are too low—a 
negative output gap—the central bank is expected to ease in order to stimulate the economy 
back to its assumed sustainable levels of output, employment and inflation. 
The optimal weight given to the two targets—the inflation target and output target—is 
formalized in the “Taylor rule,” which offers guiding principles for how the monetary policy 
rate (the fed funds rate) should move up or down in response to deviations of inflation and 
output from the desired levels.142 In response to inflation, the fed funds rate should move 
faster than the inflation rate to make sure that the “real” fed funds rate (the interest rate 
adjusted for inflation) is in fact raised—the so-called “Taylor principle.”143  
This principle was not followed by the FOMC in the 1970s, leading to accelerating inflation. 
With Volcker came a more proactive stance towards inflation. In order to “break that cycle,” 
the chairman stressed the “need to change expectations” and establish a “credible and 
disciplined monetary policy.”144 His successor Alan Greenspan would take this challenge 
seriously, pushing policy towards the yet unattained goal of “price stability.” 
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4. FEAR OF INFLATION: THE GREAT MODERATION 
“The long-run costs of a return to higher inflation and the risks of this occurring under current 
circumstances are sufficiently great that Federal Reserve policy at this juncture might be well 
advised to err more on the side of restrictiveness rather than stimulus.”145 
—Alan Greenspan (1988) 
The Greenspan FOMC seemed determined to establish its inflation-fighting credentials, first 
through raising rates in 1989 in an attempt to cool down the economy, then in the early 1990s 
by only slowly responding to an economic recession, and lastly, in 1994, by moving against 
inflationary pressures even before a rise in inflation made itself visible. This last move earned 
the label “preemptive strike.”146 Inflation rates did come down, from around 6 percent at the 
end of 1990, stabilizing at around 3 percent from 1992 to 1996. The nominal fed funds rate 
adjusted for inflation (the real rate) went through two significant swings from mid-1990 to 
late 1995. (See figure 4.1.) 
Figure 4.1 (a-b) The Greenspan Disinflation and Price Growth Stabilization, 1990-96 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED; Author’s Calculations (CPIAUCNS, FEDFUNDS) 
This chapter will explore some of the developments underlying the observed movements of 
these indicators, as well as the beliefs informing Fed practices during the first decade of the 
Greenspan FOMC. 
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The Primacy of Price Stability 
Greenspan was appointed Fed Chairman by President Reagan in the summer of 1987, 
confirmed by the Senate on August 3 and sworn in on August 11. His first policy inclination 
was to tighten. He pushed for an increase in the discount rate, from 5.5 to 6 percent, in order 
to “subdue inflationary pressures.”147 Shortly thereafter, a major stock market sell-off led Fed 
policymakers to conduct sizeable open market operations to “assure adequate liquidity” in the 
face of volatile financial markets.148 In the ensuing months, FOMC members agreed that 
circumstances pointed to weaker economic growth and “a lower risk of any substantial pickup 
in inflation.”149  
The following year was “a challenging one for monetary policy,” according to Greenspan. 
Uncertainties about the impact of the stock market crash on activities in the financial sector 
and the economy at large led Fed policymakers to increase “the availability of bank reserves 
slightly further” and to monitor “financial and economic indicators closely for any signs that 
the economic expansion was faltering.” Gradually, it became clear that “the economic 
expansion remained well on track and that the balance of risks was shifting in the direction of 
higher inflation.”150 
In other words, once financial stress subsided, concerns with inflation returned. In his 
February 1988 Humphrey-Hawkins statement, Greenspan stressed the “formidable 
challenges” ahead in “meeting national economic goals of sustaining growth and progress 
toward price stability.” He expressed support of the Fed’s dual mandate, emphasizing the 
“focus on maintaining the economic expansion and on progress toward price stability” seen as 
a “necessary condition for long-term sustained economic growth.”151 
The Monetary Policy Report of February 1989, reaffirmed the Fed’s commitment to “contain 
inflationary pressures,” reflected in FOMC decisions to “lower the ranges for monetary and 
credit expansion” that year. M2 growth ranges was reduced by a full percentage point from 
the year before, “signaling the Committee’s determination to resist any upward tendencies in 
inflation in the coming year and to promote progress toward price stability over the long 
run.”152 The growth rates of both base money and M2 decelerated from mid-1988 and well 
into 1989 before trending upwards again, as shown in figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Monetary Base and M2 Growth, 1987-1990 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (BOGUMBNS, M2NS; % change from a year ago) 
In February 1989, Greenspan was concerned that the economy was running close to its 
potential, increasing the risks of price pressures. In these circumstances, the Fed remained 
“more inclined to act in the direction of restraint than toward stimulus.” He told Senate 
committee members that “the current rate of inflation, let alone an increase, is not 
acceptable, and our policies are designed to reduce inflation in coming years.”153 
(Emphasis added.) Inflation was at this point exceeding four percent and trending upwards. 
Figure 4.3 The Greenspan Inflation, 1987-1990 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (CPIAUCNS, % change from a year ago) 
Greenspan warned that policy actions aimed at reducing inflation “will involve containing 
pressures on our productive resources and, thus, some slowing in the underlying rate of 
growth of real GNP is likely in 1989.”154 In other words, aggregate demand restraint was 
necessary to counter inflationary pressures. Such restraint was orchestrated by putting 
pressure on reserve positions, that is, tightening conditions in the market for reserve balances 
and raising the federal funds rate. Between March 1988 and May 1989, the FOMC raised the 
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rate in several steps, from 6.5 percent to 9.8125 percent (see figure 4.4). The fed funds rate 
was raised faster than the inflation rate, ensuring that the real fed funds rose as well. 
Figure 4.4 Monetary Policy Rate, 1988-1989 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (DFEDTAR) 
The Natural Rate Framework of the Greenspan Fed 
These policy actions, and the reasoning behind them, affirm the natural rate framework, 
pointing to the potency of monetary policy in restraining aggregate demand: “In the short 
run, demands can fall short of or run ahead of available resources. Monetary policy can 
assist in bringing about a better match between demand and potential supply and thereby 
contribute to aggregate price stability.”155 This approach was consistently applied when 
assessing ongoing economic developments in FOMC policy deliberations. A mainspring 
of this framework is the notion that economic activity fluctuates around a long-run 
sustainable level, given “available resources” and a certain level of productive capacity. 
When pushing demand beyond this level, adverse consequences can arise: 
“When the economy is operating below capacity, bringing demand in line with supply can 
involve real GNP growth that is faster for a time than its long run potential. But when the 
economy is operating essentially at capacity, monetary policy cannot force demand to expand 
more rapidly than potential supply without adverse consequences. Such an attempt will result in 
accelerating prices and wages, as producers bid for scarcer, and at the margin less productive, 
labor and capital. Over time it would result in little, if any, additional output.”156 
This way of thinking was apparent among macroeconomic policymakers in this period.157 
However, in the early 1990s, revisions were made by the Fed, reflecting changing economic 
circumstances. Historical experience seemed to suggest that the behavior of inflation 
“depends not only on the amount of slack remaining in labor and product markets, but on 
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other factors as well, including the rate at which that slack is changing.” In his July 1993 
Humphrey-Hawkins statement, Greenspan explained that when the economy is moving 
rapidly towards capacity, even though capacity has not yet been reached, “temporary 
bottlenecks emerge” that can push up prices. Moreover, “workers and producers raise wages 
and prices in anticipation of continued strengthening in demand.”158  
These amendments to the basic model were based on observed behavior of economic 
indicators at the time. Notably, “some of the readings on inflation” were “disturbing.” 
Greenspan noted that coming out of the 1991 recession “prices might be accelerating despite 
product market slack and an unemployment rate noticeably above estimates of the so-called 
‘natural’ rate of unemployment—that is, the rate at which price pressures remain roughly 
constant.” In the past, he held, “the existing degree of slack in the economy had been 
consistent with continuing disinflation.” In other words, the economic model was in need of 
revision due to the changing nature of the American economy. Such an approach to modeling 
and policymaking has been characteristic of the Greenspan Fed. In the words of Alan Blinder, 
who served as Fed Vice Chairman in the mid-90s, “Greenspan never has accepted the idea 
that any model with unchanging coefficients, or even with an unchanging structure, can 
describe the U.S. economy adequately. Rather, he sees the economy as in a state of constant 
flux, and he sees the central bank as constantly in learning mode.”159 
Such an approach to understanding the economy seems reminiscent of the interwar 
institutionalism of Wesley C. Mitchell and his empirical business cycle research. In 1997, 
Greenspan explicitly pointed to these influences: “There are certain principles, and certain 
empirical regularities in behavioral relations, that we can follow with some degree of 
confidence.” Many of these relationships are “embedded in the traditional notion of the 
business cycle developed by Wesley Clair Mitchell” and worked out with Arthur Burns, who 
became Fed Chairman in the 1970s. “Their insights remain relevant today.”160 Though there 
were “empirical regularities,” that could be followed, “each cycle tends to have its own 
identifying characteristic.” Thus forecasting must face an ever-changing economic structure 
as well as institutional changes impacting the behavior of the economy. One such change, 
making its mark on the U.S. economy of the 1980s and early 1990s, emanated from reforms 
of the regulatory framework for the financial services industry, especially depository 
institutions. These developments would have wide-ranging implications for monetary policy. 
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Abandoning the Monetary Aggregates 
Early on, Greenspan commented upon the uncertainties surrounding the monetary targets the 
FOMC was supposed to focus on, saying that “innovation and deregulation has affected the 
behavior of the monetary aggregates in a number of ways,” only some of which the monetary 
authorities fully understood. Thus the behavior of the aggregates seemed to have introduced 
more “noise” in the relationship between money and spending.161 
One origin of this “noise” was the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act (DIDMCA), enacted in 1980, which led to significant changes in the institutional makeup 
of U.S. financial markets, in turn affecting the behavior of the monetary aggregates. By 
allowing banks to freely set interest rates on deposits, the public could choose to hold more of 
their wealth in demand deposits rather than short-term financial instruments. Moreover, the 
ratio of demand deposits to currency, that is, how much money people held in the form of 
cash and how much they chose to hold in checking accounts, changed as well.162 As a result, 
both the supply and velocity of M1 went through large swings, making it hard to predict how 
changes in the monetary base—the only component of the money supply directly controlled 
by the Fed—would impact the wider money supply, let alone the overall level of spending. 
In the first seven years after DIDMCA was passed into law, M1 velocity mostly trended 
downwards. Nominal spending, as measured by final sales of domestic products, decelerated 
during the Volcker-induced recession at the start of the decade, and then again in the second 
half of the decade, alongside falling M1 velocity, as seen in figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 M1 Velocity and Nominal Spending, 1979-1987 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (FINSAL, M1V; % change from a year ago) 
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Volcker has been attributed with ending inflation through consistent monetary tightening. 
However, when looking at M1 figures, it would seem that the monetary aggregates did much 
of the job for him. By trending downwards, M1 velocity would dampen the growth in overall 
spending, thus putting a break on inflationary pressures. The main driver of these 
developments seems to be the financial deregulation of the early 1980s, changing the public’s 
behavior. In result, inflation rapidly trended downwards, as can be seen in figure 4.6. 
Figure 4.6 The Volcker Disinflation, 1979-1987 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (CPIAUCNS, % change from a year ago) 
Volcker did not comment upon the causal connections between falling velocity and 
DIDMCA.163 The Greenspan FOMC seemed more aware of these connections. Writing in 
1989, FOMC Secretary Donald Kohn commented upon how the Fed had changed “the weight 
that is placed on money and credit measures in the conduct of policy,” reflecting “important 
underlying developments in financial markets,” notably “changes in markets for deposits and 
other financial assets wrought by innovation and deregulation in the 1980s.” Domestic 
deregulation would combine with freer international capital flows to create circumstances in 
which, “the boundaries around specific collections of financial instruments have become 
increasingly arbitrary, and monetary or credit aggregates, however carefully delineated, are 
less likely to be stably related to spending or income.”164 
These developments made the monetary aggregates less reliable for policy purposes. 
However, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 explicitly mandated the Fed to target money 
growth. This piece of legislation requires the central bank to “maintain long-run growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long-run potential to 
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”165 It also requires that the Fed reports its target 
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ranges for money growth twice every year to Congress. Still, the Greenspan FOMC dropped 
the target range for M1 in 1987.166 
The growth ranges for the broader measures of the money supply, M2 and M3, played some 
role until 1992. In that year, the FOMC took note of “the substantial uncertainties regarding 
the relationships between income and money […]” Nominal income had proceeded at a faster 
pace than the monetary aggregates, leading Greenspan to ask: “What accounts for this 
unusual behavior? Why is it that our financial system was able to support 5½ percent growth 
in nominal GDP with only 2 percent growth in M2 and ½ percent growth in M3?” He found 
part of the answer in developments taking place in financial markets, more specifically the 
acceleration of a “long-standing process of rechanneling credit flows outside of depository 
institutions.” The increased use of capital markets for raising funds among borrowers and the 
tendency for savers to place their funds outside of deposit-taking banks, had led to a rapidly 
changing financial landscape. As a result, “the relationship between money and the economy 
may be undergoing a significant transformation.”167 
In line with its legal mandate, Greenspan assured Senate committee members that the Fed 
would continue to pay “substantial attention to developments in the money supply,” though 
stressing that “[s]electing ranges for monetary growth over the coming year consistent with 
desired economic performance, however, is especially difficult when the relationship between 
money and income has become uncertain.” He concluded that the FOMC “necessarily has 
given less weight to monetary aggregates in the conduct of policy and has relied on a broad 
range of indicators of future financial and economic developments and price pressures.”168 
In effect, Greenspan was abolishing monetary targets altogether, even though the Fed, in line 
with its formal mandate, continued to report monetary targets to Congress as an “empty 
ritual,” in the words of Alan Blinder.169 Financial deregulation played a major part in these 
developments, both in bringing down inflation during the Volcker years as well as convincing 
monetary policymakers of the futility of targeting monetary aggregates. Moreover, the wide-
ranging changes to the financial landscape played into another major development, which 
would have a major impact on policymaking, namely the evolving U.S. banking crisis, 
escalating towards the end of the 1980s. 
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The Balance Sheet Recession 
The Great Inflation had several consequences for the workings of the U.S. economy and its 
financial markets, not the least for the country’s thrift institutions, also called savings and 
loan associations (S&Ls). These were small, local (non-commercial) banks depositing 
people’s savings and making mortgages. Their postwar business model was simple; they paid 
3 percent interest on deposits, which were insured by the Federal Savings and Loans 
Insurance Corporation, and took 6 percent interest on mortgages, which were of the fixed 
rate, 30-year kind. 
Regulations put interest rate caps on deposits. As inflation rose above these caps, people took 
their money elsewhere, leading to large-scale disintermediation in the mortgage industry. 
Moreover, high inflation squeezed the profit margins of the thrifts, which were stuck with 
long-term assets (mortgages) with a fixed interest rate falling behind the inflation rate. By the 
time the Volcker Fed started initiating measures to pull down inflation, hundreds of S&Ls 
were facing insolvency. Congress intervened, passing two financial reform bills aimed at 
helping the thrift industry. S&Ls were now allowed to set interest rates freely and engage in a 
wide range of loan activities, of which they had little experience. 
Paul Krugman cites the S&L episode as a “classic example” of moral hazard: “because 
depositors in thrifts were guaranteed by FSLIC, they had no incentive to police the lending of 
the institutions in which they placed their money; since the owners of thrifts did not need to 
put much of their own money at risk, they had every incentive to play a game of heads I win, 
tails the taxpayer loses.”170 Forbearance towards insolvent institutions spawned a situation in 
which bankers were incentivized to gamble their way out of insolvency, having nothing to 
lose. Congress and the administration, in their effort to help the thrift industry, unintentionally 
encouraged such activities, leading to a decade of unsound practices and several cases of 
outright fraud. By the time Greenspan took over as Fed Chairman, large-scale banking 
problems were coming to the surface.171  
In the end, the banking crisis led to extensive losses, some of which were shouldered by 
taxpayers. At the same time, households and businesses faced substantial losses from falling 
assets prices, such as depreciating houses and construction ventures gone sour. This, in turn, 
created a situation that could perhaps be described as a “balance sheet recession.”172 
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The recession of 1990-91 contained unfamiliar elements, creating widespread uncertainties 
among market participants as well as monetary policymakers. Greenspan pointed to the 
unusual circumstances facing the economy, including “record debt burdens, overbuilding in 
commercial real estate, and a substantial cutback in defense spending.” Monetary policy 
actions were trying to respond to these developments, though substantial impediments to 
growth made this a hard task for the FOMC, among which “balance sheet restructuring” was 
“perhaps the most important” factor.173 
Greenspan noted that in the 1980s, “debt growth, hand in hand with rising asset prices, 
considerably exceeded that of income, and debt burdens rose to record levels.” Between 1984 
and 1990 around $600 billion in corporate equity was replaced by debt. At the same time, 
mortgage debt on existing homes increased close to $700 billion as households “endeavored 
to leverage the equity in their homes, the prices of which seemed to be on a permanent 
uptrend.” Moreover, tax legislation along with increased demand for office space and 
building structures in a burgeoning service economy, led to “a rapid rise in commercial 
property asset prices and commercial construction, financed largely by debt.”174 
The balance sheet recession scenario entails a period of leveraging and rising asset prices, 
followed by an asset bust, impairing the balance sheets of households and firms, in the end 
leading to a protracted period of debt repayment and sluggish growth. Greenspan pointed to 
the “difficulties faced by borrowers in servicing their debts as the expansion slowed and the 
leveling out or decline in asset prices prompted many to cut back expenditures and divert 
abnormal proportions of their cashflows to debt repayment.” Such developments tend to slow 
down the growth rate of the economy as spending drops, putting downward pressures on 
aggregate demand. At the same time, financial institutions faced “impaired equity positions” 
due to “sizable loan losses” combined with a newfound regulatory stringency. In result, 
lenders limited the availability of credit, adding another impediment to growth.175 
The debt dynamics underlying balance sheet recessions are of great importance for the 
efficacy of monetary policy. When household and corporate balance sheets are damaged due 
to falling asset prices and high debt burdens, so that they in effect end up with negative 
equity, the public shifts into “debt minimization” mode, paying down debt, rather than taking 
out new loans.176 The monetary transmission mechanism, by which the central bank is trying 
to influence its policy goals, mainly works through the banking system. By extending credit, 
the banks provide most of the wider money supply, which consists of “deposit currency” on 
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top of base money. If bank lending slows down, either due to banks rebuilding capital and 
working up reserves, or because the public is reluctant to borrow, the monetary transmission 
mechanism breaks down. Thus monetary easing is seriously hampered, because expanding 
the monetary base through open market operations has little effect on the broader monetary 
aggregates. 
Looking back at the early 1990s, Greenspan complains that “[n]othing we did at the Fed 
seemed to work.” The FOMC had started its easing cycle well before the recession broke out, 
“but the economy had stopped responding.” In spite of lowering the fed funds rate twenty-
three times between July 1989 and July 1992, “the recovery was one of the most sluggish on 
record.” He described the forces impeding growth as a “fifty-mile-an-hour headwind.”177 At 
the time, he noted that “the cumulative upward momentum that characterized previous 
recoveries was absent.” Moreover, the “growing propensity of households to pare debt and 
businesses to reduce leverage was a signal that the balance sheet restraints, feared by many 
for a long time, had indeed taken hold, working against the normal forces of economic 
growth.”178 A contemporary observer noted that the “year 1991 marked the first time in a 
generation that American companies and consumers decided to get out of debt.”179 
Applying the balance sheet recession approach to this episode, it would seem that, once more, 
events originating in the financial sector, rather than monetary policy, were the main 
determinants of disinflation. When the public enters into debt minimization mode, money 
growth will halt, putting downward pressures on spending and prices. M2 growth decelerated 
significantly in spite of substantial rate cuts. (See figure 4.7.) 
Figure 4.7 M2 Growth, 1990-1992 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (M2NS, % change from a year ago) 
                                                      
177 Greenspan, Age of Turbulence, 2007, p. 118 
178 Alan Greenspan, “Testimony,” before the Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of 
Representatives, December 18, 1991 
179 Christopher Wood, The Bubble Economy, Solstice, 2006, p. 180 [Originally published in 1993] 
0.0	  2.0	  
4.0	  6.0	  
8.0	  
1990	   1991	   1992	  
M2	  Growth	  
 58 
The monetary base expanded by around 5.5 percent on an annual basis in 1990, 7.4 percent in 
1991 and then 10.2 percent in 1992, but to little avail. The broader monetary aggregates were 
not responding as intended.180 The fed funds target rate was reduced in a series of steps during 
1990-1992, as seen in figure 4.8. Still, the “headwind” kept the recovery on hold.  
Figure 4.8 Monetary Policy Rate, 1990-1992 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (DFEDTAR) 
The Fed was criticized for not cutting rates fast enough. In the words of Greenspan: “Some 
have argued that monetary policy has been too cautious, that rates should have been lowered 
more sharply or in larger increments.” However, he was concerned with the “sensitivity of 
inflation expectations” and what was seen as a necessary period of readjustment, working 
through structural imbalances in order to “establish a basis for sustained growth.” Too 
aggressive easing was deemed inappropriate, since it would not have “dealt fundamentally 
with the very real imbalances” that “needed to be resolved before sustainable growth could 
resume.”181 This line of reasoning deserves some attention, since it is almost the exact 
opposite of how the Fed was perceived to behave in the 2000s, when the notion of a 
“Greenspan put” came to the fore. 
A major motive behind the hesitant rate cuts during the recession of 1990-91 seems to have 
been the fear of reemerging inflation. Reading through sources of the early Greenspan years, 
this fear always seems to loom high among Fed policymakers. Some critics, including several 
media commentators and political leaders, questioned the rationale behind this gradualist 
approach to monetary easing when inflation was in fact falling.182 (See figure 4.9).  
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Figure 4.9 Monetary Policy Rate and Inflation Rate, 1990-1991 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (DFEDTAR, CPIAUCNS) 
Greenspan answered that this argument was a “non sequitur,” since the “disinflation very 
likely would not have occurred in the context of an appreciably more stimulative policy, and 
such a policy could have led to higher inflation in the next few years.” Moreover, the 
“credibility of noninflationary policies would have been strained and longer-term interest 
rates likely would be higher, inhibiting the restructuring of balance sheets and reducing the 
odds of sustainable growth.”183  
Arguments advanced at the time, as well as retrospective commentaries, suggest that the 
FOMC did not associate the disinflation with the balance sheet recession, creating downward 
pressures on money and spending. Instead, the behavior of inflation was primarily attributed 
to expectations. Greenspan thought that the lack of a clear commitment to the overriding goal 
of price stability could have led long-term interest rates to shoot up, making the readjustments 
and repair of damaged balance sheets for households and corporations harder, prolonging the 
crisis. However, if the public were not taking on new debt, this would hardly be the case, as 
the demand for funds would be depressed, keeping bond rates in check. Symptomatically, 
yields on government securities came down during the early 1980s.184 
These opposing perspectives point to some major issues of contention within macroeconomic 
thought, touched upon in the introduction. The balance sheet recession approach emphasizes 
underlying dynamics of debt and asset prices, as suggested by the financial instability 
framework. Moreover, implications for the behavior of the monetary aggregates and 
aggregate spending are stressed by the monetary equilibrium approach. Falling velocity and a 
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decelerating money supply will put contractionary pressures on the economy. In contrast, the 
main paradigm emerging during the Great Moderation stresses the role of expectations in the 
dynamic interplay between the public and macroeconomic policymakers, related to inflation, 
output and employment. The expectations perspective is, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
based on the historical lessons drawn from the 1970s and the academic response to the Great 
Inflation, a time when financial markets and asset prices played less of a role in the observed 
macroeconomic disturbances. 
Greenspan made explicit references to how expectations had been unanchored by these 
inflationary experiences. He argued that in the 1950s and 60s, the interactions between 
inflation and inflation expectations was less important because “[s]avers and investors, firms 
and households made economic and financial decisions based on an implicit assumption that 
inflation, over the long run, would remain low enough to be inconsequential.” As a result, 
inflation premiums on long-term interest rates were low. Hence, “monetary policy had far 
more room to maneuver,” and the Fed could engage in aggressive monetary easing “without 
igniting inflation expectations.”185 
Even during the inflationary 1970s, “there was a clear reluctance to believe that the inflation 
being experienced was other than transitory,” as witnessed by the behavior of bond yields. 
However, “the dam eventually broke, and the huge losses suffered by bondholders during the 
1970’s and early 1980’s sensitized them to the slightest sign, real or imagined, of rising 
inflation. At the first indication of an inflationary policy, monetary or fiscal, investors 
dumped bonds, driving up long-term interest rates.” In conclusion, these sensitivity issues 
made monetary policymaking a much harder task for the Fed: “An overly expansionary 
monetary policy, or even its anticipation, is embedded fairly soon in higher inflation 
expectations and nominal bond yields.”186 Thus, even in face of the “headwinds” of the early 
1990s, the FOMC saw the need to move carefully, so as not to ignite new inflationary 
expectations, in turn, pushing up consumer prices.  
Policymakers envisioned that their main task was to manage these expectations. Such 
concerns would weigh heavy in 1994, when the economy showed signs of fully recovering 
from the S&L crisis and bond yields were moving upwards. 
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Preemptive Tightening 
On February 4, 1994, the FOMC decided on the first interest rate hike in close to five years. 
The credit crunch of the early 1990s had finally ended, and it seemed to be the right time to 
end the low interest rate policies of this period. Moreover, the FOMC wanted to take control 
of the business cycle. As explained by Greenspan, looking back at this policy decision: 
“We wanted the inevitable downturn, when it came, to be less of a roller-coaster ride—a 
moderate slowing instead of a sickening plunge into recession. The Fed had long tried to get 
ahead of the curve by tightening rates at the first sign of inflation, before the economy had a 
chance to seriously overheat. But raising rates in this way had never averted a recession.”187 
He adds that the FOMC “opted to take advantage of the relative economic tranquility to try a 
more radical approach: moving gently and preemptively, before inflation even appeared.” 
(Emphasis added.) Thus was formulated a strategy of preemption, stressing the need to 
counter an upside risk before it materialized. Greenspan explained the new monetary 
approach to Congress at a February, 1994 hearing: 
“[I]f the Federal Reserve waits until actual inflation worsens before taking countermeasures, it 
would have waited too long. Modest corrective steps would no longer be enough to contain 
the emerging economic imbalances […] Instead more wrenching measures would be needed, 
with unavoidable adverse side effects on near-term economic activity.”188 
In other words, preemption was called for, because reacting later to contain a threat once it 
had surfaced would entail “more wrenching measures” and potentially more adverse 
economic outcomes. As part of this strategy, the Fed was in need of a new tool to more 
closely steer inflation expectations. It had to communicate its intentions directly to the public 
in order to influence bond rates. 
As explained by Blinder and Reis, “if the Fed is reasonably transparent, the bond market will 
do much of its work for it.”189 The rationale behind this thinking is that long-term interest rate 
matter more than short-term rates to economic activity. But the Fed only directly controls one 
short-term rate, the overnight fed funds rate. According to the theory of the “term structure of 
interest rates,” long-term rates reflect expected future short-term rates (plus a premium). Thus 
“expectations about future central bank behavior provide the essential link between short rates 
and long rates.”190 
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By clearly communicating its intentions during a tightening or easing cycle, the Fed can more 
closely influence long-term rates and make monetary policy more efficient. Transparency 
thus becomes key in managing inflation expectations. This realization came somewhat 
reluctantly to the FOMC and the Fed Chairman. For instance, in October 1989, Greenspan 
stated before a House committee that announcements of FOMC decisions “could impede 
timely and appropriate adjustments to policy.”191 In a confidential FOMC telephone 
conference, in October 1993, he reiterated his strong-held views on the disclosure issue, 
saying that “immediate release of the directive could threaten to roil markets unnecessarily, 
and concern about market reaction could reduce flexibility in decisionmaking.”192  
Only a few months later the FOMC was discussing a move towards transparency by 
disclosing its policy intentions to the public. At the February 4, 1994 committee meeting, 
Greenspan expressed that he wanted to raise a question that had been “tugging” at him for the 
last number of weeks—whether the FOMC should announce its interest rate decision. He 
added, “when we move in this particular context, which of course will be the first time we 
have moved since September 1992, we are going to have to make our action very visible.” He 
was “particularly concerned that if we choose to move tomorrow, we make certain that there 
is no ambiguity about our move.”193 
Robert Parry, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, supported Greenspan’s 
proposed policy statement, but pushed the agenda further by calling for a discussion “about 
the desirability of similar statements in the future” as some FOMC members believed that 
“there is some advantage to doing it on a continued basis.”194 Robert P. Forrestal, president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, voiced a contrary concern that this move would create 
precedent—that the Fed would be “pushed by pressures” to “make this an ongoing operating 
procedure.” Thinking such a procedure would result in the loss of “some flexibility,” he 
wanted the statement to be a one-time event.195 The FOMC decided to go ahead with the 
statement, which was released immediately following the meeting. The full statement read:  
“Chairman Alan Greenspan announced today that the Federal Open Market Committee 
decided to increase slightly the degree of pressure on reserve positions. The action is expected 
to be associated with a small increase in short-term money market interest rates. 
The decision was taken to move toward a less accommodative stance in monetary policy in 
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order to sustain and enhance the economic expansion. 
Chairman Greenspan decided to announce this action immediately so as to avoid any 
misunderstanding of the Committee’s purposes, given the fact that this is the first firming of 
reserve market conditions by the Committee since early 1989.”196 
As Forrestal had worried, this action would prove to be a lasting precedent. To Parry’s credit, 
it was a precedent that FOMC members and other Fed officials would come to embrace as an 
important tool in managing the public’s inflation expectations.  
The rate hike of February 1994 was followed by tightening measures throughout the year, 
bringing the fed funds target rate up from 3 percent to 5,5 percent, as shown in figure 4.10. 
Figure 4.10 Monetary Policy Rate, 1994 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (DFEDTAR) 
Once more, the Fed was criticized for conducting too tight policy.197 Greenspan explained the 
reasoning behind these decisions before a House committee: “To be successful, we must 
implement the necessary monetary policy adjustments well in advance of the potential 
emergence of inflationary pressures, so as to forestall their actual occurrence.”  It was not 
sufficient to look at current inflation figures, since “[s]hifts in the stance of monetary policy 
influence the economy and inflation with a considerable lag, as long as a year or more.” Thus 
the “challenge of monetary policy is to interpret current data on the economy and financial 
markets with an eye to anticipating future inflationary or contractionary forces and to 
countering them by taking action in advance.” (Emphasis added.)198 
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Greenspan noted that there “remains a significant inflation premium embodied in long-term 
interest rates, reflecting a still skeptical world financial market view that American fiscal and 
monetary policies retain some inflation bias,” a price still paid for the inflationary 1970s, 
“despite major successes in reversing inflationary pressures during the past 15 years.” Hence 
the need to keep strengthening the credentials of the central bank of containing inflationary 
pressures; “judging from the remaining inflation premium embodied in long-term rates, the 
job is not yet complete.” He added: “Having paid so large a price in reversing inflation 
processes to date, it is crucial that we do not allow them to re-emerge.”199 
The trajectory of the yield on government securities with 30-year maturity is displayed in 
figure 4.11. So are the federal funds rate and the spread between the two. As can be seen, 
bond yields were on the rise slightly before the FOMC decided to start raising rates in 
February 1994, giving rise to concerns of inflationary expectations trending upwards. The 
yield on 30-year Treasuries continued to climb throughout most of 1994, before declining the 
following year. The FOMC initiated rate cuts after the turnaround in long-term interest rates. 
Figure 4.11 Long and Short-term Interest Rates, 1990-1999 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED; Author’s calculations (DFEDTAR, GS30) 
The ample attention given to bond markets would become a characteristic trait of how 
monetary policy was conducted in the Greenspan years and reflected the importance given to 
managing expectations and the desire to act preemptively, containing inflationary pressures 
before they surfaced in price statistics. 
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The Early Greenspan Standard 
The “standard” that emerged during the first decade of the Greenspan FOMC pointed to 
specific operating procedures informed by an evolving model of the economy. The choice of 
policy instrument was clear—the manipulation of short-term interest rates in the market for 
reserve balances (the fed funds market) through the use of open market operations. The 
overarching goal was price stability. But what exactly does “price stability” mean? How is it 
defined? How is it measured? Which measures should be used to attain this goal, and how 
does the central bank know when the goal is achieved? 
In 1996, the Fed dedicated a Jackson Hole symposium to the topic of “Achieving Price 
Stability,” discussing questions like these. In his opening remarks, the chairman stressed the 
“operational difficulty of knowing exactly to what we are all referring when we speak of 
‘price stability.’” He defined this desirable outcome as a situation “when economic agents no 
longer take account of the prospective change in the general price level in their economic 
decisionmaking.” The goal was to remove “unproductive price-expectation-driven actions 
from economic activity”—a “necessary condition for economic stability and maximum 
efficiencies.”200 The operational definition put great weight on managing expectations. But 
expectations cannot be observed directly. Thus to measure whether the central bank has 
achieved its goal of price stability, it must make use of “proxies.” One such proxy is 
obviously some kind of index measuring the overall price level. However, there will always 
be an element of arbitrariness to such indexes and they can only tell policymakers of price 
movements retrospectively. 
Greenspan noted that “we aren’t going to get much assistance in this endeavor from 
conventional textbook models or run-of-the-mill academic discussions,” implying that 
success rested upon some interpretative capacity on the part of the monetary policymakers. 
Knowing that “a general price level must exist in principle” the question becomes how to 
observe the implications of such a level in real world economic life. One answer would be to 
look at market transactions reflecting anticipated changes in the price level over time: 
“For so long as contracts are being made that involve the exchange of future claims on goods 
and services denominated in nominal units, the parties to those contracts will have made some 
implicit or explicit judgment about the forward purchasing power of those nominal units. And 
those judgments will be embodied in the prices placed on the transaction.” (Emphasis added.)201 
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A proxy by which price stability and inflation expectations can be observed are the terms of 
contracts involving “the exchange of future claims on goods and services.” One such type of 
claim is bonds, and one type of bond, government securities (Treasuries), is exchanged in a 
market that is both deep and highly liquid and with a negligible default risk. The main risk 
pertains to swings in inflation. The yield on these securities could thus reveal the expected 
rate of inflation during the lifetime of the security. In the words of Greenspan, “expectations 
of future changes in the purchasing power of the currency become embedded in the term 
structure of interest rates.”  Extracting inflation expectations is still “no easy task, in part 
because it requires assumptions about real interest rates as well as term and inflation risk 
premiums,” but it gives the authorities a window into the public’s expectations by gazing at 
actual market behavior.202 
So what are the implications for the Fed practices? For one, ample weight is given to observe 
the movements of bond yields. “Looking out the window” to see what is going on with the 
inflation rate, as measured by different indexes, is not enough. To firmly anchor inflation 
expectations, monetary policymakers must look into the future or, more precisely, the market 
for future claims. Price stability will only be achieved when expected inflation, as embedded 
in the term structure of interest rates, are firmly anchored at the desired level. Moreover, long-
term interest rates reflect market participants’ expectations of future short-term interest rates 
and can thus be gauged as a measure of whether the FOMC is able to successfully convey to 
the public the desired direction of its interest rate decisions when in a tightening or easing 
cycle. To aid in this process, policymakers can make use of additional tools to indirectly 
manage long-term interest rates, notably policy statements, revealing the “bias” of the 
policymakers towards tightening or easing.  
Thus one important intermediate goal that emerged was to manage inflation expectations 
rather than inflation directly. This was done by carefully tracking developments in bond 
markets, especially the markets for government debt.203 The interpretations involved of 
developments taking place in asset markets—not for the sake of monitoring financial 
imbalances, but rather to assess inflationary expectations—point to the importance of 
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judgment on the part of the monetary policymakers and, in consequence, the use of discretion 
in policymaking. This contrasted with the academic emphasis on rule-bound authority, 
exemplified by Kydland and Prescott (1977), as well as the tendency towards formalized 
inflation targeting in other industrial countries throughout the 1990s.204 At the 1996 Jackson 
Hole symposium, FOMC secretary Kohn discussed the tradeoff between the long-term 
discipline of a formal inflation target and the short-term advantages of operating more 
flexibly. He stressed that the “less quantitative and time-specific objective of the Federal 
Reserve” had given it “considerable flexibility in responding to unexpected developments, 
enabling it to smooth the path of output and vary the pace of progress toward price stability as 
circumstances seemed to dictate.” He concluded: “The results largely speak for themselves. 
Inflation has been brought down to a low level, with only one mild recession since 1982.”205 
Figure 4.12 Consumer Prices, 1988-1996 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (CPIAUNS, CPILFENS; % change from a year ago) 
The overall Fed track record of inflation from 1988 to 1996 is shown in figure 4.12. These 
developments took place without any formal commitment by the central bank to target inflation. 
Kohn criticized the use of strict inflation targeting for giving considerable weight on “an 
inherently uncertain and imprecise projection.” Knowing that “forecasts will be wrong and 
contingencies will arise in ways that are unanticipated,” flexibility was called for, allowing 
policy to move “in directions that may seem counterintuitive to the general public under 
inflation targets.”206 Such contingencies would play a larger role during the second half of the 
Greenspan era, from 1997 to 2006, when a wide range of threats would pose new challenges 
to FOMC decisions. These threats are the topics of the subsequent chapters. 
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5. FEAR OF FINANCIAL FALLOUTS: THE GREAT GLOBAL BOOM 
“Someday, of course, the expansion will end; human nature has exhibited a tendency 
to excess through the generations with the inevitable economic hangover. […] It is the 
job of economic policymakers to mitigate the fallout when it occurs, and, hopefully, 
ease the transition to the next expansion”207 
—Alan Greenspan (1999) 
In February 1998, Greenspan reaffirmed the FOMC commitment to preemptive tightening: 
“History teaches us that monetary policy has been its most effective when it has been 
preemptive.” The time lag between policy actions and inflation “implies that if policy actions 
are delayed until prices begin to pick up, they will be too late to fend off at least some 
persistent price acceleration and attendant economic instabilities.” In the preceding year, the 
pressure on resources steered the FOMC “toward being more inclined to tighten than to ease 
monetary policy.” Thus in March 1997, the committee decided upon “modest incremental 
restraint,” raising the federal funds target rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 5.5 percent.208  
That year, real GDP grew by close to four percent, the fastest annual growth rate in 10 years. 
The unemployment rate dropped to 4.75 percent, the “lowest sustained level since the late 
1960’s,” as pointed out by Greenspan. These developments supported “the view that such low 
inflation, as closely approaching price stability as we have known in the United States in three 
decades, engenders many benefits.” The chairman noted that productivity growth had been on 
the rise, in part spurred by low inflation. The rise in productivity was moreover associated 
with reductions in the annual federal budget deficits, leaving more room for private sector 
investment, as well as “the rapidly increasing efficiency” of U.S. financial markets, attributed 
to “new technologies and of significant market deregulation over the years.”209 
Deregulation of financial markets and capital accounts, freeing up international capital flows, 
had spurred a new global financial landscape. These developments were deemed to be highly 
beneficial. In the words of Greenspan, an “increasingly sophisticated international financial 
system” had “fostered impressive growth in world trade and in standards of living for the vast 
majority of nations who have chosen to participate in it.” However, there was a downside to 
these developments, as the system had “the capability to rapidly transmit the consequences of 
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errors of judgment in private investments and public policies to all corners of the world at 
historically unprecedented speed.”210  
Starting in the summer of 1997, a worldwide contagion in financial markets spread at 
historically unprecedented speed, changing priorities among monetary policymakers and 
gradually influencing their understanding of the economy. During most of the late 1990s, the 
FOMC was hesitant in raising interest rates when output and employment displayed strong 
growth. Moreover, in the fall of 1998 the fed funds rate was cut 0.75 percentage points in an 
attempt to forestall the potential fallout from the crisis in global financial markets. Once the 
crisis was perceived to have passed, priorities shifted back to forestalling a rise in inflation, as 
output and labor markets showed increasingly signs of overheating in 1999 and early 2000. 
Then the U.S. economy experienced a major financial incident of its own, this time in equity 
markets as the dotcom boom came to an end. The Fed only hesitatingly responded to these 
developments, but once the easing cycle was initiated in early 2001, the fed funds rate came 
down rapidly and dramatically, spurred on by the terror attacks in September of that year. 
The trajectory of the federal funds rate, nominal and real, during the years of financial 
turbulence from the Asian crisis to 9/11, is displayed in figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 Monetary Policy Rate, 1997-2001 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED; Author’s calculations (DFEDTAR, CPIAUCNS) 
This chapter will take a closer look at these developments and the new understandings that 
emerged, in the end leading to new revisions of monetary doctrines and practices. 
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A First Step Towards Downside Preemption 
After the March 1997 rate hike, the FOMC decided against additional restraint, leaving the 
federal funds at 5.5 percent throughout the year, “despite further tightening of the labor 
market.” One reason was that measured inflation fell, due to an appreciating dollar, weak 
commodity price growth and faster productivity growth. By keeping the nominal fed funds 
rate still in the face of falling inflation expectations, it was argued that the FOMC conducted 
“passive” tightening, through a modest rise in the real fed funds rate—the nominal rate 
adjusted for a “proxy for inflation expectations.”211 
Though the economy was showing signs of strong growth and “heated” labor markets going 
into 1998, the FOMC was worried about downside risks that could upset the otherwise bright 
outlook. Greenspan noted that the projections for aggregate spending on goods and services 
were less assured “because of storm clouds massing over the Western Pacific and heading our 
way.” In the summer of 1997, a financial crisis erupted in several East Asian countries, 
gradually spreading to other emerging markets. These developments put strains on 
international financial markets, threatening to adversely impact the U.S. as well. 
One concern was that exports would dampen, exerting a “discernible drag on total output in 
the United States.” As for the inflation outlook, “Asian restraint” would most likely result in 
several developments putting downward pressures on price growth. An appreciating dollar 
was expected to lead to a further decline in the prices of imported goods. This would in turn 
make “domestic producers hesitant to raise their own prices” due to increased competition 
from cheaper foreign goods. Moreover, “lesser demands for raw materials on the part of 
Asian economies as their activity slows” would keep commodity prices in check. 
The key question was “whether the restraint building from the turmoil in Asia will be 
sufficient enough to check inflationary tendencies that might otherwise result from the 
strength of domestic spending and tightening labor markets.” In other words, which factors 
would win out, high levels of activity in the domestic economy, usually associated with 
inflationary forces, or foreign developments, exerting disinflationary forces on the U.S.? The 
FOMC came to the conclusion that, “any intensification of inflation should be delayed, very 
gradual, and readily reversible,” leading the committee to decide that “monetary policy 
should most appropriately be kept on hold.” 212 
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As before, the Greenspan FOMC displayed a willingness to continuously revise the economic 
model to reflect perceived changes to the economic landscape:  
“The way America does business, including the interaction among the various economic 
players in our economy, is in the midst of a significant transformation, though the pace of 
change is unclear. […] As a consequence, many of the empirical regularities depicting the 
complex of economic relationships on which policymakers rely have been markedly altered. 
The Federal Reserve has thus been pressed to continuously update our understanding of how 
the newer forces are developing in order for us to address appropriately our underlying 
monetary policy objective: maximum sustainable economic growth.”213 
Such transformational changes called for assessment of “the newer forces” by carefully 
examining a wide range of economic indicators, including broad sets of financial data, before 
drawing any policy conclusions: “With the continuation of a remarkable 7-year expansion at 
stake and so little precedent to go by, the range of our intelligence-gathering in the weeks 
ahead must be wide and especially inclusive of international developments.”214 
In the spring and early summer of 1998, FOMC concerns shifted back to an upside risk of a 
“rise in inflation” seen as “the primary threat to the continued expansion of the economy.” 
However, when meeting in August, “the risks had become balanced.” 215 This was soon 
revised yet again, as downside risks seemed to threaten the economy. At the FOMC meeting 
in late September, the fed funds target rate was cut by 0.25 percentage points to 5.25 percent 
in order to “cushion the effects on prospective economic growth in the United States of 
increasing weakness in foreign economies and of less accommodative financial conditions 
domestically.”216 At the meeting, Richard Fisher, executive vice president of the New York 
Fed in charge of open market operations, pointed to financial indicators suggesting market 
expectations “not of a single easing of monetary policy but of a whole series of easings” into 
1999. These expectations began building in August, in response to the Russian default crisis, 
among policymakers referred to as the “Russian devaluation and moratorium.”217 This crisis 
was putting strains on bond markets around the world, witnessed by a “rush out of emerging 
market and higher yielding instruments in late August,” leading to a sell-off of more risky, 
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private market bonds and increased demand for U.S. Treasuries.218 This signaled greater 
difficulties for private companies in obtaining funds in bond markets. 
Greenspan pointed to the “major trauma in world financial markets” which occurred “when 
the Russian devaluation and debt moratorium were announced.”219 This posed a puzzle; the 
size of the Russian economy was negligible in the global economy, so how could a Russian 
debt default trigger such widespread effects in world financial markets? One answer was that 
the episode indicated that the contagion from the Asian crisis was still in motion. Another 
explanation related to moral hazard. It would seem that international investors had become 
accustomed to the idea that emerging markets would be bailed out by the IMF, sometimes 
aided by the U.S., as happened in Asia. When the attempted rescue of Russia was aborted, 
FOMC members observed “an abrupt reassessment of risks,” and a flight to safety. 
The September 1998 decision to cut the fed funds target rate did “not rest on incoming data 
about the economy.” In fact, the economy was still growing strong, the unemployment rate 
remained low and inflation was edging higher, especially measures of core inflation. Rather, 
the case for a rate cut relied on the potential threats stemming from “the sea change in 
investors’ perceptions of risk,” causing financial conditions to become more restrictive. 
However, moving cautiously was called for as the unemployment rate was “well below most 
estimates of its sustainable level,” which had raised concerns among committee members for 
some time that “economic growth needed to slow substantially from the pace of the last few 
years—most likely to below trend—just to keep inflation from accelerating.”220 
As can be discerned from these policy deliberations, the natural rate framework still applied 
to the overall assessment of the economy. However, new downside risks had materialized, 
stemming from developments within financial markets. Even though these factors had not yet 
made any visible impact on the main economic indicators—output, employment and 
inflation—they were looked as potentially disturbing, leading the FOMC to cut rates 
cautiously. The target rate was further lowered by 0.25 percentage points on October 15, due 
to “[g]rowing caution by lenders and unsettled conditions in financial markets” which were 
“likely to be restraining aggregate demand in the future.”221 A final cut, which would turn out 
to be the last reduction in the fed funds rate of that century, was decided upon at the 
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November 17 committee meeting. By this time, conditions in financial markets had “settled 
down materially” though “unusual strains” remained.222 
Thus the FOMC lowered the target for the fed funds rate 0.75 percentage points in the fall of 
2008, responding to potential threats from the fallout of the emerging markets crises raising 
downside risks of “restraining aggregate demand in the future.” The most visible sign of these 
financial strains within the U.S. was the near-collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), of which the “abrupt and disorderly close-out” was judged to pose 
“unacceptable risks to the American economy.” Thus, in September, New York Fed President 
William J. McDonough orchestrated an orderly bailout by private financial firms, in order to 
stave off a potential financial panic.223 
At the start of 1999, The Fed could once more look back at a year of robust growth. Real 
GDP rose about 4 percent for the third year in a row, while the unemployment rate dropped 
even further, to 4.5 percent, the lowest level since 1970. Despite continued tight labor 
markets, headline inflation fell to its lowest level “in many decades,” in part owing to falling 
prices on commodities and other imports, as well as strong productivity gains.224  
Assessing this progress, Greenspan asked: “Can this favorable performance be sustained?” He 
was concerned that after eight years of expansion, the economy appeared to be “stretched in a 
number of dimensions, implying considerable upside and downside risks to the economic 
outlook.” On the upside, high levels of economic activity, witnessed by strong growth and 
low unemployment, seemed unabated. At the same time, a rapid rise in equity prices raised 
“questions about whether shares are overvalued.” Furthermore, debt levels were on the rise, 
both among households and firms, as well as the country’s external debt, reflected in the 
growing current account deficit. On the downside, Greenspan held that the U.S. economy 
remained “vulnerable to the rapidly changing conditions overseas,” which the events in the 
summer of 1998 showed could be “transmitted to U.S. markets quickly and traumatically.” 
He concluded that “[i]n light of all these risks, monetary policy must be ready to move 
quickly in either direction” should Fed policymakers “perceive imbalances and distortions 
developing that could undermine the economic expansion.”225 
Thus he concluded with a symmetrical statement—that the Fed should stand ready to tighten 
or ease in the face of perceived upside or downside risks. During the summer of 1998, the 
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balance had tipped towards easing, when the Russian default threatened to impact the U.S. 
economy. As the economic expansion continued well into 1999, however, the balance tipped 
the other way. In May, the FOMC released a statement that it was “concerned about the 
potential for a buildup of inflationary imbalances that could undermine the favorable 
performance of the economy.” Hence it formulated a balance of risks sentence pointing 
toward “the possibility of a firming in the stance of monetary policy.” Inflation still remained 
“quite subdued.” But domestic financial markets had recovered and “foreign economic 
prospects” had improved “since the easing of monetary policy last fall.”226 Six weeks later, 
the FOMC initiated its tightening cycle, eventually bringing the federal funds rate up by 1.75 
percentage points in less than a year. 
A recurring message in the statements accompanying the rate hikes was that the FOMC was 
concerned about demand outgrowing potential supply, witnessed by strong growth and tight 
labor markets. As stated at the turn of the century, the committee remained “concerned with 
the possibility that over time increases in demand will continue to exceed the growth in 
potential supply, even after taking account of the remarkable rise in productivity growth. 
Such trends could foster inflationary imbalances that would undermine the economy’s 
exemplary performance.”227  
Core inflation, measured as percentage changes in consumer prices less energy and food, was 
relatively stable throughout the late 1990s, hovering around 2 percent, before rising slightly in 
2000, to around 2.5 percent. (See figure 5.2.)  
Figure 5.2 Headline and Core Inflation, 1997-2000 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (CPIAUCNS, CPILFENS; % change from a year ago) 
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Headline inflation, that is, an index reflecting all consumer prices, fluctuated more strongly, 
in large part due to fluctuations in international oil prices, which fell slightly in 1997-98, and 
then rose substantially in 1999-2001(though these price movements seem almost trivial to 
what was observed in the period 2004-2010). The FOMC gives most attention to core 
inflation when making policy.228 Inflationary pressures, indicate by core CPI figures, were not 
visible in 1999 and only slightly so in 2000. Thus, in the late 1990s, the FOMC maintained its 
preemptive stance towards inflation, combined with an increased sensitivity to downside risks 
emanating from financial markets, domestically and abroad. 
Beginning in the summer of 1999, the policy rate was hiked 0.25 percentage points at a time, 
in successive steps. In May 2000, the FOMC decided on one last hike of 0.5 percentage 
points, bringing the target rate up to 6.5 percent. This policy decision was accompanied with a 
balance of risks sentence stating that the committee believed the risks were “weighted mainly 
toward conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures in the foreseeable 
future.”229 This stance was largely held intact throughout the year, though in November the 
FOMC noted that private sector demand was showing signs of “softening.” Moreover, 
“tightening conditions in financial markets” suggested that the economy could be in for a 
recession.230 The turnaround in stock prices, and the economic developments in the first half 
of the 2000s will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. For now, it will be useful to assess 
how developments in the late 1990s influenced Fed thinking. 
 
Understanding the New Financial Landscape 
As recalled from the previous chapter, the changing nature of the American economy, 
including the institutional makeup of U.S. financial markets, led to important changes in 
monetary policymakers’ understandings. Monetary aggregates were dropped and the natural 
rate framework was amended in several ways. Ample weight was given to inflationary 
expectations, assessed by proxy indicators such as bond yields. With the emerging market 
crises that shook the world in the second half of the 1990s, new understandings were formed 
of how developments taking place abroad could impact the U.S. economy. Policymakers tried 
to gain a better understanding of the new international financial landscape in an era of 
deregulated capital flows and strong global growth. Greenspan had characterized the Mexican 
crisis at the middle of the decade as “the first crisis of this new international financial 
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system.” The crisis that started in Asia in the summer of 1997, and then spread to other 
emerging markets, was “its second.”231 
Greenspan asserted that “it is just not credible that the United States can remain an oasis of 
prosperity unaffected by a world that is experiencing greatly increased stress.”232 
Developments in the global economy would have both negative and positive consequences 
for the U.S. economy as assessed by monetary policymakers. On the one side, the threat of 
financial fallouts from abroad could impact domestic financial markets and impede American 
growth. On the other side, global economic developments seemed to keep U.S. inflation in 
check. 
In the fall of 1998, monetary policymakers had been willing to take out an insurance against 
the potential fallout from the emerging markets crisis. As explained before the Congressional 
Joint Economic Committee in the summer of 1999, the “recovery of financial markets, 
viewed in isolation, would have suggested that at least part of the emergency injection of 
liquidity, and the associated 75 basis point decline in the funds rate, ceased to be necessary. 
But, with wage growth and price inflation declining by a number of measures earlier this 
year, and productivity evidently still accelerating—thereby keeping inflation in check—we 
chose to maintain the lower level of the funds rate.” In other words, weak consumer price 
growth led the FOMC to believe that it could, at least for the time being, focus in on other 
problems, without being concerned with an uptick in inflation. Global disinflationary forces 
and strong domestic productivity growth combined to keep inflation in check.  
While the noninflationary economic expansion in the U.S. appeared “remarkably stress free 
on the surface,” there were still “developing imbalances” that would give reason to question 
whether these imbalances placed the economic expansion at risk. Among the imbalances were 
“an unsustainable trend” among households and firms “to increase their spending on goods 
and services beyond the gains in their income from production”—a trend that had been 
spurred by the rise in equity and home prices. Should the economy experience a dramatic 
contraction in equity markets prices, this would greatly reduce the extra spending.233 
The return of normalcy to financial markets and “growing concerns about emerging 
imbalances” led the FOMC to contemplate rate hikes in 1999. One important issue that was 
discussed was the “weight to place on asset prices.” Greenspan pointed out that the 1990s had 
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“witnessed one of the great bull stock markets in American history.” However, it would be 
“difficult to assess” whether there was in fact a bubble in advance of its bursting, since this 
required “a judgment that hundreds of thousands of informed investors have it all wrong. 
Betting against markets is usually precarious at best.”234 
The conclusion drawn was that monetary policy primarily should focus on price stability. It 
would be useful to “preempt forces of imbalance,” but such forces were not always possible 
to identify, implying that financial imbalances were too hard to predict. Addressing 
imbalances in asset markets called for a different kind of preemptive stance, namely to 
“mitigate the fallout when it occurs, and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.” 
This line of reasoning, and the observed willingness of the Fed to act preemptively in the face 
of potential financial fallouts, led to the notion of a “Greenspan put”—a floor for asset prices 
protecting investors against truly adverse outcomes when asset markets underwent large-scale 
downward corrections.235 The commitment to “mitigate the fallout” from asset busts attracted 
criticism, leading to a debate on monetary policy and asset bubbles. 
 
The Asset Bubble Controversy 
During the last three decades, the world has seen a number of episodes of financial instability 
with serious macroeconomic costs in both industrial and emerging markets.236 Questions 
regarding why such crises are taking place and what to do about them have increasingly 
moved to the top of policy agendas, both at the domestic level and in international forums, 
such as the G20. The most recent financial crisis, and the unresolved global imbalances 
associated with it, has made the need to find an answer to these problems more acute. 
Among those researchers exploring this topic is a group of economists at the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland. They have developed a specific set of 
views on the nature of such booms and busts and how the authorities should react to them. 
The leading figure among these monetary policy analysts and advisors is William White, 
former chief BIS economist. He strongly believes that “price stability was not enough” to 
ensure stable and sustainable economic growth during the Great Moderation.237 In contrast, to 
ensure long-run sustainability, the monetary authorities should address imbalances in order to 
prevent potential crises. BIS economists define these “imbalances” as “marked and sustained 
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deviations from historical norms.” Among the main indicators of such imbalances are “very 
low household saving rates in many countries, with associated high internal and external debt 
levels” (debt held by domestic and foreign creditors), as well as “unusually high asset prices” 
(prices of housing, equity, bonds etc.).238 In order to counter, curb and correct these 
imbalances, BIS economists have been leading proponents of the need for central banks to 
“lean against the wind,” by raising interest rates and tightening money.  
The Fed view on asset booms and busts emerged during the booming 1990s. Greenspan 
stressed psychological factors, as witnessed by the notion of “irrational exuberance.”239 
Moreover, having “tried and failed” to address stock market imbalances, policymakers had 
come to the conclusion that attempts at leaning against asset prices through rate hikes would 
only ratchet up the long-term trend.240 When raising rates in 1997 by a quarter of a percentage 
point, stock prices halted briefly, before rising again. Similarly, during the tightening cycle of 
1994, stock prices leveled out, then started rising again once the tightening was over.241 
At the 2002 Jackson Hole symposium, Greenspan explained the rationale behind moving 
preemptively to contain potential financial fallouts, but not address these kinds of imbalances 
as they were building up. The lessons drawn form the 1990s bull market was that it is “very 
difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact—that is, when its bursting 
confirmed its existence.” Even if monetary policymakers would be able to identify an 
unsustainable bubble, this would still not warrant preemptive tightening, since such a course 
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of action could induce a contraction in economic activity—the “very outcome” policymakers 
“would be seeking to avoid.”242 
Greenspan formulated his policy ideal in quite strong terms: “But is there some policy that 
can at least limit the size of a bubble and, hence, its destructive fallout? From the evidence to 
date, the answer appears to be no.” The chairman gained intellectual support from Ben 
Bernanke, who shortly after becoming Fed Governor in 2002 posed a timely question: “Can 
the Federal Reserve (or any other central bank) reliably identify ‘bubbles’ in the prices of 
some classes of assets, such as equities and real estate? And, if it can, what if anything should 
it do about them?” He agreed that being able to identify a bubble in progress is “intrinsically 
difficult” and that using rate hikes—tightening money through increases in the monetary 
policy rate—would lead to a slow-down of the economy, a cost considered too high to 
contemplate. However, he also diverged somewhat from Greenspan’s views, giving some 
scope for Fed interventions into financial markets to correct asset bubbles. Firmly agreeing 
that monetary policy should not factor in asset price developments, he instead placed hopes in 
the Fed’s use of its “regulatory, supervisory, and lender-of-last-resort powers to help ensure 
financial stability.”243 
Bernanke went on to express that this was “a robust strategy, in that—although it certainly 
does not eliminate all economic and financial instability—it protects the economy against 
truly disastrous outcomes, which history has shown are possible when monetary policy goes 
severely off track.” He restated the commitments of the Greenspan put by stressing that “if a 
sudden correction in asset prices does occur,” if necessary, “the Fed should provide ample 
liquidity until the immediate crisis has passed,” citing Greenspan’s response to the stock 
market crash of 1987 as a “good example” of how the Fed should conduct policy.244 
Both Greenspan and Bernanke were of the strong belief that asset bubbles are hard to detect, 
and if Fed officials could somehow detect them, they should not make use of monetary policy 
instruments to curb the boom, but rather contain the fallout of the bust. Thus two contrary set 
of beliefs emerged during the 2000s—the Fed view and the BIS view—giving rise to a debate 
on whether the central bank should “lean” against asset prices in the boom phase, or “clean” 
up the mess afterwards.245 The diverging views and the associated policy prescriptions are 
summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1 Fed vs. BIS Views on Monetary Policy and Asset Bubbles 
Fed view BIS view 
Asset bubbles cannot be identified before they 
burst. 
There are several indicators of imbalances, such 
as rapid credit growth, unsustainable levels of 
household and corporate debt as well as asset 
prices diverging strongly from historical trends. 
The central bank should “clean up” the mess after 
a bubble bursts by easing money. 
The central bank should “lean” against asset 
bubbles by tightening money. 
Pre-emptive easing should be used to help 
distressed financial markets. 
Pre-emptive tightening should be used to make 
sure financial imbalances don’t get out of hand. 
The costs of raising interest rates, in the form of 
lost output in the short run, are too high. 
The costs of letting financial bubbles getting out 
of hand are too high in the long run. 
Price stability is the main goal. Price stability is not enough. 
 
White, along with co-researcher Claudio Borio, presented the BIS views at the 2003 Jackson 
Hole symposium on “Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy.” 
The reception among Fed officials was overall negative. For instance, Fed Governor Frederic 
Mishkin expressed the view that the “thrust of the Borio-White paper does not send us in the 
right direction.” Rather than using monetary tightening to address the build-up of financial 
imbalances, he advocated the use of regulatory tools as the “first-best policy.”246 
This discussion goes to the very heart of major contentions within macroeconomics related to 
the conflicting views on money and cycles, briefly discussed in the introductory chapter. In 
the dominant view, prevailing among monetary practitioners and theorists, price stability is 
the norm, associated with a natural rate of output and employment. Adding in expectations, 
the main goal is to anchor anticipated inflation, so as to dampen fluctuations in economic 
activity. Within this paradigm, financial imbalances are seen as disturbing influences from 
outside—an exogenous force upsetting the otherwise balanced economy. In the alternative 
view, stressing monetary disequilibrium when interest rates cease to play their coordinating 
role in inter-temporal exchanges, imbalances can arise impacting the whole economic 
structure. Monetary disturbances can arise even when prices are stable. Symptomatically, BIS 
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economists talk about imbalances, financial and real, and point to imbalances independent of 
price stability. Mishkin, on the other hand, stressed the financial side of the economy, seen as 
largely unrelated to monetary policy. Thus, according to the latter perspective, the task of 
addressing financial imbalances is better left off to “prudential” supervision of financial 
institutions to prevent financial stress from playing a disturbing role.  
The “financial instability” approach is to some degree compatible with the two other 
perspectives. In the first version, price stability is seen as the norm, but long periods of 
stability can induce risk-taking. Greenspan seems to adhere to such a view: 
“[P]roduct price stability does not guarantee either the maintenance of financial market 
stability or maximum sustainable growth. As recent experience attests, a prolonged period of 
price stability does help to foster economic prosperity. But, as we have also observed over 
recent years, as have others in times past, such a benign economic environment can induce 
investors to take on more risk and drive asset prices to unsustainable levels.”247 
To phrase it along the lines of Minsky, “good times induce balance sheet adventuring.”248 In 
the words of Greenspan, during the second half of the 1990s, “measures of risk had fallen to 
historic lows as businesspeople, having experienced years of continuous good times, 
assumed, not unreasonably, that the most likely forecast was more of the same.”  
The monetary equilibrium framework can be combined with the Minsky approach to form a 
different vision of macroeconomics, in which stable prices is largely irrelevant as an indicator 
of overall stability. Rather, the focus is on monetary excesses (during the boom phase) and 
shortfalls (during the ensuing recession in the wake of the bust). Both scenarios are believed 
to spur widespread imbalances, both real and financial. Lately, William White has advocated 
a new direction for macroeconomics partly along these lines.249 
Mishkin has been a leading proponent of the inflation targeting approach to monetary policy, 
and thus largely represents the price stability camp outlined in the introduction. He has 
written extensively on the issue, some of it in collaboration with Ben Bernanke.250 This 
perspective gives rise to strong policy implications regarding monetary policy and asset 
prices. Before becoming a central banker himself, Bernanke’s academic views led him to 
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believe that “[c]entral banks should adjust monetary policy actively and pre-emptively to 
offset incipient inflationary or deflationary pressures,” but “should not respond to changes in 
asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation.”251 In his mind, “the 
inflation-targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers 
should respond to asset prices: changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to 
the extent that they affect the central bank’s forecast of inflation.” In other words, if the Fed, 
through its foresight, is able to predict some spillover effects from asset prices into consumer 
prices, it should change its interest rate. However, “there should be no additional response of 
monetary policy to asset-price fluctuation.”252 
In 2002, Bernanke expanded upon this perspective, saying that the Fed should use “the right 
tool for the job.” Making use of monetary policy to address the problem of asset bubbles 
would be like trying to “perform brain surgery with a sledge hammer.” He added that the Fed 
and other regulators “should insist that banks be well capitalized and well diversified and that 
they stress-test their portfolios against a wide range of scenarios.” Moreover, the Fed could 
“contribute to reducing the probability of boom-and-bust cycles occurring in the first place, 
by supporting such objectives as more transparent accounting and disclosure practices and 
working to improve the financial literacy and competence of investors.”253  
 
Confronting the Consensus 
Among the participants at the 2003 Jackson Hole symposium who to some degree sided with 
BIS economists Borio and White on the issue of using monetary policy to address the build-
up of imbalances was Michael Mussa, who served as Director of the Department of Research 
at the International Monetary Fund from 1991 to 2001. He cited the case of Japan in the 
1980s as a “poster child for discussing why monetary policy should, in selected instances, pay 
serious attention to asset-price distortions,” stressing that the inflation rate in Japan remained 
very low in the pre-crisis years. At the same time there was “an enormous explosion of asset 
prices, real estate prices, and enormous growth of credit.” Once such a bubble collapsed, 
“there was going to be serious macroeconomic problems.”254 In the late 1990s, Mussa and 
other IMF officials were monitoring American developments “very carefully” because they 
were “concerned that asset-price equities were overvalued and a downward correction might 
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hurt the economy.” They discussed whether the monetary expansion undertaken in response 
to the Russian default of 1998 was overextended into 1999, fuelling the bubble. Mussa took 
issue with the Fed view, saying that the “notion that central banks never are in a situation 
where they can perceive a distortion on the upside in asset markets that recommends some 
type of preemptive action is too strong a conclusion to draw.” When indicators are “pointing 
to something developing that might look like Japan, then you want to be very careful to take 
serious account of that.”255 
Two years later another IMF official, Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan, took issue with 
another aspect of the prevailing consensus, this one also related to financial stability. In 
presenting the paper “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” at Jackson Hill, 
he challenged the validity of the “Greenspan doctrine,” a set of beliefs which held that 
financial innovation during the Great Moderation in the main had contributed to reducing 
risk, while increasing the overall efficiency and robustness of the economy. He questioned 
whether financial developments have “come at a cost” and, moreover: “How concerned 
should central bankers and financial system supervisors be, and what can they do about it?”256 
Rajan pointed to “altered managerial incentives,” which, in turn, altered the “nature of risks 
undertaken by the system, with some potential for distortions.” In addition to incentives 
encouraging “herd behavior” and excessive risk-taking, he pointed to some of the dangers that 
can arise when interest rates are held low for extended periods of time: “An environment of 
low interest rates following a period of high rates is particularly problematic, for not only 
does the incentive of some participants to ‘search for yield’ go up, but also asset prices are 
given the initial impetus, which can lead to an upward spiral, creating the conditions for a 
sharp and messy realignment.”257  
These developments would induce more procyclicality into the system—that is, amplify the 
boom and the bust—and might also “create a greater (albeit still small) probability of a 
catastrophic meltdown.” Thus “monetary policy should be informed by the effect it has on 
incentives, and the potential for greater procyclicality of the system.”258  
As with Borio and White challenging central elements of the prevailing consensus in 2003, 
Fed officials voiced misgivings with the general message presented. In a prepared 
commentary to Rajan’s paper, Governor Donald Kohn defended Greenspan’s views on 
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financial market developments. He started off with stressing that his perspective “has been 
very much influenced by observing Alan Greenspan’s approach to the development of 
financial systems and their regulation over the past 18 years,” adding that “the Greenspan 
doctrine […] has reflected the chairman’s analysis and deeply held belief that private interest 
and technological change, interacting in a stable macroeconomic environment, will advance 
the general economic welfare.” Greenspan had welcomed the advent of new technologies and 
new instruments in financial markets, and the “Greenspan doctrine holds that these 
developments, on balance, improve the functioning of financial markets and the real 
economies they support.” These developments had made financial institutions “more robust” 
and also “made the financial system more resilient and flexible—better able to absorb shocks 
without increasing the effects of such shocks on the real economy.”259 
This robustness would seem to be another argument for why monetary policymakers could let 
imbalances go unheeded. The overall costs to the economy might not be that great. Moreover, 
Kohn suggested that developments in financial markets had contributed to the overall stability 
witnessed during the Greenspan years: 
“[I]ndustrial economies have been marked by much less variability in output and inflation 
over the past 20 years. Many reasons have been given for this so-called great moderation, but 
developments in financial markets have likely played a role in making the economy more 
resilient. As a consequence […] problems in the financial sector are less likely to intensify 
shocks hitting the economy and financial market.”260 
It would seem that the Greenspan notion of stabilizing developments in financial markets had 
become an integral part of the overall Fed consensus on the Great Moderation. An example of 
the new resilience was to be found in the “experience of 2001-2003,” in which “[u]nusually 
large declines in equity prices and increases in defaults and risk spreads” had “reduced wealth 
and raised the cost of capital but did not aggravate the downturn by impinging on the flow of 
funds.” In other words, a financial bust had not brought on a credit crunch, and had seemingly 
smaller spillover effects into the overall performance of the real economy than otherwise 
could have been expected. The recession in the wake of the crash was among the mildest and 
shortest on record. However, the dotcom bust brought with it other major concerns, notably 
the perceived threat of deflationary forces taking hold of the economy. 
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6. FEAR OF DEFLATION: THE DOTCOM BUST AND JAPAN’S GREAT 
RECESSION 
“With inflation rates now quite low in the United States, however, some have 
expressed concern that we may soon face a new problem—the danger of deflation, or 
falling prices.”261 
—Ben Bernanke (2002) 
A series of financial crises rattled world markets from 1997 and into the new millennium. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, these events led to important shifts in U.S. monetary 
doctrines and practices, as new emphasis was given to financial stability. Eventually the U.S. 
itself experienced a devastating stock market plunge, starting in 2000. The technology-heavy 
stock index NASDAQ was hit especially hard. (See figure 6.1.) 
Figure 6.1 Tech Equity Prices, 1990-2005 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance (NASDAQ Index) 
In March 2001, the Wall Street Journal reported that investors in NASDAQ shares had lost 
more than $3.6 trillion, a figure larger than the entire U.S. stock market twenty years 
earlier.262 The crash was associated with a drop in spending, leading to an economic 
downturn. One measure of nominal spending is final sales of domestic product, which 
decelerated from March 2000 to mid-2002. (See figure 6.2a.) The drop in activity was 
especially pronounced in nonresidential fixed investment, which fell from an annualized 
growth rate of around 10 % in the first three quarters of 2000 to around negative 10 % in late 
2001. (See figure 6.2b.) 
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Figure 6.2 (a-b) Nominal Spending and Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment, 2000-2004  
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (FINSAL, PNFI; % change from a year ago) 
The FOMC responded somewhat hesitatingly to these developments. It had raised the fed 
funds target rate to 6.5 percent at its May 2000 meeting, and decided to keep it there 
throughout the year. The first sign of a policy reversal appeared on December 19. An 
assessment of economic indicators prepared for the FOMC meeting pointed to continued tight 
labor market conditions. However, Fed staff forecasting made a “substantial downward 
revision” of economic activity, projecting a slow-down to 2.25 percent output growth in the 
first quarter of 2001. Activity was expected to “pick up in the spring.”263 
As late as November 2000, policymakers still worried of “persisting risks of heightened 
inflation pressures” despite “clear indications of more moderate expansion in economic 
activity.” In their assessment, these circumstances called for “a steady monetary policy” to 
promote the dual goal of price stability and sustainable growth. By December, “the risks of 
higher inflation had diminished materially,” but not enough to contemplate a rate cut. 
However, the balance of risks pointed “toward conditions that could generate economic 
weakness in the foreseeable future.”264 The FOMC issued a policy statement pointing to 
“stress in some segments of the financial markets,” suggesting that the economy might be 
“slowing further.”265  
The committee soon shifted its policy stance, engaging in a dramatic rate cut exercise that 
would bring the fed funds rate down to 1.75 percent in less than a year. (See figure 6.3.) The 
first move came on January 3, 2001, when the FOMC decided to cut the target rate by 0.5 
percentage points while stating that “the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that 
may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.”266 
                                                      
263 Beige Book, p. vi, and Greenbook, p. I-1, prepared for FOMC meeting December 19, 2000  
264 Minutes, December 19, 2000; discussion of November FOMC meeting cited here 
265 Statement, December 19, 2000 
266 Statement, January 3, 2001 
0.0	  2.0	  
4.0	  6.0	  
8.0	  
Final	  Sales	  of	  Domestic	  
Product	  
-­‐10.0	  -­‐5.0	  
0.0	  5.0	  
10.0	  
Nonresidential	  Fixed	  
Investment	  
 87 
Figure 6.3 Monetary Policy Rate, 2000-2001 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (DFEDTAR) 
The recession in the wake of the dotcom crash was remarkably mild, if measured in output. 
Still there was something unusual going on, as the employment rebound took a long time to 
gather pace. In fact, the economy seemed to experience a “jobless recovery,” as had happened 
in the recession of the early 1990s.267 (See figure 6.4.) 
Figure 6.4 Real GDP Growth and Unemployment, 1987-2006 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (GDPC1) and Department of Labor, Statistics 
Even though economic growth recovered, there were discomforting signs of weakness in the 
post-crash years that FOMC members took notice of in their policy deliberations, including 
an uncertain economic atmosphere and unusual low price growth. This chapter will look at 
these developments and how policymakers responded to them. 
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Growing Concerns 
In the early 2000s, the FOMC observed a “series of blows” to the economy, including a 
dramatic drop in equity market values, corporate accounting scandals, and the escalation of 
geopolitical risks. The terror attacks on September 11, 2001 spurred monetary policymakers 
to cut both the fed funds target rate and the discount rate (the Fed lending rate) by 0.5 
percentage points a few days later, while continuing “to supply unusually large volumes of 
liquidity to the financial markets, as needed, until more normal market functioning is 
restored.”268 The two rates were reduced another 0.50 percentage points each on October 2 as 
the “terrorist attacks” had “significantly heightened uncertainty in an economy that was 
already weak,” putting a further dampening on business and household spending.269 On 
November 6, both rates were cut again, by similar amounts, due to “[h]eightened uncertainty 
and concerns about a deterioration in business conditions both here and abroad” which were 
seen to be “damping economic activity.”270 On December 11, both rates were reduced again, 
bringing the federal funds target rate down to 1.75 percent. Economic activity was seen to 
remain “soft.”271 
“Despite these adversities,” however, “the nation’s economy emerged from its downturn in 
2001 to post moderate economic growth,” boosted by monetary and fiscal stimulus, as well as 
“unusually rapid productivity growth.”272 In 2002-2003, the economic performance appeared 
to be “gradually improving,” but “the tentative nature of this improvement warranted the 
continuation of a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy.” Thus the federal funds 
target rate was held steady at 1.75 percent during the first 10 months of 2002. On November 
6, growing uncertainties led the FOMC to lower the target rate by 0.5 percentage points. In a 
coordinated move, the Board of Governors cut the discount rate by a similar amount. The 
Statement accompanying these decisions stressed “greater uncertainty, in part attributable to 
heightened geopolitical risks,” inhibiting spending, production, and employment. Moreover, 
inflation and inflation expectations remained “well contained.”273 
Thus, with a low probability of inflationary pressures, the FOMC decided it could help the 
economy work its way through a “current soft spot.” William McDonough, President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Vice Chairman of the Federal Open Market 
Committee, argued that the FOMC should take out some “insurance” against the “downside 
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risk.” He worried that the economic outlook remained uncertain, not “just by looking at the 
domestic economy alone,” but the international situation made “the need for insurance even 
clearer.” Growth was seen to be weak around the world, including Europe, Japan and Latin 
America, and there was still uncertainty as to the domestic economic outlook. Thus “the time 
for the Committee to act” had arrived.274  
An incremental rate movement, however, was deemed insufficient: “When one is taking 
insurance against downside risks, one should take out the amount of insurance that is 
appropriate; 25 basis points simply is not enough.” McDonough was concerned that the 
market would see such a move as too timid.275 The 2002 Annual Report explained that the 
FOMC feared that “the near-term weakening could become entrenched.”276 Thus a preemptive 
move in order to forestall potential problems was called for. 
One month later, discussions centered upon a new potential threat. At the December 10 
FOMC meeting, Fed staff had provided projections and different scenarios for the economic 
outlook. Adding to the discussions of economic weakness, they included an assessment of the 
likelihood of consumer price growth trending towards zero and even below. President Parry, 
of the San Francisco Fed, “was struck by how large that probability” was, estimated to around 
28 percent. Federal Reserve economist David Stockton pointed out that the number mainly 
referred to “benign” deflationary pressures stemming from productivity growth. The more 
serious concern was “ending up in a Japanese-style deflation” with the monetary policy rate 
ending up at zero. That scenario had a lower probability—estimated to about 8-9 percent.277  
President Robert McTeer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, believed that the 
committee’s “aggressive move” at the November meeting, when the target rate was lowered 
by 0.5 percentage points, was the “needed preemptive strike” to contain these contractionary 
pressures.278 However, half a year later, the FOMC saw the need to move preemptively once 
more to perceived downside risks. 
At the June 25, 2003 committee meeting, the word “deflation” was mentioned 100 times. 
Vincent Reinhart, director of the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Monetary Affairs, saw 
it prudent to come up with a contingency plan—“Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low 
Short-term Interest Rates.” He noted that “the current nominal federal funds rate of 1¼ 
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percent places the Committee in a region it has not been in a half century.” He outlined 
“policy alternatives that may help to ensure that monetary policy remains potent,” in case 
interest rates reached the lower zero bound.279 
Even though economic indicators pointed to “a firming in spending, markedly improved 
financial conditions, and labor and product markets that are stabilizing,” weak consumer price 
growth led the FOMC to cut the already historically low fed funds target rate from 1.25 to 1 
percent, stating that “the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome substantial fall in 
inflation exceeds that of a pickup in inflation from its already low level.”280 (Emphasis 
added.) Looking back, Greenspan explained the rationale behind the policy action: 
“At the FOMC meeting in late June, where we voted to reduce interest rates still further, to 1 
percent, deflation was Topic A. We agreed on the reduction despite our consensus that the 
economy probably did not need yet another rate cut. The stock market had finally begun to 
revive, and our forecasts called for much stronger GDP growth in the year’s second half. Yet 
we went ahead on the basis of a balancing of risk. We wanted to shut down the possibility of 
corrosive deflation; we were willing to chance that by cutting rates we might foster a bubble, 
an inflationary boom of some sort, which we would subsequently have to address.”281 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the early 2000s, headline inflation fluctuated between 1 and 4 percent, which in part can be 
explained by movements in international oil prices. More importantly, core inflation trended 
gradually downwards from early 2002 to late 2003. (See figure 6.5.) During this time, 
monetary policymakers went through a brief deflation scare. 
Figure 6.5 Consumer Prices, 2000-2004 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (CPIACUNS, CPILFENS; % change from a year ago) 
                                                      
279 Transcript, June 24-25, 2003, pp. 3-4 
280 Statement, June 25, 2003 
281 Greenspan, Age of Turbulence, 2007, p. 229 
0.0	  1.0	  
2.0	  3.0	  
4.0	  
2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	  
In#lation	  
Core	  InDlation	   Headline	  InDlation	  
 91 
Lessons from the Past and the Present 
The long gone specter of deflation—not seen in the U.S. since the crisis-ridden 1930s—was 
now perceived as a potential, though unlikely, threat. In the words of Greenspan, “[u]ntil 
recently, this topic was often regarded as an academic curiosity. Indeed, a decade ago, most 
economists would have dismissed the possibility that a government issuing a fiat currency 
would ever produce too little inflation. However, the recent record in Japan has reopened 
serious discussion of this issue.”282 Fed policymakers were increasingly concerned with 
financial and economic developments taking place in Japan, worrying about the implications 
for the post-crash U.S. economy.283 In the words of Bernanke: 
“With inflation rates now quite low in the United States […] some have expressed 
concern that we may soon face a new problem—the danger of deflation, or falling 
prices. That this concern is not purely hypothetical is brought home to us whenever 
we read newspaper reports about Japan, where what seems to be a relatively 
moderate deflation—a decline in consumer prices of about 1 percent per year—has 
been associated with years of painfully slow growth, rising joblessness, and 
apparently intractable financial problems in the banking and corporate sectors.”284 
In 1990, Japan experienced a similar asset bust to that of the U.S. ten years later. Japanese 
stock and real estate prices went into a protracted decline. At the same time, consumer price 
growth started trending downwards (See figure 6.6.) 
Figure 6.6 Japan’s Inflation Rate, 1990-2010 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 
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From 1999 till 2002, the Japanese economy went through a period of moderate negative price 
growth (deflation), at the same time experiencing low growth rates.285 Fed officials “carefully 
analyzed the Japanese experience of the early 1990s,” concluding that “aggressively moving 
against the risk of deflation would pay dividends by reducing the odds on needing to deal 
with the zero bound on nominal interest rates should the economy be hit with another 
negative shock.”286 Fed Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson noted that U.S. core inflation was 
at a level “not seen on a sustained basis in almost forty years.” In result, market commentators 
were worrying that the U.S. might “follow Japan into a deflationary slump.” Still, he did not 
expect the U.S. to experience sustained deflation. Such a scenario had a low probability. But 
should it come about, the consequences could be grave as “a sustained fall in prices will 
transform what might otherwise be a manageable level of nominal debt accumulated by 
businesses and households into a rising and potentially debilitating level of real debt and real 
debt service costs.” Such developments could lead to “widespread defaults, bankruptcies, and 
bank failures, with potentially devastating consequences for the entire financial system.”287 
Such a scenario is referred to as “debt-deflation”—“the deflation-induced, ever-increasing 
real value of debts,” as described by Bernanke.288 This analysis was influenced by the 
writings of Irving Fisher, a monetary economist who developed a “debt-deflation” theory of 
the Great Depression in 1933. The major causes of the boom-bust cycle, according to Fisher, 
are “the debt disease” and “the price level disease.”289 Deflation increases the real value of 
debt, impairing the overall workings of the economy. He suggested that these deflationary 
forces could be offset by monetary measures. 
In 2002, Ben Bernanke held a speech before the National Economists Club in Washington 
D.C., outlining which measures the monetary authorities could resort to in order to contain 
deflationary pressures, should they arise. He assured his audience that “under a paper-money 
system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive 
inflation.”290 The speech, entitled “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here,” 
presented a set of beliefs that was dubbed the “Bernanke doctrine.”  
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Bernanke’s views on depressions and how to address deflationary forces can moreover be 
traced back to a certain understanding of the economic crisis of the 1930s that focuses almost 
solely on the “monetary mistakes” made by the Federal Reserve from the late 1920s onwards 
while ignoring the imbalances building up in the preceding years. This view is associated 
with Milton Friedman’s “Monetarist” explanation of the Great Depression, of which “the 
direct and indirect influences […] on contemporary monetary economics would be difficult to 
overstate,” according to Bernanke. These perspectives were presented in Milton Friedman 
and Anna J. Schwartz’ A Monetary History of the United States (1963), “the leading and most 
persuasive explanation of the worst economic disaster in American history.”291 The authors 
labeled the period from 1929 to 1933 the “Great Contraction,” based on the fact that the 
broader money supply contracted by approximately 1/3 along with a severe contraction in 
output.292  
The interpretation of the Great Depression, shared by Bernanke and Friedman, played into 
their understanding of what went wrong in Japan in the 1990s. Milton Friedman juxtaposed 
the monetary “mistakes” of the Bank of Japan in the 1990s with what he perceived as the 
“successful” Fed policies in response to the dotcom crash, comparing both to the policy 
response in the wake of the Great Crash of 1929. He viewed these three episodes as a “natural 
experiment in monetary policy.”293  
Friedman thought that the lack of a monetary response to the downturn of the early 1930s was 
the main cause of the Great Contraction, asserting that this episode could have been avoided 
if only the Fed had expanded the monetary base and cut interest rates rapidly once the crisis 
hit. As he wrote in A Monetary History, “this contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the 
importance of monetary forces.”294 In the case of Japan, Friedman thought the monetary 
authorities responded too late and too timidly. In the wake of the dotcom crash, however, U.S. 
monetary authorities seemed to have taken the correct course of action, promptly cutting 
interest rates and expanding the monetary base. 
By looking at economic indicators in the years following these three major crashes, Friedman 
concluded that the “results of this natural experiment are clear,” asserting that monetary 
responses explain “what happens to national income and to stock prices,” that is, the depth of 
the crises and the speed and strength of the recovery, both in the real economy and in 
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financial markets. These episodes thereby supported “the view that monetary policy deserves 
much credit for the mildness of the recession that followed the collapse of the U.S. boom in 
late 2000.”295 
The strong Fed response in the wake of the dotcom crash led to a robust rebound of financial 
markets, whereas in the case of Japan, stock markets went into a long period of decline. As 
for the 1930s, “the S&P index started falling away” from the stock market developments of 
the two other episodes “under the influence of a collapsing money stock.” In other words, the 
dismal performance of financial markets was caused by too weak monetary growth. This 
could in turn imply that the problem was not so much rising stock prices in the boom as the 
lack of a monetary response to help asset prices rebound after the bust. 
The monetarist analysis of the U.S. economy in the interwar years led several economists to 
question whether there was in fact an unsustainable investment boom in 1920s. Writing in 
1987, Anna J. Schwartz held that had “employment and economic growth continued, stock 
prices could have been maintained.”296 Turning conventional wisdom on its head, Friedman 
and Schwartz attributed the outbreak of the crisis to undue monetary tightening in 1928-29 
caused by the desire to “curb the stock market boom,” stressing that the Fed “should not have 
made itself an arbiter of security speculation or values and should have paid no direct 
attention to the stock market boom.”297  
The implications of these interpretations are clear: The Fed should not try to lean against what 
it perceives as asset bubbles, because it could be mistaken in trying to identify a bubble. 
Furthermore, this tightening would risk setting off a severe recession and, in the worst case, a 
depression, like in the 1930s, or a protracted period of stagnation, like Japan’s “Lost Decade” 
of the 1990s.  
This line of thought resonated well with Bernanke’s own thinking on the subject. In a speech, 
given before the National Association for Business Economics in New York in 2002, he cites 
the Fed’s attempt at leaning against the 1920s asset bubble as a cautionary tale. The 
protagonist of this monetarist-inspired story is Benjamin Strong, Governor of the New York 
Fed, who acted on his own initiative as an informal head of the Federal Reserve System until 
he died in 1928. Strong resisted the siren calls of those who wanted to halt the speculative 
boom on Wall Street, because “any policy directed solely to forcing liquidation” in the stock 
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market “will be found to have a widespread” effect, “mostly to the detriment of the healthy 
prosperity of this country.”298 
However, when Strong died in 1928, the leadership of the Fed went into the hands of those 
who “pushed for higher interest rates.” The Fed discount rate was raised from 3.5 percent in 
1928 to 6 percent in August 1929. The stock market peaked the following month and fell 
sharply in October as panicky sales drove down stock prices. The economic downturn 
actually started two months before the Great Crash. From this story of monetary 
mismanagement, Bernanke draws what to him seems like an inescapable conclusion: 
“The correct interpretation of the 1920s, then, is not the popular one—that the stock market 
got overvalued, crashed, and caused a Great Depression. The true story is that monetary 
policy tried overzealously to stop the rise in stock prices. But the main effect of the tight 
monetary policy, as Benjamin Strong had predicted, was to slow the economy—both 
domestically and, through the workings of the gold standard, abroad. The slowing 
economy, together with rising interest rates, was in turn a major factor in precipitating the 
stock market crash.”299 (Emphasis added.) 
To back up his claim, in addition to making the usual references to Friedman and Schwartz, 
Bernanke drew intellectual support from John Maynard Keynes, who in 1930 concluded that 
the “high-market rate of interest” which was set by the Fed prior to the collapse “in their 
effort to control the enthusiasm of the speculative crowd,” (that is, to curb the speculative 
boom) “played an essential role in bringing about the rapid collapse.” Thus Keynes attributed 
“the slump of 1930” primarily to high interest rates and their “deterrent effects on 
investment,” and “only secondary to the collapse itself.”300 
For Bernanke, the first lesson of the Great Depression then was never trying to burst a bubble, 
as this could have severe consequences for the rest of the economy. He made a similar 
observation regarding the Japanese financial crash of the early 1990s and subsequent lost 
decade: “The only place that monetary policy played a role was that in 1989 [the Bank of 
Japan] intentionally tried to prick the bubble.” He added that the central bank did in fact 
“succeed in pricking the bubble. Asset prices collapsed and they had a 14-year depression.”301 
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The second major lesson: if a bubble bursts, do not let the money supply contract and 
deflationary tendencies get hold of the economy—in line with the monetarist interpretation of 
the Great Contraction as a result of “a number of serious additional mistakes that deepened 
and extended the Great Depression of the 1930s.” The worst of these mistakes, the Fed 
“permitted a severe deflation in the price level, which drove real-interest rates sky-high and 
greatly increased the pressure on debtors”—in line with the emphasis of “debt-deflation” as a 
major concern in such contractionary episodes. 
Thus the links between Fed beliefs on asset bubbles and deflation become clear. By moving 
to curb an asset boom, the central bank can inadvertently set off severe recessionary forces, 
which, if not checked, can give rise to deflation. Hence the need to move preemptively 
against both financial fallouts and potential contractionary forces impeding the economy in 
the wake of asset busts. These motives seem to have come together in the early 2000s, leading 
to new directions in the development of policymakers’ understandings of the economy, in 
turn leading to new monetary practices. 
Bernanke concluded his cautionary tale on an optimistic note, saying that a “small 
compensation for the enormous tragedy of the Great Depression is that we learned some 
valuable lessons about central banking. It would be a shame if those lessons were to be 
forgotten.” In his “Deflation” speech, presented around the same time, Bernanke seemed 
confident that the Fed had learned this lesson well and would always be able to stop deflation, 
implying that Fed officials could stimulate the economy back on track. Worries about falling 
into a Japanese style trap were largely brushed aside, if only monetary policymakers took 
heed of the lessons learned from past deflationary episodes. 
According to Bernanke, the “sources of deflation are not a mystery.” It is “in almost all cases 
a side effect of a collapse of aggregate demand—a drop in spending so severe that producers 
must cut prices on an ongoing basis in order to find buyers. Likewise, the economic effects of 
a deflationary episode, for the most part, are similar to those of any other sharp decline in 
aggregate spending—namely, recession, rising unemployment, and financial stress.”302 
The concern with containing the fallout of asset busts and their after effects—as opposed to 
considering both the imbalances of the boom, as well as the distress of the bust—led 
increasingly to a distinct mode of operation from the late 1990s and throughout the period 
under investigation and has characterized Alan Greenspan’s “risk management paradigm.” 
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Risk Management Paradigm 
Speaking at the Jackson Hole symposium in 2003, Alan Greenspan presented some of his 
core beliefs on Fed policymaking. The speech, entitled “Monetary Policy under Uncertainty,” 
was an attempt at creating some kind of philosophical reasoning for the mode of action the 
Fed had entered into during his long-lasted tenure. He started the speech on a Hayekian note, 
emphasizing the role of uncertainty in decision-making. The importance of limited knowledge 
was a main staple of the social philosophy of the Austrian-born economist F.A. Hayek.303 For 
Greenspan this human limitation was a basic premise of monetary decision-making: 
“Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the 
defining characteristic of that landscape.”304 
He added that every “model, no matter how detailed or how well designed conceptually and 
empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience with all its 
intricacies on a day-to-day basis.” From this, he concluded, “even with large advances in 
computational capabilities and greater comprehension of economic linkages, our knowledge 
base is barely able to keep pace with the ever-increasing complexity of our global 
economy.”305 Greenspan then turned this Hayekian reasoning around into a philosophical 
justification of discretionary authority: 
“[G]iven our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of our ever-
changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs of benefits of particular outcomes, a 
central bank seeking to maximize its probability of achieving its goals is driven, I believe, to a 
risk-management approach to policy.”306 
By “risk-management,” Greenspan was thinking specifically of how the FOMC should 
conduct monetary policy by weighing in the risks of different scenarios that could materialize 
in the short run. If a certain outcome was seen as especially daunting, then this scenario 
should be avoided, even if the chances of it coming to pass were slim. Applying this policy 
framework to the perceived, though remote, threat of deflation, the implications from this line 
of reasoning were clear: “These considerations have inclined Federal Reserve policymakers 
                                                      
303 Early formulations of what has been described as the “knowledge problem” can be found in 
“Economics and Knowledge” (1936) and “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945), reprinted in F.A. 
Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, University of Chicago Press, 1996 
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standard. He remained somewhat sympathetic to this school of thought, expressing at the turn of the 
millennium that “the Austrian school have reached far into the future from when most of them 
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mainstream economists think in this country.” Alan Greenspan, “Hearings,” before the U.S. House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services, Washington D.C., July 25, 2000 
306 Greenspan, “Monetary Policy under Uncertainty,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2003 
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toward policies that limit the risk of deflation even though the baseline forecasts from most 
conventional models would not project such an event.” (Emphasis added.)  
In other words, since models are not to be relied upon, and since certain outcomes should be 
avoided, it followed that to be on the safe side, potential threats of financial fallouts and 
deflationary pressures should be preempted through monetary easing. To avoid such 
outcomes, it would be necessary to “undertake actions intended to provide some insurance 
against the emergence of especially adverse outcomes.” This “insurance” policy was the 
explicit rationale given by Greenspan to “ease policy” when, for instance, the Russian debt 
default rattled financial markets in 1998. This monetary expansion was conducted despite the 
FOMC’s “perception that the economy was expanding at a satisfactory pace and that, even 
without a policy initiative, was likely to continue to do so,” because monetary policymakers 
“were concerned about the low-probability risk that the default might severely disrupt 
domestic and international financial markets, with outsized adverse feedback to the 
performance of the U.S. economy.”307 
The sole cost imputed into this “insurance” was a “risk of higher inflation at some future 
date,” a cost that “was viewed as relatively low at the time, largely because increased 
competition, driven by globalization, thwarted employer’s ability to pass through higher labor 
costs into prices.” In other words, changes in the global economy had put a lid on inflationary 
forces, tipping the balance of risk towards downside threats. 
There is no mention of how such policy practices could affect asset prices. Neither is there 
mention of how this “insurance” could lead to unforeseeable problems in the future by 
changing incentives among financial market participants, a main concern raised by Raghuram 
Rajan at the 2005 Jackson Hole symposium. Moreover, Greenspan points to a central cause of 
the increasingly lowered interest rates during this period, namely that increased globalization 
put downward pressure on consumer prices, thereby making it possible for the Fed to hold 
interest rates at exceedingly low levels, without risking a return of inflation or rising 
inflationary expectations. Greenspan’s “risk-management” practices were thereby facilitated 
by external developments taking place in the global economy, as well as domestic 
productivity gains which contributed to keep consumer prices in check during a period of 
monetary ease. 
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Good vs. Bad Deflation 
At the December 10, 2002 FOMC meeting, President Gary Stern of the Minneapolis Fed 
suggested a different view on deflation: “It seems to me that, with strong productivity 
improvement under way in two very, very large economies, the United States and China, and 
given what that implies for pressure on producers in some other countries, downward price 
pressure around the world should not be unexpected.”308 In other words, there were two 
contrary deflationary scenarios. In the one case, exemplified by China, falling consumer 
prices were associated with strong economic growth. In the other case, exemplified by Japan, 
falling consumer prices seemed to be associated with a protracted recession.  
Monetary economists Michael Bordo and Andrew Filardo took note of the Fed’s new vigilant 
approach towards deflation in the early 2000s, replacing the earlier concern with inflation “as 
public enemy number one.”309 They acknowledged the damaging effects of the deflationary 
pressures during the 1930s and similar episodes. However, they also made the distinction 
between different kinds of deflation. There are the “bad” and “ugly” kinds, associated with 
sudden contractions in money and credit, but there is also the “good” kind, which in the past 
has been associated with periods of high productivity growth and rising prosperity. After all, 
the U.S. experienced a long period of falling prices in the decades following the American 
Civil War, at the same time witnessing rapid industrialization.  
As pointed out by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, “from 1880 to 1896, the wholesale 
price level in the United States fell 30 percent—nearly 2 percent per year. Far from being a 
period of gloom and doom, this deflation accompanied a period of relative prosperity: Real 
income increased 85 percent over this time span, nearly 5 percent per year.”310 The more 
recent example of China will help to further illuminate this important point of “growth 
deflation.” From 1998 to 2002, Chinese real output grew at 7-8 percent per year. At the same 
time consumer prices fell on average by about 1-3 percent per year. (See figure 6.7.) 
A major point is that price deflation caused by productivity gains and rising output should not 
be conflated with debt deflation and severe crises. Furthermore, the deflation associated with 
the latter kind of episodes does not testify to the causes of these crises: “Although the weight 
of professional opinion favors the idea that deflation played a central role in the Great 
Depression, the claim that price deflation was the initial cause is less obvious.” The 13.1 
percent drop in output during the first year of the crisis “was accompanied by almost no price 
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movement.” However, the rapid deflation that occurred later on certainly “played an 
important role in determining the magnitude and severity of the economic contraction.”311 
Similarly, deflation in the case of Japan only set in several years after the initial crash.  
Figure 6.7 Chinese Growth Deflation, 1990-2001 
 
Source: Cleveland Fed, 2003 (Chinese real GNP and general retail price index) 
Concerns with deflation among Fed officials seemed based on a certain set of beliefs, in 
which the performance of the price level is associated with expectations among market 
participants.312 In such a view, expectations of low, or even negative, price growth can 
become entrenched, unless monetary policymakers intervene to push up expectations to the 
desired level. A related problem is that when interest rates come close to its lower zero bound 
and when price growth flatten out close to zero percent per year, there is less room to 
stimulate the economy, as the real fed funds rate cannot be lowered. 
In 1998 Paul Krugman proposed a solution to this problem, suggesting that the Bank of Japan 
should “credibly promise to be irresponsible” in order to push up inflation expectations. 
Drawing upon the perspective of rational expectations, he came to the conclusion that the 
Japanese situation “fundamentally involves a credibility problem,” the opposite one that 
central bankers usually cope with, namely to make the public believe that the central bank 
intends to create substantial inflation.313 In a similar vein, Bernanke suggested that the 
Japanese central bank could adopt a price-level target to initiate a period of reflation, thus 
committing monetary policy to bring up the price level. One perceived benefit of such a 
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policy would be to lower the real rate of interest by creating expectations of inflation.314 
Among FOMC members, the Bank of Japan was believed to have failed in its monetary 
response to deflationary pressures in that they did not commit to a policy of raising prices.315 
In contrast, a view stressing the role of monetary disequilibrium and real imbalances, 
incorporating additional insights from the financial instability approach, would say that 
damaging deflationary pressures could set in if there are fundamental factors hampering the 
monetary mechanism of the economy. One such factor could be impaired balance sheets, 
triggering a protracted balance sheet recession. As recalled, if such a scenario materializes, 
monetary policy is largely rendered impotent, due to the fact that the monetary transmission 
mechanism breaks down. This does not seem to have been the case in the U.S. in 2003. True, 
stock prices experienced a dramatic decline in the wake of the dotcom bust, but the balance 
sheets of households were largely held intact. The corporate sector seems to have managed its 
way through the early 2000s, though several firms experienced large-scale losses on pension 
fund assets, due to the decline in stock prices.316 No systemic problems arose in the banking 
sector that could adversely impact lending. In fact, stock markets recovered and the recession 
was surprisingly mild and short-lived. The main worry was unemployment rates tending to 
stay elevated for a long time coming out of the recession. 
To put the early 2000s in relief to the U.S. balance sheet recession of the early 1990s, 
discussed in chapter 4, it is instructive to look closer at the behavior of monetary aggregates. 
As shown in figure 6.8, monetary base growth was brought down in 2000, as the Fed 
curtailed open market operations, being mostly concerned with upside risks. As the policy 
stance shifted going into 2001, base money growth was brought up again. The main thing to 
notice is the close correlation between base money and M2 from the second half of 2001 
onwards. In contrast to the early 1990s, monetary easing in the early 2000s did impact wider 
monetary aggregates—suggesting that the economy was not facing a protracted balance sheet 
recession. 
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the Recovery,” remarks at the 41st Annual Winter Institute, St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, 
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Figure 6.8 Monetary Aggregates, 2000-2003 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED (BOGUMBNS, M2NS; % change from a year ago) 
Another metric, the behavior of M2 velocity, shows a fall of around 5 percent in 2000, 3.8 
percent in 2001 and 2.1 percent in 2002, suggesting some initial strains, but hardly enough to 
keep overall spending down coming out of the recession.317 Yet another metric is to look at 
final sales of domestic product—a proxy for aggregate spending—which decelerated in 2002, 
before accelerating the year after, but showed positive growth all through this period. (See 
figure 6.2.) It would seem that there were certain financial headwinds in the early 2000s, but 
not enough to bring about “bad deflation,” in the past associated with contractionary 
pressures. Moreover, low inflation could be caused by other factors related to the real side of 
the economy. Productivity gains and cheap imports tend to push down prices, two trends 
influencing economic developments at the time. In other words, the low level of inflation was 
not an indicator of debt deflation or a credit crunch, as had been the case in the U.S. in the 
early 1930s and Japan in the 1990s.  
 
Cautious Tightening 
By the end of 2003, the deflation scare had subsided. At the December 9 FOMC meeting, it 
was noted that “with growth now seen as more assured, downward risks to inflation were 
viewed as considerably reduced relative to earlier in the year, and the risk of a pernicious 
deflation in which declining prices reinforced weakness in demand—a risk that the members 
had always viewed as small—was now regarded by most as virtually nil.”318 
It was not until the summer of 2004 that the Fed started raising the fed funds target rate. 
These hikes took the form of small and consecutive steps, 0.25 percentage points at a time, 
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from mid-2004 until mid-2006. It took nearly two years before the fed funds rate reached 5 
percent. In the preceding years, the real fed funds rate, measured as the nominal rate adjusted 
for headline inflation, turned negative for more than three years. (See figure 6.9.) 
Figure 6.9 Inflation-adjusted Monetary Policy Rate, 2000-2006 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED; Author’s calculations (DFEDTAR, CPIAUCNS) 
Nominal interest rates were well below the rate prescribed by the Taylor rule for an even 
longer period of time, around four years.319 From 2003, the economy was experiencing robust 
growth. At the same time, asset prices went into a period of strong appreciation, as seen in 
figure 6.10.  
Figure 6.10 Stock Prices and Housing Prices, 2000-2009 
 
Source: S&P, Robert Shiller (S&P 500, Composite-10 Housing Price Index) 
In line with Fed doctrines, as they had evolved into the 2000s, monetary measures were not 
made use of to lean against rising asset prices. Preemptive tightening was thus not considered 
as a means to address imbalances from building up. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 “The best way to get out of trouble is not to get into it in the first place.”320 
—Ben Bernanke (2002) 
Monetary policymakers must make their decisions under a high level of uncertainty. In the 
words of Bernanke, Fed officials “face difficult challenges in their efforts to stabilize the 
economy.” Not only are they uncertain about “many aspects of the workings of the 
economy,” but also how monetary policy affects the economy and by which channels such 
effects take place. These problems could perhaps be labeled “model uncertainty,” reflecting 
the imprecise knowledge among central bank decision-makers on how monetary operations 
impact the economy. As a result, “monetary policy will never achieve as much reduction in 
macroeconomic volatility as would be possible if our understanding were more complete.”  
Additional uncertainties arise related to the data gathering process. Monetary policymakers 
“are even uncertain about the current economic situation as economic data are received with a 
lag, are typically subject to multiple revisions, and in any case can only roughly and partially 
depict the underlying economic reality.”321 
The data gathering process is only one obstacle. There are at least three forms of lags 
confronting monetary policymakers, related to policy formulation, implementation and 
impact. The first one of these could be called the recognition lag, the time and effort it takes 
to gather the necessary information and interpret it before formulating policy. Then follows 
the implementation lag, the time between recognition and actual implementation. Third, and 
last, comes the effectiveness lag, the time it takes for the implemented policy to hopefully 
have its intended effect.322 
To deal with these epistemic challenges, monetary policymaking can take two different 
routes. One direction would be to commit the central bank to a monetary rule, such as the “k 
percent” rule proposed by Friedman, targeting monetary aggregates; a nominal income rule, 
stabilizing the growth rate of nominal GDP; or an inflation target, aiming at stabilizing 
consumer price growth at a specific annual rate.323 
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The other direction would be to allow for more flexibility in order to address contingencies as 
they arise, weighing in risks and trying to make use of good judgment. This seems to be the 
road taken by the Greenspan FOMC, and increasingly so, moving into the second half of the 
Great Moderation. In the words of the former Chairman:  
“The struggle to understand developments in the economy and financial markets since the 
mid-1990s has been particularly challenging for monetary policymakers. We were confronted 
with forces that none of us had personally experienced. Aside from the then recent experience 
of Japan, only history books and musty archives gave us clues to the appropriate stance for 
policy.”324 
Thus, FOMC policymakers saw the need to continuously revise their understanding of the 
economy and how monetary policy should respond to unfolding developments. Concluding 
remarks will seek to relate these evolving beliefs and policy practices to some of the issues 
raised in the introductory chapter, both to the alternative theoretical approaches outlined as 
well as to concerns with discretionary conduct of monetary policy. 
 
The Evolving Greenspan Standard 
Former Fed Governor Laurence Meyer has commented that while Alan Greenspan was 
“willing to play by the rules in normal times,” he did “not hesitate to depart from them in 
unusual circumstances.”325 Such “unusual circumstances” would come to dominate Fed 
decisions from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Thus a specific set of doctrines and practices 
evolved—characterized by “risk management” and preemption. 
The reasoning that went into the Fed’s risk management paradigm, points to a final 
destination of monetary doctrines and practices as they evolved during the Greenspan era. 
The emphasis on observing structural and institutional changes unfolding in the U.S. as well 
as global economy, the awareness of forecasting errors, and the uncertainties involved in the 
use of textbook economic models, led the Greenspan FOMC to continuously revise its 
framework for conducting policy. These developments eventually led to the practice of 
preemptive easing and, in the end, hesitant tightening. 
                                                                                                                                                            
NBER Working Paper, no. 4439, October, 1994; Ben S. Bernanke, Thomas Laubach, Frederic Mishkin 
and Adam Posen, Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience, Princeton University 
Press, 1999 
324 Alan Greenspan, “Opening Remarks,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2002, p. 4 
325 Laurence H. Meyer, A Term at the Fed: An Insider’s View, HarperCollins, 2004, p. 213 
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The asymmetrical characteristic of FOMC decisions from 2001 onwards were not only visible 
in the monetary easing and accommodation from 2001 to 2004, but also in the manner in 
which rates were hiked from 2004 to 2006, the final years of the Greenspan Fed. It is 
instructive to compare these monetary practices to those of the two earlier episodes. 
As recalled, in the early 1990s, rates were only gradually reduced in the face of a recession 
and “50-mile-per-hour headwinds.” Subsequently, rates were increased preemptively when 
signs of robust economic growth and rising inflationary expectations arose in 1994. The 
reasoning behind these actions, as evidenced by statements formulated by the actors involved, 
was the desire to fully contain inflationary pressures and keep a lid on longer-term 
inflationary expectations. As argued at the time, in order to “be successful,” the FOMC would 
have to “implement the necessary monetary policy adjustments well in advance of the 
potential emergence of inflationary pressures, so as to forestall their actual occurrence.” The 
challenge facing policymakers were thus to interpret economic and financial data in order to 
anticipate future inflationary or contractionary forces, and counter them “by taking action in 
advance.”326 
In the first half of the Greenspan era, these actions centered upon preventing inflationary 
forces, which were not seen as fully contained. Policymakers perceived that there was still “a 
significant inflation premium” to be discerned from observing long-term interest rates, 
especially bond yields. These premiums were seen to reflect a belief among participants that 
monetary policy retained some inflationary bias. Thus, the inflation-fighting credentials did 
not seem secure; the job was “not yet complete.” Moreover, the costs of bringing down high 
levels of inflation, especially the painful experiences of the Volcker disinflation, seemed to 
suggest that it was “crucial” that the FOMC did not let these inflationary forces re-emerge.327 
Thus monetary policymakers sought to strengthen their inflation-fighting credentials to 
convince bondholders, and the public at large, of their anti-inflationary commitments. This 
would seem to explain the motives behind the decisions of engaging in preemptive tightening 
in 1994. 
In the next monetary episode, stretching from the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 to the 
turnaround in U.S. stock markets at the beginning of the new millennium, the picture seems 
more mixed. The commitment to preemptive tightening in the face of perceived future 
inflationary pressures seemed to be maintained, by looking at statements given by historical 
actors. However, the policy actions point to gradual hesitation in leaning against signs of 
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strong growth and what policymakers themselves perceived as “heated” labor markets. 
Weighing the global disinflationary forces up against the pressure stemming from domestic 
markets, the FOMC felt assured that “any intensification of inflation should be delayed, very 
gradual, and readily reversible,” thus the perceived need to tighten was less pronounced than 
in the mid-90s. In result, “monetary policy” was largely “kept on hold.”328 Moreover, when 
faced with downside risks associated with distress in world financial markets, especially in 
the wake of the Russian default, the FOMC sought to contain potential fallout by taking out 
“insurance”—thus engaging in preemptive easing. 
In the third episode, the FOMC initially moved somewhat hesitatingly when stock markets 
went into significant decline from September 2000 onwards, but once the balance of risks 
shifted towards a focus on downside threats stemming from financial developments and signs 
of weaker economic activity, rates were cut in dramatic fashion, starting in January 2001. The 
9/11 terror attacks and the perceived global uncertainties that followed led policymakers to 
pull down money market rates to record lows, not seen in half a century, and keep them there 
for an extended period of time. The FOMC was by now mainly concerned with downside 
risks. When core inflation gradually trended down towards 1 percent in 2003, policymakers 
were inclined to act preemptively by easing rates from already low levels. Several economic 
and financial indicators pointed towards a robust recovery. However, the FOMC was 
concerned with “the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome substantial fall in 
inflation.”329 
The monetary strategy of the early 2000s was seen as successful by policymakers. In 2002, 
Greenspan stated: 
“The massive drop in equity wealth over the past two years, the sharp decline in capital 
investment, and the tragic events of September 11 might reasonably have been expected 
to produce an immediate severe contraction in the U.S. economy. But this did not occur. 
Economic imbalances in recent years apparently have been addressed more expeditiously 
and effectively than in the past, aided importantly by the more wide-spread availability 
and more intensive use of real-time information.”330 
Thus risk management and preemption seemed to give high dividend, and became a main 
staple of U.S. monetary doctrines. 
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By comparing these three episodes, policy seems to have shifted from an asymmetrical bias 
towards preemptive tightening in the first half of the Greenspan era, to an opposite bias 
towards the end, that of preemptive easing. The movements of the fed funds rate across the 
Greenspan era are displayed in figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1 The Greenspan FOMC Monetary Policy Rate, 1987-2006 
 
Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED; Author’s Calculations (DFEDTAR, CPILFENS) 
As an approximation, by comparing the slopes of the curve depicting the fed funds target rate, 
the second half of the period looks to some degree like a mirror image of the first half. From 
1989 to the fall of 1992, rates were gradually reduced in the face of an ongoing recession and 
financial problems related to the balance sheets of banks, households and firms. 
Unemployment shot up, and remained elevated from 1990 to 1995, while output growth 
significantly decelerated in 1990, turning negative in early 1991. (See figure 6.4.) In 1994, as 
economic growth was on the rise and unemployment trending downwards, rates were raised 
relatively fast. 
By contrast, in 2001, rates came down more quickly and were kept at a low level for a longer 
period of time. Rates were further cut to stave off potential threats in 2002 and 2003. When 
downside risks failed to materialize, and the economy was showing signs of robust growth, 
tighter labor markets and strong asset appreciation, rates were only gradually raised from 
mid-2004. 
By comparing the real fed funds rate, the move towards preemptive easing should become 
even clearer. In the early 1990s, real rates were gradually brought down to zero percent and 
briefly kept there. In contrast, in 2001 the real rate was brought down close to zero in less 
than a year, then kept there for around a year, before pushed even lower, into negative 
ground, where it was kept for more than two years. Which underlying beliefs led 
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policymakers to keep the federal funds rate—nominal and real—at such low levels for such a 
long time? 
It has been argued that beliefs were formed by lessons drawn from past monetary episodes as 
well as new understanding forming in response to contemporaneous challenges coming to 
policymakers’ attention throughout this period. 
Looking backwards, the defining monetary event that would shape postwar concerns with 
macroeconomic stabilization was the Great Contraction of 1929-1933—the initial years of the 
Great Depression in which the broader money supply as well as output and employment went 
through a rapid and severe contraction. The fear of deflation and depression gradually faded 
out of memory in the postwar era as policymakers were increasingly confronted with a 
contrary challenge, a surge in inflation leading to a protracted period of macroeconomic 
volatility, high unemployment and sluggish growth—the Great Inflation. Once inflation was 
contained, through unprecedented monetary tightening in the early 1980s and a further push 
towards “price stability” in the 1990s, the specter of deflation reemerged in the early 2000s.  
In the wake of a severe asset bust, U.S. inflation trended downwards. Simultaneously, a post-
crash Japanese economy was ailing from a mysterious malaise in which moderate deflation 
was associated with stagnant economic growth. Thus the events of the 1930s took on new 
meaning, now seen in the light of “Japanese disease,” a protracted economic slowdown with 
deflationary pressures that apparently could impact even a modern, industrial economy with 
developed macroeconomic policy levers in the hands of fiscal and monetary authorities. 
The preemption strategy seems to have resulted from the desire, or perceived need, to tackle 
what was increasingly seen as a wide range of threats that could upset the delicate balance of 
the Great Moderation and central bankers’ hard-earned reputation as stabilizers of inflation 
and output volatility. In other words, the reputational capital of the Fed was at risk. A 
depreciation of this capital would have much wider ramifications than any base pecuniary 
losses. According to prevailing doctrine, the public needed to believe in the ability of central 
bankers, in order for the economy to function as planned. In lack of a metallic base, such as 
was provided by the gold standard in the early years of the Fed, the “nominal anchor” for the 
price level and the public’s expectations of inflation now solely rested upon the credibility of 
the monetary authorities in stabilizing the purchasing power of the dollar or, to be more 
precise, the annual growth in consumer prices. The alternative could be prices and wages 
spinning out of control, as happened in the Great Inflation—a time monetary policy veered 
significantly off track and the authorities’ inflation-fighting credentials were at a low ebb.  
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Painful measures to rein in inflation had given results—monetary excesses and a volatile 
economy had given way to moderate and stable inflation as well as moderate output volatility. 
The consensus that emerged among central bankers and their intellectual supporters within 
academia greatly emphasized the desirability of price stability. Initially this was interpreted as 
a commitment to prevent inflation from trending upwards. With the deflation scare, a 
downside risk to inflation was added as well. 
In light of the economic imbalances that surfaced shortly after Greenspan’s departure as Fed 
chief—starting with an incipient housing crisis in 2006, turning into a credit crunch in the fall 
of 2007, and finally a full-scale financial crisis in the fall of 2008—several economists and 
commentators increasingly started to question central aspects of the formerly shared 
consensus. Journalists and legislators seemed to focus in on the much-maligned “Greenspan 
doctrine”—the set of beliefs holding that financial innovations during the Great Moderation 
were mainly a stabilizing force, strengthening the overall performance of the economy. 
Central banking researcher John B. Taylor drew a different conclusion, putting the blame 
squarely on FOMC decisions diverging from his own monetary policy rule. His main 
contention was that monetary policy had somehow veered “off track” during the first half of 
the 2000s, becoming less principled.331 Thus an important question is whether the shifts in 
policy focus and actions during the Greenspan years represent a move from more rule-bound 
authority to a larger degree of discretion, as the Taylor critique would suggest. In other words, 
did the conduct of monetary policy become more discretionary during Greenspan’s tenure? 
 
Preemption as Discretion 
Assessing different monetary strategies, one could perhaps make a distinction between three 
ways of conducting policy. The first could be called “putting out fires,” which seems to be a 
good description of policy practices in the 1970s and early 1980s. The monetary brakes were 
only applied once inflation seemed to spin out of control—when inflationary pressures were 
perceived as a more urgent matter than escalated unemployment rates. The second approach 
could be called “looking out the window.”332 Policy practices following such a strategy would 
be to tighten money whenever the real time inflation rate (or any other indicator the central 
bank is trying to target) exceeds the preferred level. Strict inflation targeting, as initially 
practiced in some industrial countries, could perhaps fit such a description.  
                                                      
331 John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, 
and Worsened the Financial Crisis, Hoover Institution Press, 2009 
332 Blinder suggests the labels “putting out fires” and “looking out the window” and includes a 
discussion of preemption, Central Banking, 1999, pp. 7-17 
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As recalled, Donald Kohn early on took issue with such an approach and stated the desire to 
allow flexibility in the conduct of policy when faced with certain contingencies.333 Thus the 
Fed chose a third approach, one that could be described as preemption. Such a strategy 
involves looking at a wide range of economic and financial indicators to get an idea of where 
the economy is headed and which potential threats could arise, then performing a balancing of 
risk, before moving to prevent such risks from materializing if they are seen as especially 
damaging to the economy. 
In the early 1990s, this approach was used to carefully assess signs of inflation expectations 
trending upwards. One indicator made use of was bond yields, which could reveal the 
public’s anticipations of future inflation as well as its beliefs on where the monetary policy 
rate was headed. On several occasions, the Fed attempted to manage these expectations by 
taking actions that would show its determined stance against letting inflationary forces re-
emerge. Thus, the inflation-fighting credentials of the central bank were believed to be 
gradually strengthened. 
In the late 1990s, a second motive appeared. Now policy aimed at preempting downside risks, 
as witnessed by the rate cuts in 1998. Once these risks were perceived to have subsided, 
policymaking turned to addressing the heated economic expansion through rate hikes in 1999-
2000. However, the response to clear signs of tight labor markets and strong growth seemed 
less determined than in 1994, and the tightening came somewhat belatedly. Moreover, the Fed 
decided not to lean against the strong asset price appreciation associated with the dotcom 
boom. 
By the early 2000s, the precautionary focus turned policymakers’ attention even more 
strongly to addressing downside risks, as the fight to combat inflation seemed finally to have 
been accomplished. In 2003, Governor Ben Bernanke noted that core inflation (measures of 
inflation that exclude the prices of food and energy components) had reached a level in the 
range of 1 to 2 percent per year, which was “probably the de facto equivalent of price 
stability.”334  
In the early Greenspan years, the natural rate framework was applied consistently in assessing 
the economy and deliberating upon policy. This framework was gradually revised, in light of 
new understandings of the economy. More attention was given to managing inflation 
expectations by interpreting economic and financial data. From the late 1990s, a wider set of 
                                                      
333 Donald L. Kohn, “Policy Targets and Operating Procedures in the 1990s,” Kansas City Fed 
Symposium, 1989, p. 137 
334 Ben S. Bernanke, “An Unwelcome Fall in Inflation?,” remarks before the Economics Roundtable, 
University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, July 23, 2003 
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concerns emerged, as a growing awareness of global developments, including disinflationary 
forces and potential financial disturbances from emerging markets, increasingly came to 
influence policymakers’ understandings. Thus the epistemic burden placed upon 
policymakers’ shoulders seems to have become increasingly heavy. The perceived need to 
contemplate a broader range of contingencies points to policy becoming more discretionary. 
In his opening remarks at the 2003 Jackson Hole symposium on “Monetary Policy and 
Uncertainty,” Greenspan outlined how the monetary authorities should address risks related to 
potential financial fallouts, concluding that a “cost-benefit analysis is an ongoing part of 
monetary policy decisionmaking, and tips more toward monetary ease when the fallout from a 
contractionary event […] seems increasingly likely and its occurrence seems especially 
costly.”335 He was specifically referring to actions taken to preempt the potential fallout from 
the Russian debacle in 1998. Likewise, in explaining the actions taken to contain the 
downside risk of deflation in 2003, he stated that “it is incumbent on a central bank to 
anticipate any contingency, however remote, if significant economic costs could be associated 
with that contingency.”336  
Comparing these statements to how the Fed defended its reluctance to ease in the early 1990s, 
when the economy was in fact experiencing the consequences of the fallout from a 
contractionary event, namely the S&L crisis and the balance sheet recession that followed, 
suggests important changes in policymakers’ understandings of the economy. In the early 
1990s, the FOMC was concerned with the need to “establish a basis for sustained growth.” 
Moreover, monetary ease was seen as inappropriate in dealing “with the very real 
imbalances” that “needed to be resolved before sustainable growth could resume.”337 
Such a view would lean more towards the perspectives proposed by BIS economists. In 
contrast, in the second half of the Greenspan era, monetary easing was increasingly seen as an 
appropriate remedy to contain financial fallout and the threat of post-crash contractionary 
forces, including the threat of “corrosive” deflation. The strategy, as described by Governor 
Bernanke in the opening quote of this chapter, was that a precautionary principle should be 
followed in addressing downside risks, especially the potential of deflationary pressures 
arising in the wake of a substantial asset bust. However, this precautionary principle was not 
applied in addressing imbalances on the upside, such as strong asset appreciation and rapidly 
increasing debt levels among firms and households during a boom. Thus the principle of 
                                                      
335 Alan Greenspan, “Opening remarks,” Kansas City Fed Symposium, 2003, pp. 4-5 
336 Alan Greenspan, “Statement,” Humphrey-Hawkins, 2003 (2), p. 49 
337 Alan Greenspan, “Statement,” Humphrey-Hawkins, 1993 (1) 
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preemptive tightening was not seen as appropriate to address strong asset price inflation and 
other signs of a heated economy unrelated to the natural rate framework.  
These beliefs point to a certain understanding of the economy seen from within the 
perspective of price stability. As briefly discussed in the introductory chapter, this model of 
the economy postulates a “neutral” or “natural” rate of interest, one that tends neither to push 
prices up nor down. Later this idea was revised within the context of “rational expectations.” 
If the public could form precise expectations of the growth in consumer prices, they would 
adjust their behavior accordingly so that no “real” effects pushed the economy away from the 
assumed natural rates of output and employment. However, what is missing from this 
conception of the economy are other forms of imbalances that can arise, related to inter-
temporal dis-equilibrium stemming from interest rates falling below the natural level, seen as 
the rate that equilibrate (voluntary) savings and investment. 
The monetary equilibrium approach, associated with this view of the interest rate, places 
much more weight on imbalances that arise when interest rates seize to play this important 
role. Specifically, money supply exceeding money demand will tend to add expansionary 
pressures, push down interest rates and change incentives among households, producers and 
investors—even when consumer price growth is stable. Productivity growth and global 
disinflationary forces, stemming from strong growth abroad, push down prices, thus keeping 
inflation in check. However, low interest rates will still affect other variables in the economy, 
giving rise to potential imbalances. Such concerns were not voiced among FOMC decision-
makers, adhering to the overarching price stability framework for understanding policy. 
The Greenspan FOMC thus put great weight on managing expectations and drawing upon the 
natural rate framework. However, once monetary policymakers perceived to finally have 
gotten a firm grip on inflation, priorities changed, addressing other threats. The formation of 
financial instability was seen as largely unrelated to monetary policy, other than that price 
stability could foster an environment encouraging speculation and in which risk was seen as 
less pronounced. 
Greenspan seemed to take a view of financial instability not far removed from Minsky, 
emphasizing how “good times” in periods of stable prices and moderate output volatility can 
set off destabilizing speculation in asset markets.338 However, his beliefs seem to lack 
                                                      
338 “As recent experience attests, a prolonged period of price stability does help to foster economic 
prosperity. But, as we have also observed over recent years, as have others in times past, such a benign 
economic environment can induce investors to take on more risk and drive asset prices to unsustainable 
levels.” Alan Greenspan, “Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook,” Testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, June 17, 1999 
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consistency in that he simultaneously put great faith in financial market participants’ ability to 
assess risk and perform sound valuation, encapsulated in the “Greenspan doctrine.” His 
understanding of the U.S. economy and the (potentially) stabilizing role of monetary policy 
could perhaps best be described as eclectic, in that his thinking seem to be torn between a 
Minsky view of financial market behavior, a Hayekian view of market knowledge and a Fed 
staff view of price stability, expectations and the “natural rate” framework. On top of this was 
a firm commitment to look at the facts, going through vast amounts of data and be willing to 
revise formerly held beliefs in the face of new evidence. As such, Greenspan’s empiricism 
and ongoing learning process, trying to understand the transformational forces observed in the 
global economy in an “age of turbulence” played an important part in forming the evolving 
U.S. doctrines and practices of the Great Moderation. 
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